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THE BAMBERG RIDER

By Otto Georg von Simson
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The strange and beautiful monument of a rider, placed in the eastern choir of Bamberg Cathedral (Plate I), was executed in the first half of the thirteenth century. The consecration of the Cathedral took place in 1237, and it is almost certain that by that date the plastic decoration as it exists today was finished. In the same year Bishop Eckbert von Andechs died; it was he who had built the Cathedral anew, cherishing the ambition to equal the Cathedral of Rheims—at least by the beauty of the many sculptured figures that were to adorn the porches of the transept. Unfortunately this project was abandoned after Eckbert's death.[1] Those sculptures that had already been finished were transferred to the interior of the church. The Rider was placed at the entrance of the eastern choir, and it has been suggested that it was the sculptor himself who selected this beautiful place for his greatest work. If he did, it must have been his last achievement at Bamberg, for when he was forced to abandon the work with which Bishop Eckbert had charged him he apparently left Bamberg and vanished from historical record altogether. All we know about him is that he must have seen Rheims where he possibly worked as a young man, for his work shows influences of the French monument. No other works by him are known, and we are left in doubt concerning many problems connected with it, notably the true significance of his Rider.

In the thirteenth century this figure is quite unusual in the program of cathedral sculpture, and none of the names given to it hitherto seems to be appropriate. It was believed for a long time that the Rider represented some historical personage, and the theory most generally accepted today is that it is an image of St. Stephen, King of Hungary.[2] This attribution, however, is based entirely on his-

1. J. J. Morper, in *Pantheon* (1937), Vol. XVIII, pp. 18 ff.

2. Cf. *ibid.* and G. Schreiber, *Stephan I der Heilige* (Paderborn, 1938), and *Stephan I in der deutschen Sakralkultur* (Budapest, 1938), Bibliography. The argument in favor of Stephen puts considerable emphasis on an eighteenth century local tradition calling the Bamberg Rider St. Stephen. The French Revolutionists who destroyed the sculptured kings of the Old Testament on the Cathedral of Paris were equally convinced that those figures represented the kings of France.

torical considerations which can not possibly be relevant if we recall the nature of art in the Middle Ages. The *typism* of medieval art consists in its use of symbols for the expression of theological conceptions—a fact which has prevented the portrait, in the modern sense of that word, from finding its way into the monumental art of the Middle Ages. On the other hand, it seems almost certain that the Bamberg Rider does not represent any of those holy personages which have been suggested. Neither St. George, nor St. Stephen of Hungary, nor one of the Three Magi, have been depicted that way in Christian iconography so conservative throughout the Middle Ages.[3] No doubt the Bishop, who in those days not only appointed the artist but also told him what symbolic figures he should represent, had some special idea which he wanted to have expressed by the Rider. Therefore the problem of the figure's identity resolves itself into three questions: where else has medieval art conceived the symbol of the rider? what was its meaning? why was it used on the Bamberg Cathedral?

The Bamberg Rider, though unique in its beauty and individual conception, is iconographically not without predecessors. There exist a number of sculptured riders in the southwest of France executed in the twelfth century, and generally placed in a niche of the church façade, which fact shows that they must have had some religious meaning.[4] The identity of these sculptures seems to be fairly well established; out of a total number of twenty-five, some of them still visible today, eight riders are mentioned in medieval chronicles, where they are described as effigies of Constantine.[5] If one considers the extraordinary role which this emperor, saint of the Eastern Church,

3. The very conception of the Bamberg Rider excludes the possibility of conceiving him as part of a group like the Three Magi. We have no satisfactory description of the three sculptured riders on the outside of the *Reiterhäuschen* attached to the eastern choir of Bamberg Cathedral, which has now disappeared. In the early nineteenth century, these riders were described as Emperor Henry II, the Duke of Meran, and Bishop Eckbert of Bamberg, because of the coats of arms appearing above them. According to O. Hartig (*Bamberger Blätter für fränkische Kunst und Geschichte* [1936], Nos. 7-9), these riders cannot, apparently, be linked with Christian iconography, nor with the monument here under discussion.

4. A. Kingsley Porter, *Romanesque Sculpture of the Pilgrimage Roads* (Boston, 1923), Index, s.v. Constantine; L. Bréhier, *L'Art chrétien* (Paris, 1918), p. 261.

5. Cf. Abbé Arbellot, *Mémoires sur les statues équestres de Constantin* (Limoges, 1885); I. L. M. Noguès, *La Question des cavaliers au portail des églises de l'Ouest* (Congrès d'archéologie de France, 1894), p. 233: Bréhier, *loc. cit.*

played in the theological and popular imagination of the Middle Ages, this would indeed seem to be the correct identification.[6]

Constantine had been the first Roman emperor to become a Christian, yet he related the new religion, and even Christ, to his own person much as the late Roman emperors had identified themselves with certain pagan deities of the East. The Hellenistic emperor-mysticism which the Roman emperors had adopted, and its cosmic and especially solar symbols, were not altogether abolished by Constantine when he became the first Christian ruler. By adapting them to his own person he secularized them, so to speak, thus creating that cult of the Christian emperor which, with its secret allusions both to the Christian god and to the ancient sun-like rulers of the East, survived throughout the Middle Ages. Wherever Constantine's name was mentioned in those times, and wherever his image appeared, it evoked those strange ideas. People were not aware, at that time, that the Emperor's attitude towards Christendom had, in many respects, been an ambiguous one. It may have been this attitude, however, which stimulated imagination from the very beginning, leaving curious traces in the art of the time. In many cases it is still doubtful whether representations of Constantinian art are to be interpreted in a truly Christian, or in a pagan sense. One biblical scene represented many times in Constantinian art is the death of Pharaoh and the Egyptians in the Red Sea. The defeat of Maxentius by the Emperor in the Battle Near the Milvian Bridge, which ended in the drowning of the former, had immediately been compared to that Biblical event.[7] Constantine himself has so often been called a second Moses, that it seems only natural that the artists of the fourth century should have taken up the same comparison, and that, by depicting the biblical event, they should have glorified the historical one, thus using re-

6. In his *Gemma Animae*, Honorius Augustodunensis explains the Introitus of the masses of the sixth Sunday after Pentecost, and the five following Sundays, as alluding to the deeds of Solomon *sub lege*, and to those of Constantine *sub gratia*. (Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, Vol. 172, 709 ff.) This comparison of the Emperor with Solomon, in the eyes of the Middle Ages, not only the perfect ruler, but also the antitype of Christ himself, is very remarkable.

7. That comparison seems to have been no invention of Eusebius; Gelasius Cyzicen relates that the people of Rome praised the Battle Near the Milvian Bridge with the words of Exod. 15:1 and 11, *Actorum Conc. Nic. Comment.* (Migne, *Patr. Lat.* Vol. 85, 1205). On the representation of that biblical scene in Constantinian art, and its possible allusion to the Emperor as the "Second Moses," cf. E. Becker, in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* (1910); J. Lassus, in *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire* (1929), Vol. 46, pp. 159 ff.; N. H. Baynes, *Constantine the Great* (London, 1931).

ligious images for the apotheosis of the Emperor. This allegory would almost seem too *baroque* did it not remind us so much of the art of Imperial Rome, with its mythological allusions to the emperor.

It is precisely to such a Constantinian metamorphosis that the rider owes its transformation from a pagan symbol into a Christian one. Equestrian statues of the emperor were very frequent in Rome. A gilded rider monument had already been erected to Sulla, and Julius Caesar received the same honor,[8] which later became almost a custom with the Roman emperors. Thus it was well within the bounds of tradition that Constantine too should have had his equestrian statue erected in the Forum Romanum, where it was still to be seen in the ninth century.[9] Moreover, Constantine seems to have had a predilection for the horse. It appears on almost every scene commemorating his conquests, and the scene which depicts the Battle of Susa on the Arch of Constantine shows a horse without a rider isolated from the rest of the episode, and emphasized in such a way that we are induced to understand it symbolically.[10]

The symbolic and mythological meaning of the horse has been well established. In the mythology of nearly all races the horse is an image of the sun.[11] In the later Sanskrit, one and the same word is used for *horse* and *sun*.[12] The Indian myth tells us that Kalki, Vishnu's last avatar, will appear on the last day in the form of a white horse.[13] But Kalki is also a rider who, with the unmistakable features of a solar deity, and in strange resemblance to the Rider of

8. H. A. Grueber, *Coins of the Roman Republic in the British Museum* (London, 1910), pl. 110, 11.

9. Cf. H. Jordan, *Topographie der Stadt Rom* (Berlin, 1885), Vol. 1, 2, pp. 187 ff.; Platner and Ashby, *A Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome* (London, 1929), p. 201.

10. Cf. J. Wilpert, in *Bulletino della commissione archeologica communale di Roma* (1922), Vol. 50, p. 41. A curious reminiscence of this iconography occurs on one of the late Romanesque capitals in the cloisters of St. Trophîme at Arles. The solitary horse opposite the scene of Constantine's triumph is Roman, not only in style, but also in its symbolism. Cf. note 77, p. 275.

11. For sun horses in the mythology of India, see E. Abegg, *Der Messiasglaube in Indien und Iran* (Berlin, 1928), pp. 44 f. and passim; of Persia, K. Rapp, in *Zeitschrift der morgenländischen Gesellschaft* (1865), p. 71; of the early Germans, W. Mannhardt, *Antike Wald- und Feldkulte* (Berlin, 1877), p. 203; I. von Negelein, *Das Pferd im arischen Altertum* (Königsberg, 1903), pp. 35 ff.

12. Max Müller, *Essays* (Leipzig, 1869), pp. 119 f. On the horse in the mythology of the Greek and German languages, cf. M. Jähns, *Ross und Reiter* (Leipzig, 1872), Vol. 1, pp. 250 ff.; W. H. Roscher, *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie*, s.v. Helios.

13. Abegg, *op. cit.*, pp. 55 f.

the Apocalypse, will conquer Evil and rule the world. This example proves the general rule that, in mythology, a god riding an animal is that animal itself.[14] Both the Persians and the early Germans worshiped the sun in the shape of a horse, and Helios standing in his chariot is probably not the original image of the Greek sun god—in fact, representations exist showing him on horseback (Plate II. Fig. 1).[15] The Romans also seem to have regarded the horse as an image of the sun. As early as the fifth century B.C., the *Aes signatum* shows a winged horse, the meaning of which has been clarified for us by coins of the Emperor Galienus, where the same representation bears the inscription *Soli Conservatori Augusti.*[16]

Here we have the reason why the Roman emperors liked to have themselves represented as riders: the emperor cult had become more and more blended with that of *Sol Invictus,* the emperor thus appearing as an incarnation of the Unconquered Sun.[17] It was precisely the horse which made this idea clear to the people of those days; even the horse races in which the emperor took part had the same significance. At a very early date they had been performed in honor of the sun god Apollo, and that they kept their mythological meaning even in Christian times, is stated both by Tertullian and Cassiodorus, the latter interpreting each detail of the races as a solar symbol.[18] When the emperor took part in these races or had himself repre-

14. *Ibid.*, p. 48, n. 3.

15. E. Gerhard, *Ueber Lichtgottheiten auf Kunstdenkmälern* (Berlin, 1840), pl. 4, 1. The mirror is from the museum of the Collegio Romano, Rome. Cf. the curious oath imposed on Moslem converts, who had to give up περὶ τοῦ Ἡλίου καὶ τῆς Ελήνης λέγων αὐτοὺς καβαλλαρίους εἶναι. F. Cumont, *Etudes syriennes* (Paris, 1917), pp. 92 f.

16. *Aes signatum* reprod., Grueber, *op. cit.*, pl. 4, 35. Cf. P. Strack's cautious interpretation of the winged horse as a "symbol of victory," *Untersuchungen zur römischen Reichsprägung* (Stuttgart, 1931), Vol. II, pp. 120 f.

17. The crowned rider on the relief from Corbridge has been called Helios by S. Reinach, *Répertoire de reliefs grecs et romains* (Paris, 1912), Vol. II, 448, 5; cf. *Revue archéologique* (1909), Vol. II, p. 468. Cumont (*loc. cit.*) is more inclined to interpret it as a Roman emperor. L. Malten, in "Das Pferd im Totenglauben," *Archäologisches Jahrbuch* (1914), has interpreted the horse in Greek mythology solely as the chthonic, sinister symbol of the death ceremonies. The role which the horse plays in the funeral cults of almost all races is interesting enough; however, the early peoples, who saw death and resurrection so closely united in nature, often used the same symbol for both.

18. "Ut quasi per duodecim signa disgrediens annus integer signaretur . . . septem metis certamen omne peragitur, in similitudinem hebdomadis reciprocae. Ipsae vero metae secundum zodiacos decanos ternas obtinent summitates, quas ad instar solis quadrigae celeres pervagantur. Rotae Orientis et Occidentis terminos designant" Cassiodorus, *Var.* lib. 3, 56 (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, Vol. 69, 605 f.). Cf. Tertullian, *De spect.*, cap. 8 (*ibid.*, Vol. 1, 639).

sented standing on his quadriga, it became so impressive a symbol for his cosmic triumph that it was still remembered in an era that had long since forgotten the mythological meaning of the quadriga and its driver.[19] As late as the sixth century there were horse races in Constantinople arranged in honor of the emperor; the day on which they took place was the twenty-fifth of December, the birthday of the Unconquered Sun.[20] Two centuries later, when the Iconoclasts, by abolishing the representations of sacred subjects, created that method of symbolic allusions so important for medieval art, these imperial horse races were still frequently depicted.[21] A curious example is offered by the early eleventh century frescoes adorning the staircase of St. Sophia at Kiev. Here we find not only horse races, but all the different performances of a circus, with the imperial family looking on—a representation that seems, at first, to have no symbolic significance at all. The composition of this scene, however, with the Emperor in the upper zone and the games in the lower, closely resembles the relief on the base of the Emperor Theodosius' obelisk at Constantinople, which was executed about 400 A.D. The relief shows the circus games with the similar interest in the different scenes, but there can be no doubt as to the significance of the whole: the monument was erected in honor of the emperor, and the circus games were apparently the most impressive image of his triumph.

It has been pointed out that this iconography of the imperial art has inspired another group of monuments, the so-called consular diptychs, where scenes from the circus are frequently represented below the image of the consul; here again the games are symbols of triumph, the horse races with their mythological significance being the most important. To return to the frescoes at Kiev, it seems unlikely that a circus should have been depicted at such a place unless it were to symbolize an idea well in accordance with the Christian spirit, i.e., the emperor's cosmic power.[22] It was the image of the sun god on his chariot which, also in the West, became a symbol of the Christian emperor, as can be seen in an early twelfth century miniature from

19. On the cosmic significance of the Roman circus games and the emperor's part in them, cf. A. Piganiol, *Recherches sur les jeux Romains* (Strassburg, 1923), pp. 123 ff.

20. H. Usener "Sol Invictus," *Rheinisches Museum* (1905), N.F., Vol. 60, pp. 470 ff.

21. Cf. *Vita St. Stephani junioris* (Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, Vol. 100, 1119).

22. A. Grabar, *L'Empereur dans l'art byzantin* (Paris, 1936), pp. 71 ff.

the Chronicle of Santa Sophia depicting the Emperor Otto II as a Christian Helios.[23]

The rider monument exists in two principle types in late Roman art. The one of which the statue of Marcus Aurelius is the most famous example shows the emperor, seated quietly on his horse, lifting his right hand in the old Roman gesture of allocution.[24] This, however, was also the gesture of benediction of the sun god, and it has been pointed out recently that, in the representation of the emperor, it was this mythological meaning that had come more and more to replace the idea of allocution.[25] Still more obvious is the solar symbolism in the second type of rider monument, examples of which have been found both on the eastern and the northwestern borders of the Roman Empire.[26] It shows the rider piercing a triton-like monster with a lance or some other weapon. There can be no doubt that these riders, too, are images of the Roman emperor. The mythological and iconographic source of this representation is very old; the famous legend of Bellerophon who, riding on the winged horse Pegasus, fought the chimera has many parallels in mythology. The meaning of this myth is certainly connected with the sun: the battle of light against darkness, and the sun's victory renewed every spring and each morning.[27] What is interesting for us in this myth is the important role which the horse plays. As Plutarch tells us, it even penetrated the Egyptian legend of the sun god Horus' fight with Typhon.[28] The idea

23. Cod. Vat. Lat., 5939. Cf. L. Olschki, in *Bibliofilia* (1934), Vol. 36, pp. 213 f.

24. Already Sulla's rider monument (erected B.C. 82) had depicted the dictator with this gesture. Cf. note 8, p. 260.

25. Cf. C. Sittl, *Gebärden der Griechen und Römer* (1890), pp. 303 f.; A. Alföldi, "Insignien und Tracht der Römischen Kaiser," *Römische Mitteilungen* (1935), p. 107. Regarding the same gesture of Sol on coins with the inscription, *Soli Invicti Comiti*, Cumont says: "Il élève le bras droit, montrant, en signe de protection, la paume de la main ouverte." *Textes et monuments relatifs aux mystères de Mithra* (Bruxelles, 1899), Vol. I, p. 123.

26. Notably in Arabia, and in Germany and France. Cf. E. Maass, *Die Tagesgötter* (Berlin, 1902), pp. 180 ff. J. Strzygowski, "Hellenistische und koptische Kunst in Alexandria," *Bulletin de la société archéologique d'Alexandrie* (Vienna, 1902), p. 27.

27. On the name Bellerophon as meaning "He who kills Darkness," cf. Müller, *op. cit.*, pp. 153 ff. On the closely related myth of Perseus, whom Herodotus calls ἱππότα, *cf.* Roscher, *loc. cit.* King Polydektes asks Perseus to conquer the Medusa only after having refused the latter's present of a horse. Cf. Malten, *op. cit.*, fig. 3, 4, 6. The Kilikian Perseus was represented as a dragon-killer on horseback. Cf. H. Böhlig, *Geisteskultur von Tarsos* (Göttingen, 1913), p. 61.

28. Before his fight against Typhon, Horus asks his father, Osiris, for a horse. Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*, cap. 19; *Moralia* (ed. Wyttenbach. Oxford, 1796), Vol. II, pp. 468 f. On rider gods of the Greco-Roman period of Egypt, notably Ἥρων, a

of a riding sun god fighting the evil spirit of darkness with a lance (this weapon being another solar symbol) probably originated in Iran, where the victory of the Persian sun god Ormuzd over Ahriman was represented in the same fashion.[29]

By adopting this representation, Roman art had not even to invent the identification of the sun god with the emperor; Sassanian art had anticipated it in those monumental rock carvings where the Persian ruler was pictured on horseback with the conquered enemy under his horse, just like the sun god who was represented opposite him.[30] No doubt the Roman rider monument deliberately used this iconography in order to express, by the eastern symbol, that cosmic idea of kingship which had also become the Roman one. This is also proved by the strange fact that several rider monuments of this type have been discovered in Germany and France near the sanctuaries of that other Persian sun god Mithras, who was very often depicted as a huntsman on horseback. That the emperor was represented like the god whose cult enjoyed an ever growing popularity in those days was certainly a powerful demonstration of his cosmic might. «Par une conséquence lointaine et inattendue» says Cumont, «l'antique légende iranienne de la lutte d'Ormuzd et d'Ahriman a contribué à former les conceptions monarchiques des Romains.»[31]

The two types of the antique rider monument, that of Marcus Aurelius and that of the giant-killer, can not strictly be separated, since there was a conquered enemy lying under Marcus Aurelius' horse originally.[32] The representations of the "hunting" emperor, on the other hand, since about the time of Caracalla show, a clear tendency to replace the scene of the emperor's actual fight against an enemy or a wild beast by that of his completed victory, with the dead opponent lying under his horse.[33] The hieratic symbol of cosmic tri-

close relative of Horus, cf. P. Perdrizet, *Negotium perambulans in tenebris* (Strassburg, 1922), p. 8; and Cumont, "Un dieu supposé syrien, associé à Hérôn en Egypte," *Mélanges syriens offerts à. R. Dussaud* (Paris, 1937).

29. Cf. notably the studies of J. Strzygowski, *Orient oder Rom* (Leipzig, 1901), and *Baukunst der Armenier* (Vienna, 1918), pp. 631 ff.

30. Cf. E. Herzfeld, *Am Tor von Asien* (Berlin, 1920), p. 63, and F. Sarre, *L'Art de la Perse ancienne* (Paris, n.d.), pl. 70, 78.

31. Cumont, *Mon. myst. de Mithra*, p. 158. The figure of Mithras on horseback was well known in the East. Cf. M. Rostovtzeff, in *Römische Mitteilungen* (1934), p. 192.

32. *Mirabilia Romae*, ed. Parthey (Berlin, 1869), cap. 39.

33. Grabar, *op. cit.*, pp. 141 ff. This development towards a more hieratic symbol of triumph is also evident in the representations of the emperor participating in the circus races.

umph has thus taken the place of its mythological description—but the original meaning of a now almost ceremonial representation seems never to have been forgotten.[34] The equestrian statue of Theodoric at Ravenna, which Charlemagne had brought to Aachen, where it was placed before his palace, as a symbol of imperial might, depicted the ruler as a rider with a lance. A second figure, by Walafrid Strabo described as nude, may have closely resembled those *tritons* on the earlier Roman monuments.[35] Why and how the ancient mythological image was to survive in Christian times will have to be considered now.

The transformation of the pagan symbol into a Christian one certainly took place under Constantine. On coins and other works of art he had himself represented as a rider with the conquered enemy under his horse, and, as Eusebius tells us, there even existed a representation depicting the emperor's enemy Maxentius as a dragon under his feet.[36] At first sight, this seems to be well in line with the emperor's general tendency to "secularize" the cults of pagan deities by transforming them into one of his own person. Near Constantinople there was the sanctuary of a dragon-killing god on horseback whose cult could now adopt a more Christian meaning.[37] To have the Battle Near the Milvian Bridge depicted as the cosmic triumph of Christianity

34. I cannot deal in this article with the equally "solar" meaning of those imperial hunting scenes. Cf. Grabar, *ibid.* The Middle Ages seem also to have remembered the symbolic meaning of hunting, which would explain the curious tympanon at Parthenay-le-Vieux, showing Constantine hunting. Cf. J. Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsaltertumer* (Leipzig, 1828), pp. 255 ff.

35. The lengthy discussion between H. Grimm, in *Das Reiterstandbild Theoderichs* (Berlin, 1869) and G. Dehio, in *Zahns Jahrbuch für Kunstwissenschaft* (1872) about the equestrian statue which Walafrid Strabo saw at Aachen was definitely brought to a conclusion by W. Schmidt, in *Zahns Jahrbuch* (1873). The monument which Charlemagne had brought to his capital was identical with that of Theodoric at Ravenna, as described by Agnellus (Muratori, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores* [1723] Vol. II, p. 123). According to Walafrid (*Monumenta Germaniae Poetae Lat.*, Vol. II, p. 370), the rider held a lance and was accompanied by a nude figure, perhaps a Triton like those on Roman monuments.

36. At the entrance of the imperial palace at Constantinople (Eusebius, *Vita Constantini*, 3, cap. 3). This allegorical generalization of the historical victory was not forgotten during the Middle Ages. In the famous Gregory Codex 510, in Paris, the same event is represented by the isolated figure of Constantine on horseback, piercing Maxentius with a lance—a representation strangely reminiscent of the Roman giant-killers. The Romanesque fresco in the Baptistry of St. Jean at Poitiers describes the conquered enemy under Constantine's horse simply as "Heresy."

37. P. Perdrizet, *Cultes et mythes du Pangée* (Nancy, 1910). According to Suidas, the "palace" of the "hero" (whom he calls Στρατηγὸς τῶν Βυζαντίνων) stood on the spot where, under Justinian, the church of another rider saint, St. Theodore, was erected.

over Evil was of great advantage for Constantine's political designs. This iconography became frequent under Constantine's Christian successors to the imperial title, and the *Diptych Barberini* (Plate II. Fig. 2) is a well-known example of this curious blending of a pagan symbol with Christian elements. But on the other hand, this "metamorphosis" had a curious effect on Christian imagination, which is expressed not only in art, but even in hagiography. The dragon-killer on horseback is strangely suggestive of the Christian St. George, who is depicted in exactly the same way. It has been thought for some time that both the representation of the Saint on horseback and the episode of his fight with the dragon were conceptions of a rather late period. Since no representations of that scene apparently existed before the twelfth century, the suggestion was made that it was only a poetical invention, and that it was under the influence of the famous *Legenda Aurea* that, in the thirteenth century, such representations spread rapidly over Europe. Why it became so famous at that time will be explained later, but it seems certain today that it was then already an old and well-known subject of Christian art, and that it was not literature that communicated it to art, but rather the other way round.[38]

First of all, the theory that none of the early Eastern (especially Coptic) representations of rider saints could be St. George has been disproved. In Cappadocia images of a riding saint killing a dragon have been discovered, bearing the inscription, St. George, and dating from the tenth century.[39] More interesting still is the fact that the story of his fight with the dragon seems to have existed already in the eighth century, and that St. George mounted on a white horse appears even in the legends of the fifth century, that is, soon after the Constantinian era.[40] And yet no trace of either horse or dragon is to be found in the original legend of the Saint. If we ask why the old image of a riding dragon-killer, which we know to be a solar symbol, was introduced into the Christian legend, the answer sounds amazingly logical. St. George himself bears many unmistakable traces of a solar hero, and it was by those attributes that this fact was stressed

38. Cf. H. Aufhauser, *Das Drachenwunder* (Leipzig, 1911), p. 242.

39. G. de Jerphanion, *Les Églises rupestres de Cappadoce* (Paris, 1925), Vol. II, p. 323, pl. 187, 2.

40. Aufhauser, *op. cit.*, p. 237, and *Miracula S. Georgii* (ed. Aufhauser. Leipzig, 1913), pp. 44 ff.; E. A. W. Budge, *George of Lydda* (London, 1930), p. 268.

in a time which found its way, not without difficulty, from the pagan to the Christian religion. In fact, the figure of St. George has been related by the historians of mythology to almost every solar deity, Horus, Perseus, Marduk; and Cumont has proved lately that there are strange resemblances between some legends of St. George and Mithraic mythology.[41] In the last days of paganism the cult of the sun had overshadowed all other religions and their gods, and the solar nature of St. George may have been the reason why he enjoyed an almost incredible worship in the East.[42] (So many pagan or semi-pagan legends sprang up about him that, already in the fifth century, Pope Gelasius had to forbid their being read in the churches.[43]) For the same reason Christian art was apparently induced to represent the Saint like one of those solar rider gods. In some cases their idols were worshiped as images of St. George,[44] and the transition from the Egyptian Horus to the Christian saint is obvious in a number of Coptic representations (Plate III. Fig. 1).[45] The transformation of the Greek rider Bellerophon into the rider saint has likewise been proved by Professor Lehmann-Hartleben.[46]

At the same time, however, it seems as though St. George had become mingled, by the contemporaries of Constantine, with the personality of the emperor himself. This is made comprehensible if one considers that both the emperor and the saint claimed the same heritage of the sun god for themselves. Was it, perhaps, this semi-pagan character of St. George that made him the favorite saint, not only

41. Ch. Clermont-Ganneau, "Horus et S. George," *Revue archéologique* (1876), Vol. 32; F. Cumont, "St. George and Mithra the 'cattle-thief,'" *Journal of Roman Studies* (1937), Vol. 27.

42. Cf. Clermont-Ganneau, *op. cit.*, and K. Künstle, *Ikonographie der Heiligen* (Freiburg, 1926), p. 263.

43. Cf. Budge, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

44. On the identity of the Thracian rider god and St. George, especially in Bulgaria, where an antique relief showing the former was worshipped as an *ikone* of the latter, cf. Cumont, "St. George and Mithra," Bibliography.

45. The famous relief in the Louvre showing a rider with a falcon's head killing a crocodile, has first been described by Clermont-Ganneau, *op. cit.* Its identity, however, is doubtful. Another Coptic relief, in the museum at Cairo, shows a Christian rider saint killing a dragon, but above the saint's head there appears the Apis-bull, with the sun between its horns, W. E. Crum, *Catalogue générale des antiquités égyptiennes du Musée de Caire* (Cairo, 1902), no. 8682. The sacrifice of a falcon, the sacred bird of Horus, to St. George is mentioned in papyri of the sixth and seventh centuries. Cf. G. Ebers, *Sinnbildliches* (Leipzig, 1892), p. 24.

46. "Bellerophon und der Reiterheilige," *Römische Mitteilungen* (1923-24), p. 279. For the similar transformation of the Dioscuri into Christian saints, see H. Grégoire, *Saints jumeaux et dieux cavaliers* (Paris, 1905).

of Eastern Christendom but of Constantine himself? The Emperor expressed his special veneration for St. George by establishing his cult in both Palestine and Constantinople.[47] On the other hand, we have already pointed to Constantine's custom of diverting the cults of the pagan gods, and also of Moses and even Christ himself, to his own glorification. Thus it would seem quite likely that the Emperor wished to compare himself with St. George, and that it was he who inspired the representation showing the Saint on horseback fighting the dragon. There are several proofs for this theory: first, that since Constantine Christian iconography has mingled the Emperor and the Saint in such a way that it is sometimes almost impossible to find out which is actually depicted. A Coptic representation of a crowned man piercing a dragon with a lance is described as an image of St. George, but in the Saint's church at Lydda it was the Emperor who was depicted in exactly the same fashion.[48] Thus if, in the seventh century, St. Arculf mentions a "statue of St. George" in this place we are left in doubt whether the pious pilgrim has not mistaken an effigy of Constantine for one of the Saint.[49] Secondly, there seems to be no doubt that the image of the riding St. George piercing a dragon has been influenced by those representations of the emperor already mentioned. According to Strzygowski,[50] the Coptic representations of a crowned saint on horseback fighting a dragon with a lance are one and all derived from an emperor image of the type of the Barberini diptych. The Coptic relief on the pulpit at Aachen Cathedral shows how closely the representations of the rider saint and of the emperor resembled each other at that time. It is even possible that the whole legend of St. George's fight with the dragon may be the hagiographical interpretation of those equestrian monuments.[51]

This excursion into the legend of St. George is intended to prove that two monumental images of the rider which Christian art knew,

47. *Acta Sanctorum*, April, Vol. III, p. 109.

48. Cf. Budge, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

49. *De locis sanctis* (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, Vol. 88, 810).

50. Besides those of his works already mentioned, see also "Der koptische Reiterheilige und der heilige Georg," *Zeitschrift für aegyptische Sprache* (1902); "Christliche Denkmäler Aegyptens," *Römische Quartalschrift* (1898); *Koptische Kunst: Catalogue générale des antiquités du Musée de Caire* (Vienna, 1904).

51. The inspiration of legends by works of art is frequent during the Middle Ages. Before their battle for Christendom, the rider saints Procopius and Mercurius have a vision resembling strangely that of Constantine before the defeat of Maxentius. See H. Delehaye, *Les Légendes grecques des saints militaires* (Paris, 1909), pp. 83, 93.

the emperor and the saint, not only had the same mythological source, but were also to express the same idea. How well this—mythological—meaning was remembered during the Middle Ages will be discussed now.

At Constantinople rider monuments were also erected to Constantine's successors. Curiously enough, though they were meant to represent *Christian* emperors they were full of the old solar attributes. The equestrian statue of Justinian showed the emperor wearing a crown of peacock feathers and a coat decorated with stars (Plate III. Fig. 2).[52] This cosmic decoration, according to the legend, had already adorned the coat of the Babylonian sun god and king, Marduk.[53] The peacock is a symbol of the emperor the solar origin of which can still be recognized by the allegorical interpretation which the early Christians gave to that bird.[54] Significant, too, is the gesture of Justinian: as we have seen, the lifting of the right hand was the gesture of the sun god; it was precisely this gesture which reminded later times of the solar significance of the rider monument. The equestrian statue of Theodosius at Constantinople was actually praised by a chronicler as an image of the rising sun.[55] Apparently it is this monument, the final destruction of which is not recorded until the twelfth century, to which a source of this time refers. In his description of the statue

52. A. D. Mordtmann, "Esquisse topographique de Constantinople," *Revue de l'art chrétienne* (1891), Vol. IX, p. 471; Th. Reinach, in *Revue des études grecques* (1892), Vol. IX, pp. 82 ff. The statue was erected A.D. 542 or 543. Reinach dates the drawing by Nymphirius ca. 1420. The most important descriptions of the monument are those of Procopius and Georgius Pachymeres. See F. W. Unger, "Quellen der byzantinischen Kunstgeschichte," in *Quellenschriften zur Kunstgeschichte* (1878), Vol. XII, pp. 137 ff.

53. On its symbolic meaning, cf. R. Eisler, *Weltenmantel und Himmelszelt* (Munich, 1910); F. Kampers, *Vom Werdegang der Kaisermystik* (Leipzig, 1924), pp. 69 ff. But this "cosmic coat" was also part of the insignia of the medieval emperors. Cf. the *Mantum S. Henrici cum descriptione totius orbis*, in the treasure of Bamberg Cathedral; Fr. Bock, *Die Kleinodien des Hl. römischen Reiches* (Vienna, 1864), pl. 41. Regarding the problem of the medieval insignia, see below.

54. Cf. F. Cabrol, *Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne* (Paris, 1907), s.v. Paon; F. X. Kraus, Realenzyklopädie des christlichen Altertums (Freiburg, 1886), s.v. Pfau; H. Lothar, in *Studien über christliche Denkmäler*, N. F. Vol. 18. The crown of peacock feathers, since Constantine, has been a symbol of the emperor (Cf. J. Burckhardt, *Zeitalter Konstantins*. [Gesamtausgabe, 1929] pp. 222 f.), the ceremonial importance of which Constantinus Porphyrogenetus mentions. Tzetzes, who says that the *toupha* originated in Persia (*Chil.* VIII, 305) is probably right. Cf. Philostratus' significant comparison ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ ῥόνου στικτός οἷον ταῶς (*Eikones*, II, cap. 32). As regards this crown as an insigne of the medieval emperors, see K. Burdach, *Vom Mittelalter zur Reformation* (Berlin, 1913-28), Vol. II, 1, 428.

55. F. W. Unger, "Ueber die vier Kolossalsäulen in Konstantinopel," *Repertorium für Kunstwissenschaft* (1879), Vol. II.

whose real meaning he does not know, the writer gives two different interpretations which are both connected with solar mythology. He says that some people think the rider is Bellerophon riding on Pegasus; others are reminded of Joshua, who by lifting his right hand commands the sun to stand still.[56] Apparently it was this allusion to Joshua which kept the remembrance of the solar meaning of the rider image alive throughout the Middle Ages.

An equestrian statue of the same type as those at Constantinople was a kind of national shrine in the city of Pavia until its destruction by the French soldiers in 1796. The name of this statue was *regisole* (sun ruler), and even the early nineteenth century guidebook of Pavia can give no other explanation for this name than that the uneducated people of the Middle Ages had taken the rider for Joshua.[57] The symbolic significance of that one impressive gesture was still understood long after the Roman cult of the sun had been forgotten. This fact is proved by another even more interesting example. In the apocryphal Gospel of St. Bartholomew, it is Christ who, by stretching out his right hand each morning, commands the sun to rise.[58] This passage demonstrates the attempt to abolish the heretical identification of the sun with Christ and yet to reconcile Christendom with sun worship which had been its most powerful enemy. This task was carried out in part by adapting the pagan symbols to Christian imagination. The comparison of the Savior with the sun occurs on many Christian monuments,[59] and it is precisely the image of the rider under which the sun was to survive as a Christian symbol. The early Christians, transforming the Roman symbol of triumph, depicted the horse in the catacombs as an image of the resurrection of the Christian soul.[60] Moreover, the Nordic peoples conceived their sun god Baldr as a rider also, and we have curious evidence for the transformation

56. *Idem, Quellenschriften* (1878) Vol. XII, p. 168.

57. C. M. Sannazaro, *Guida di Pavia* (1819), p. 83. The Regisole belonged to the iconographical type of the Marcus Aurelius. Cf. the woodcut of 1505 reproduced by Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

58. "Je viens à vous au temps de la lumière, au moment où j'ai coutume d'étendre ma droite divine pour que le soleil brille sur la terre." R. Graffin-Nau, *Patrologia Orientalis* (Paris, 1907), Vol. II, p. 191.

59. Cf. the relief on the baptismal font in the baptistry at Pisa, showing the sun disk around Christ's head, with the inscription, *Introitus Solis*. On the comparison of Christ with the sun, cf. Usener, *loc. cit.*; F. J. Dölger, *Die Sonne der Gerechtigkeit* (Münster, 1919); and Cumont, *Mon. myst. de Mithra*, I, pp. 355 f.

60. The horse had already been used as a symbol of the ascending soul by Plato (*Phaidros*, cap. 25, 34). And the post-Flavian paintings in the Nasonian monument in

PLATE ONE

Photograph by K. Gundermann, Würzburg

THE BAMBERG RIDER

Figure 1

Figure 2

PLATE TWO

Figure 1

Figure 2

PLATE THREE

PLATE FOUR



Courtesy of Myrtilla Avery

EXULTET ROLL FROM TROIA

of this Germanic rider god into the riding Christ.[61] A Scandinavian variation of the *Merseburger Zauberspruch*, the famous pre-Christian magic incantation containing a solstice myth, relates the same story with the exception, however, that the divine rider is now Christ instead of Baldr.[62]

But already the Revelation of St. John, the book which has probably stirred medieval imagination more than any other, contains two visions of a rider on a white horse, and both were interpreted by the Fathers and, following them, by medieval art, as representing Christ's appearance for the Last Judgment.[63] According to the commentators of the Carolingian period, the rider *Faithful and True* is an allegory of the two-fold nature of the Lord, which interpretation makes the horse an almost integral part of the symbolic representation of Christ.[64] At the same time the Apocalyptic vision was soon merged with the rider of the Second Book of the Maccabees, who wears a gilded harness and carries a lance like the ancient rider gods of the East.[65]

Rome already give a fully developed allegory of the soul under the image of the horse. Cf. R. Eisler," Orphisch-dionysische Mysteriengedanken in der christlichen Antike," *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg* (1922-23), Vol. II, pl. 11. In regard to horses on early Christian tombs, see Cabrol, *op. cit.*, s.v. Cheval; Fig. 2765 reproduces a curious Sardinian epitaph, in which the deceased, who is described as "mandatis serviens vitae in omnibus Christi," is symbolized by a horse with the labarum on its thigh.

61. On the relationship between Baldr and the Nordic sun god Freyr, see G. Neckel, *Die Ueberlieferungen vom Gotte Baldr* (Dortmund, 1920), pp. 104 ff. On Freyr's and Baldr's horses as sun horses, see Jähns, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 390 ff. In regard to Germanic representations of riding dragon-killers, and their possible identification with Odin, cf. G. Kossina, *Germanische Kultur* (Leipzig, 1932); W. Veek, in *Die Alamannen in Württemberg* (1931), p. 44, stresses the influence of Iranian monuments.

62. Jähns *op. cit.* Cf. also L. Weiser, *Das Haferopfer des Christkindes* in *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Volkskunde* (1927-28), Jähns has been the first to point to the transformation of the Nordic sun hero, Siegfried, into St. George. In the north of Europe, representations of the riding Saint existed already in the early twelfth century. Cf. also E. S. Prior, *An Account of Medieval Figure Sculpture in England* (Cambridge, 1912), pp. 154 ff. Fig. 129.

63. St. Augustine, in *Beati Joanni Apoc. Expositio* (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, Vol. 35, 2424); Alcuin, *Comment. in Apoc.* (*ibid.*, Vol. 100, 1123); Hrabanus Maurus, *Allegoriae in Sacram Scripturam* (*ibid.*, Vol. 112, 916). Another source for the Christian rider allegory is St. Paul (Eph. 6:10-17). Cf. also A. Goldschmidt, *Der Albanipsalter* (Berlin, 1895), pp. 47 ff. It has inspired many medieval representations, of which Dürer's "Knight, Death and Devil" is the last.

64. Cf. Beati, *In Apocalipsi libri duodecim* (ed. Sanders. Rome, 1930), lib. 11, 1, pp. 591 f.; "equus albus corpus Christi adsumptum est."

65. "Eques in veste candida, armis aureis hastam vibrans" (II, Macc. 11:8). It is identified with the Apocalyptic rider by Hrabanus Maurus, *Comment. in lib. Mach.* (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, Vol. 109, 1228): "Onia orante descendit eques terribilis . . . ille videlicet de quo Joannes in Apocalypsi sua scribit."

The illuminators of the Book of Revelation, and of the famous Commentary of Beatus, apparently preferred to represent Christ in this typological form, rather than with a sword emerging from his mouth as described by St. John.[66] They even added other iconographical features, such as the rider killing a dragon, for which no Biblical explanation can be given, and which make the survival of the pagan tradition only more obvious.[67]

In the sixth chapter of Revelation there appears another rider on a white horse armed with a bow. This rider was interpreted as an image of Christ's ascension and of the Holy Ghost.[68] Reading St. Augustine's interpretation, however, one can not help feeling that he still has in mind the role which the horse played in the apotheosis of the Roman emperor, both as a vehicle and a symbol of the latter's ascension and final deification.[69] But, by thus linking Christ's ascension and the advent of the Holy Ghost in this seemingly pagan symbol, a most impressive image was created to express the theological relationship between the two events. The rider appearing with the Lamb and the Lion of Judah in the Apocalyptic scene of the Carolingian Vivian Bible thus becomes an impressive symbol for the Trinity, and its Christological meaning.[70]

66. Cf. MS. 99, in the library at Valenciennes, and MS. Lat. nouv. acq. 1132 (Paris, Bibl. Nat.), in H. Omont, *Manuscrits illustrés de l'Apocalypse aux IX^e and X^e siècles* (Paris, 1924), pl. 27.

67. The *Beatus* from St. Sever, eleventh century (Paris, Bibl. Nat.) represents the rider with a lance, piercing a crowned man (W. Neuss, *Die Apocalypse* [Münster, 1931] II, p. 182); the *Beatus* from Gerona Cathedral, A.D. 975 (Neuss, fig. 226) even depicts him piercing a snake. The *Beatus* from Valcabado, A.D. 970 (Valladolid Bibl. Santa Cruz [Neuss, fig. 102]), shows the "Alexandrian" motive of the rider crowned by two angels. The different illuminators of the *Beatus* probably copied a fifth or sixth century manuscript. Neuss (Vol I, pp. 243 ff.) has stressed the Coptic influence.

68. Victorinus, *Scholia in Apoc. B. Joannis* (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, Vol. 5, 328). On Mithras as a rider with a bow, cf. Rostovtzeff, *loc. cit.*

69. "Equitem agnoscimus . . . non solum Christum sed etiam Spiritum sanctum. Posteaquam enim Dominus ascendit in coelum et aperuit universa mysteria; misit Spiritum sanctum (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, Vol. 35, 2424). The *Stuttgart Psalter* seems to contain a curious representation of the Holy Ghost as a rider. Psalm 46:2 is illustrated by several men clasping hands, and a rider on a white horse in the posture of an *orans* (ed. E. T. DeWald [Princeton, 1930] fol. 59v). This passage has always been interpreted as referring to the Holy Ghost (cf. Hieronymus, *Breviarium in Psalmos* [Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, vol. 26, 962]), whose advent seems to be depicted by the illuminator. As regards the horse in the Roman emperor apotheosis, see E. Bickermann in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (1929) Vol. 27, pp. 10, 19.

70. Cf. W. Köhler, *Die Karolingischen Miniaturen*, Vol. I, *Die Schule von Tours* (Berlin, 1933), p. 53. In his masterly analysis, Professor Köhler has pointed out that

The strangest representation of Christ on horseback occurs in one of the Exultet rolls, soon to be published by Dr. Myrtilla Avery. The Exultet liturgy, sung on the night before Easter, is a symbolic glorification of the Lord's Resurrection and his triumph over death. The image of his Resurrection is the kindled flame of the Easter Candle. The Church has always acknowledged the fact that in this liturgy ancient myths of the triumph of light in spring have survived. The illuminator of the Exultet roll in Troia has, at the end of the manuscript, added a picture which, while summarizing the whole content of the liturgy, gives a beautiful example for the inspiration of Christian imagination by ancient mythology: he adds a crowned rider killing a dragon with a lance (Plate IV).[71]

Monumental art, also, has depicted Christ as a rider. In this way he is represented on the fresco in the crypt of Auxerre Cathedral, and on a curious relief outside the little church at Holzkirchen in Franconia, both dating from the twelfth century.[72] The meaning of the German representation is explained in an inscription praying for Christ's pro-

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the miniatures in the Grandval Bible (Brit. Mus. Add. 10546), and in the Vivian Bible (Bibl. Nat. MS. lat. 1), may be traced back to a biblical cycle of the fifth century, of which the iconography is probably an invention of Pope Leo the Great himself (Text 1, 2, pp. 194 ff.). The illuminator of the Vivian Bible, however, has added the representation of a rider, in his picture of the Apocalypse. But, in saying that, by doing so, the artist has "changed the general, symbolic representation into the illustration of a certain passage in the text" (pp. 136 f.), Professor Köhler seems not to have taken account of the symbolic significance of the rider image during the Middle Ages. By appearing in the Vivian Bible with the Lamb and the Lion, the Rider symbolizes what may be called the third theological aeon, that of the Holy Ghost, after those of the Old and the New Dispensations. Köhler stresses the theological importance of the cycle, which, in a few clear-cut symbols, reveals the identity of God in the New and Old Testaments. The addition of the Rider as the Augustinian allegory for both the ascension of Christ, and the coming of the Holy Ghost, is an expressive symbol for the whole christological doctrine. And it proves the importance of the rider as a medieval symbol of Christ.

71. As Miss Avery kindly informs me, the Exultet roll from Troia is attached to an earlier manuscript; our roll is only a fragment, from the early twelfth century. The three Exultet rolls in the sacristy of Troia Cathedral will be fully discussed in Miss Avery's forthcoming monumental work on the Exultet rolls of South Italy, now in process of publication by the Princeton University Press (Vol. II, plates, 1937). I am greatly indebted to the author for permission to reproduce the miniature to which she has drawn my attention.

72. The fresco at Auxerre is reproduced in H. Focillon, *Peintures romanes des églises de France* (Paris, 1938), fig. 114. On the relief at Holzkirchen, cf. A. Schebler, "Der Reiter in Holzkirchen," *Würzburger Diozesangeschichtsblätter* (1936), 2. His interpretation of the rider as Christ is, no doubt, the only correct one. He reads the inscription as follows: "Equester, Aedibus in nostris sit Tau tua dextera Christe."

tection from Evil, with special reference to his lifted right hand—the protective gesture of the Roman sun god![73]

The interesting fact about the iconography of the riding Christ is that it has preserved many features from representations of the riding emperor. The mythological reason for this has already been given. But aside from that some deliberate intention can be observed here. The ancient peoples, and also the Romans, had always conceived of the Savior whom they expected as a powerful emperor.[74] Since Augustus, *Soter* (Savior) had become the surname of most of the Roman emperors. The Christians, on the other hand, emphasized that Jesus Christ was the true and only ruler of the Universe, and they did not hesitate to express this idea visually. In Eastern art there exists the unmistakable tendency towards a certain modification in the representation of Christ entering Jerusalem before his death. He is isolated from his disciples and, what is more relevant for the problem of this study, he sometimes is mounted on a white horse instead of a donkey.[75] This representation thus acquires a strange resemblance to that of a Byzantine emperor entering a city, like the fresco from Salonica now in the Byzantine museum at Athens. Those solemn entries of the emperor were of course derived from the Roman *Adventus* ceremony the symbolic importance of which can still be recognized from the frequency of its representation in Roman art. Even a rider monument like that of Marcus Aurelius may be interpreted as depicting this scene, not, of course, by copying the actual event, but by eternalizing the idea of the emperor ; taking possession of his city. No doubt it was the same idea which the Eastern artist wanted to render when representing the Entry of Christ. They even copied the iconography of the Roman *Adventus*, showing the riding emperor accompanied by Nike and a warrior; the Coptic relief in Berlin representing Christ

73. On a number of early Christian amulets from Syria and Egypt, a rider is depicted—either Solomon or St. Sisinnius—as a protector from the evil eye. I cannot agree with E. Peterson's statement (*Heis Theos*, Göttingen, 1926, p. 126) that there exists no necessary connection between these riders and the inscription. Cf. note 25, p. 263. Cf. also P. Perdrizet, *Negotium perambulans in tenebris* (Strassburg, 1922), pp. 1 ff., fig. 1. We know already the Roman sun god on horseback and his protective gesture of the lifted hand. This representation and its meaning were well known in late antiquity; but its revival in the twelfth century, and the identification with Christ are very remarkable.

74. Cf. Kampers, *op. cit.*, pp. 77 f.

75. G. Millet, *L'Iconographie de l'Evangile* (Paris, 1916), pp. 275 ff.; V. R. Petkovic, *La Peinture serbe du moyen-age* (Belgrade, 1930), pl. 168, 183.

between two angels, has justly been compared with those late antique representations.[76]

The deliberate parallelism between the imperial ceremony and the biblical event was not confined to Eastern art. On two corresponding capitals in the cloisters of St. Trophîme at Arles, the Entry into Jerusalem and the Triumph of Constantine are depicted respectively. There can be no doubt as to the symbolic correspondence of the two scenes, and it does not even seem surprising in a city that had once born the name of Constantina.[77]

As we have already seen, the horse had become a symbol of imperial dignity in the Christian world as it had been in ancient Rome. The famous horses on the Monte Cavallo in Rome were described as images of "the mighty princes of this world" in the *Mirabilia Romae*,[78] and the ceremonial significance attributed to riding on a horse in the Middle Ages is almost incredible. *Omnis nobilitas ab equo* was by no means a proverb only.[79] When Clovis had put on the Insignia which the emperor Anasthasius had sent him and mounted a horse he was acclaimed *Consul and Augustus* by the crowd.[80] Accord-

76. Cf. Grabar, *op. cit.*, p. 234, pl. 7, 2.

77. The old interpretation of this representation as Constantine's triumph over his father-in-law, Maximianus, while the Emperor's wife, Fausta, "dressed as an Amazon," rejoices over the fate of her father, of course, is very unconvincing. The emperor on horseback, above a conquered enemy, is a well-known type; the female figure is strongly suggestive of those personifications of towns in the iconography of the *Adventus;* and the "horse of Fausta," apparently a "symbolic attribute," is derived, like the rest of the scene, from Constantinian iconography. Both capitals are reproduced in F. Benoit, *Arles* (Lyon, 1927), fig. 122-23. See note 10, p. 260.

78. Cap. 38. The horse allegories of the Fathers are already mentioned by Cabrol (*loc. cit.*). Cf. also Garner, *Gregoricum* lib. 3, cap. 8 (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, Vol. 193, 87); St. Hildegarde, *Physica*, lib. 7, cap. 8. The horse as a symbol of triumph survived in the classical legends of Alexander's and Caesar's horses, as related by Isidorus of Seville, *Ethym.*, lib. 12, cap. 1 (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, Vol. 82, 430). Concerning the battle horses, the author continues: "Exultant cum vicerint." This passage is quoted in the English twelfth century *Bestiary* in the Cambridge University Library (MS. Ji.4. 26, ed. M.R. James, Oxford, 1928). A curious mixture of classical and Christian horse symbolism occurs in the *Gesta Romanorum*, where Bucephalus is compared to the true Christian who accepts no other "rider" than God (ed. Gràsse, 1842, cap. 36).

79. Cf. J. Grimm, *op. cit.*, pp. 95 ff., 712. We cannot deny the economic importance of the horse in medieval feudalism, nor the influence which this factor may have had on medieval symbolism. However, the mythological conceptions of mankind can never be fully explained by social factors alone; and the horse as a cosmic symbol has possessed human imagination before and after it had became *the* vehicle in war and in peace (Cf. C. G. Jung, "Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido," *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathische Forschungen* (1912), Vol. IV, pp. 317 ff.

80. Gregory of Tours, *Historia Francorum*, lib. 2, 38 (*Monumenta Germaniae hist. SS. rerum Merovingiarum*, I, 102).

ing to Gregory of Tours' account it was apparently the sight of the rider which aroused in the Franconian people the remembrance of the Roman *Augusti.*[81] The legends on the donation of Constantine always mention the white horse presented to the pope with the other imperial insignia as a symbol of his new supreme power.[82] And to cite a German example: there existed a medieval rule in many parts of Germany on the ceremonial entrance of the sovereign's representative into a city; it is prescribed that he should sit on a horse and wear a crown of peacock feathers—an image reminding us strongly of the monument of the Emperor Justinian.[83] It is no allegorical invention of an individual when Dante, the profoundest political thinker of the Middle Ages, describes the ideal emperor for whom he is longing as a rider.[84] A comparison like this betrays the continuity in the mythological thinking of our civilization, the power of which is particularly evident in the imagination of the creative genius. When Dante depicted the emperor as a rider, the Bamberg Rider had already been placed in the Cathedral choir. The reader will no longer be in doubt as to its meaning. Its iconography is that of the French *Constantines,* but the resemblance to representations of the riding Christ is by no means a coincidence.

What makes the problem of the Bamberg Rider so interesting is the fact that here we grasp one of those points where the profound connection between an idea and its image in medieval imagination becomes obvious. The medieval artist, of course, never had the deliberate purpose to express an intellectually complicated idea like the relation between Christ and the emperor by some symbolic invention of his own. Had this been his intention, the dullest allegory would probably have been the result. On the other hand, the Middle Ages would not have used one and the same image to depict both Christ and the emperor unless some profound relation existed between the spiritual concepts of both. That is what distinguishes an intensely

81. Cf. the similar importance of the grant of an equestrian statue to Theodoric by Zeno (Cassiodorus, in *Migne, Patr. Lat.*, Vol. 69, 423).

82. Cf. *Mirabilia Romae,* cap. 35; Burdach, *op. cit.*, II, 216; The white horse is depicted with the other insignia in the thirteenth century fresco in the Oratorium of St. Sylvester, Quattro Coronati, in Rome.

83. "Item so ist Lantrecht: so, als unsers Herrn des Bischoffs amptman mit dem Lant zu Ringave dinget . . . so sall er Inryten alsz ein gewaltiger Herre . . . off sime heubte ein Hot mit Phäenfeddern." F. J. Bodmann, *Rheingauische Alterthümer* (Mainz, 1819), p. 626.

84. *Convivio,* 4, 9.

symbolic and poetical outlook from our own. Moreover, it can be no mere coincidence that the first rider monument for a medieval emperor (for we may now give the Bamberg Rider this name) was created at the very moment when the imperial conceptions of Constantine were more vigorously expressed than ever before.

The relation between the Savior and the Christian emperor remained close throughout the Middle Ages. The almost superhuman position which Constantine had claimed for himself as the mouthpiece of the Divine Providence had never been abandoned by his successors.[85] It was a general opinion during the Middle Ages that the emperor, after his death, would share with Christ in the government of the universe.[86] But these ideas had never before been so powerfully proclaimed as under Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, the great emperor under whose reign the Bamberg Rider was created. It was during his struggles with the popes that this powerful and enigmatic character developed that proud conception of his dignity which so strangely stands on the verge between Middle Ages and Renaissance. It was not enough that he pointed to the relationship between the celestial and the earthly ruler: the Emperor praised Jesi, the little town where he was born, almost sacrilegiously in exactly the terms which the prophet had used in praising Bethlehem as the birthplace of Jesus.[87] The treason which one of Frederick's counsellors attempted against him was described as the second Crucifixion of Christ, and this identification existed by no means in the imagination of the imperial

85. Cf. Kampers, *op. cit.*, p. 18. The medieval crown is adorned with a representation of the *Maiestas Domini* (Bock, op. cit., pl. 1). The evangeliary of the Emperor Otto III, in Aachen, depicts the emperor like Christ enthroned in a *mandorla*, surrounded by the symbols of the Evangelists.

86. Cf. P. E. Schramm, "Das Derrscherbild in der Kunst des frühen Mittelalters," *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg* (1922-23). Vol. 1, Excurs 4. It is also significant that, during his lifetime, emperor Apotheosis was carried so far that even Frederick II's decisions were believed to be divine inspirations: "motus animi nostri, quem ex coelesti arbitrio sumpserimus." Cf. E. Kantorowicz, *Kaiser Friedrich II Ergänzungsband* (Berlin 1931) p. 84. On the reliquiary of Henry II in the Louvre the holy Emperor and Christ are depicted in exactly the same way. The figures of Christ, St. Adalbert, St. Bartholomew, and the Emperor Otto III on the font in St. Bartholomew all'Isola at Rome are all described as "Sancti." Cf. O. Homburger in *Jahrbuch der Preussischen Kunstsammlungen* 57, 3, p. 130. See also H. Hirsch, "Der mittelalterliche Kaisergedanke in den liturgischen Gebeten," *Mitteilungen des oesterreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung* (1930) p. 3.

87. "Unde tu Bethleem, civitas Marchie non minimum es in generis nostri principibus. Ex te enim dux exiit, Romani princeps imperii qui populum tuum reget et proteget." I. L. A. Huillard-Bréholles, *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi* (Paris, 1854), IV, I, p. 3.

court alone.[88] In 1239 the people of Rome, generally so hostile to the emperor, committed an act of heresy which aroused the greatest indignation of the pope: when the effigy of Christ was carried in procession it was acclaimed by the crowd as an image of the emperor.[89]

But the matter does not end with the emperor's identification with Christ. The name, *Sol Iustitiae,* in the thirteenth century applied not only to Christ, but also to Frederick himself, reveals already a revival of those cosmic elements in the emperor worship which the Roman emperors had adopted. There can be no doubt that the Emperor, who had been born on the day of the winter solstice, and who died unexpectedly at about the same time, was confounded in the imagination of his people with a solar hero whom their ancestors had worshiped. After his death the myth of the *Sol Invictus* suddenly sprang up in Germany. It was rumored that the Emperor was not dead, but that, like the setting sun, he had disappeared for a while in order to rise even more gloriously above a new day for the world.[90] The many legends which were created about Frederick—the one about his sleep in the Khyffhäuser mountain being the most famous—have all been recognized as revivals of the ancient solar myths of the East.[91] This deification of a historical personage almost during his lifetime is one of the most curious psychological problems of the Middle Ages. It was due partly to the outstanding personality of the Emperor himself, but partly also to that sudden influx of Eastern ideas which, following the Crusades, had the deepest influence on medieval art and thought. It was after the Crusades that the image of the rider saint appeared in the West.

88. "Iterum in Apulia crucifixus sit Christus," E. Kantorowicz, *Kaiser Friedrich II, Ergänzungsband* (Berlin, 1931), p. 244. Even Frederick's enemies spoke of the "signaculum similitudinis filii spetialis" (*ibid.*, p. 206).

89. *Vita Gregorii IX*, cf. Burdach, *op. cit.*, p. 380 .

90. Cf. the curious "Letter of the Orthodox Tiburtinians," Kampers, *op. cit.*, pp. 61 ff.; Kantorowicz, *Kaiser Friedrich II* (Berlin, 1928), p. 629. But already during his lifetime, the Emperor was called *deitas solis* (*ibid.*).

91. Cf. F. Kampers, *Kaiserprophetien und Kaisersagen im Mittelalter* (Munich, 1895), pp. 19 ff.; G. Voigt, "Die deutsche Kaisersage," *Sybels historische Zeitschrift* (1871), p. 149; H. Grauert, "Zur deutschen Kaisersage," *Historisches Jahrbuch* (1892), pp. 135 ff.; A. Bassermann, "Veltro," *Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher*, 1902), Vol. XI, p. 60. The similarity between these legends and the myth of Baldr, who is buried in a mountain, but whose resurrection is predicted by the Voluspa, is equally striking (cf. Neckel, *op. cit.*, p. 61). The emperor as a shining rider disappearing into Mt. Aetna occurs in a vision related by Thomas de Eccleston, "De Adventu Minorum," *Monumenta Franciscana* (London, 1858) I, p. 67.

The crusaders found representations of Saint George's fight with the dragon everywhere in the Orient, and also in their own visions. Mounted on a white horse he appeared to them as their champion in the fight for Christendom.[92] But together with this Christian rider, it was also those pagan ideas which had originally created its image that now spread in the West. The monarchic conceptions of the East not only found their way into the symbolism of the Holy Roman Empire, but the Bamberg rider, one of the greatest works of medieval art, would perhaps not have been conceived without them.

If the aim of this study, the interpretation of the Bamberg Rider as the medieval emperor, has been achieved, the question will arise whether or not it will be possible to bring that monument into even closer relation with the Emperor whose ideas and personality so deeply stirred the imagination of his contemporaries. It must be born in mind, however, that medieval art did not know the portrait of an individual, for reasons already explained. On the other hand, both the face and the attitude of the Rider have an individual expression which make this monument very unlike those twelfth century representations of Constantine. Indeed, it shows an unmistakable resemblance not only to the typical "Hohenstaufen face," but according to the few records we have, to Frederick II in particular.[93] This fact fits in very well with that notable tendency of the thirteenth century towards a modification of the medieval typsim, and a new interest in the individual. Frederick himself, who has been called the first modern personality,[94] had the famous arch which he built at Capua decorated with his own

92. W. Stubbs, *De Gestis regum Angl.* (London, 1889), II, p. 420; Cf. Budge, *op. cit.*, pp. 28 f. The rider hero deeply impressed the imagination of the High Middle Ages. The two greatest works of German medieval literature, Gottfried's *Tristan* (vv. 6622 ff.) and Wolfram's Parzival (vv. 383 ff., 424, 559, 678), contain images of a rider who, appearing suddenly and isolated from the rest of the scene, has always reminded scholars of the Bamberg Rider.

93. The Emperor is depicted in the Exultet roll from Salerno (Kantorowicz, *Ergänzungsband*, fig. 1), and on the *Karlsschrein* in Aachen; Dieterich's description of this work, "Das Portrait Kaiser Friedrich II," (*Zeitschrift für bildende Kunst* [1903] N.F. XIV, p. 249), might almost be a description of the head of the Bamberg Rider. Frederick's effigy in the treatise on falconry may also be compared with this monument (St. Beissel, *Vatikanische Miniaturen* [Freiburg, 1893], pl. 20b). On the "Hohenstaufen face," see Kantorowicz, *Ergänzungsband*, p. 258. The marble head in the Kaiser Friedrichmuseum, Berlin, certainly does not deserve the title,"Portrait of Frederick II," nor does the head over the portal of the Chiesa della Porta Santa at Andria (Duc de Luynes, *Recherches sur les monuments et l'histoire des Normands* [Paris, 1844], pl. 29); cf. Dieterich, *op. cit.*, pp. 250 ff.

94. Burdach, *op. cit.*, pp. 334 f.

image.[95] It should be borne in mind, however, that it was not Frederick's individuality, but his conception of the imperial dignity, which in those days stirred men's imagination; not his personal features, but the ideal emperor of the thirteenth century which was to find its monument in the Bamberg Rider. As such it was impressive, particularly for the German people. The Rider's crown is that of the medieval German king, whose importance as a symbol of supreme power is emphasized by the emperor's admirer, Walther von der Vogelweide.[96] Moreover, it resembles exactly the famous *Corona Aperta*, with which the German kings and Frederick II were crowned at the tomb of Charlemagne in Aachen, and which was probably in Frederick's possession until the unfortunate battle of Parma (1248).[97] If this assumption is right, the crown of the Bamberg Rider would be an insignia of imperial power particularly dear to the German people. Not only had the Emperor himself worn it, but he had himself frequently represented with it.[98] Something similar must be said about the Rider's dress. In this attire, the usual one of the thirteenth century noble, the German emperors have often been depicted.[99] For the lively, visual imagination of the Middle Ages no

95. Cf. Kantorowicz, *Ergänzungsband*, p. 201, pl. 2, 1. A drawing of the figure of the Emperor in Agincourt, *Histoire de l'art* (Paris, 1823), Vol. IV, pl. 27, 1.

96. Ed. Lachman, 9, 13. Walther denounced the insolence of other princes poetically, blaming them for wearing the royal "circle." Cf. Burdach, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

97. Cf. Bock, *loc. cit.*

98. In the treatise on falconry (Beissel, *loc. cit.*); on the *Karlsschrein* in Aachen (J. Braun, *Meisterwerke der deutschen Goldschmiedekunst* [Munich, 1922], 1, fig. 87, 88). Here all the German emperors are represented with this crown, which is also worn by Emperor Frederick I in the pendrawing of the *Kopialbuch* from Freising (ca. 1200), and by Emperor Henry VI, in the famous Manesse *minnesinger* manuscript. The heavy, octagonal imperial crown, too clumsy an attribute for a rider, was less usual in representations of the emperor. Unfortunately we do not know the form of the crown which Frederick II wore in his effigy at Capua. In Agincourt's drawing, it is a slim diadem resembling that on the *Raumer gem* (Kantorowicz, *Ergänzungsband*, pl. 2, 1). That the Emperor was represented on his arch with the crown, but with no other insignia in his hands, seems certain from the descriptions we possess. Cf. Dieterich (*loc. cit.*); Kantorowicz (*ibid.*, pp. 201 ff.); and C. von Fabriczy, "Zur Kunstgeschichte der Hohenstaufenzeit," *Zeitschrift für bildende Kunst* 13-2.

99. Henry VI, in the above mentioned monument, and Frederick himself, in the treatise on falconry. Cf. also Rudolf I of Habsburg, in the painting after his monument in Speyer Cathedral (M. Kemmerich, *Die deutschen Kaiser und Könige* [Leipzig, 1910], fig. 38). Kemmerich's frequent attempts to discover "portraits" of medieval rulers have very often failed. Not before the time of Rudolf of Habsburg, which in many respects marks the end of the Middle Ages, did this period conceive the portrait in the modern sense.

further attributes of imperial dignity were necessary; the crowned rider was not to be mistaken.[100]

Besides those more general considerations, it seems very likely from the historical point of view, also, that a monument of the emperor was erected at Bamberg. Bishop Eckbert was a personal friend of Frederick, and one of his most faithful supporters. On many occasions, and even in the face of papal disapprobation, he maintained the conviction that the power of the Christian emperor was, in this world, the strongest protection of the Church.[101] It would be well in accordance with medieval thinking had the bishop thus expressed his political conviction by placing the statue of the Emperor at the entrance of the Cathedral. Furthermore, in the Franconian part of Germany, Frederick enjoyed a great popularity which survived as a curious kind of mystical worship after his death.[102] That Bamberg, though not the capital of the empire, would have been a suitable place for an imperial monument may further be proved by the recent rediscovery of a once famous thirteenth century monument at Bamberg, which throughout the Middle Ages was thought to mark the "Navel of the Holy Roman Empire."[103]

It is not without difficulty that the student finds his way through such a maze of heterogeneous material, yet it seems worth while to follow a mythological image like the Rider through the centuries, and to discover that, even under so many disguises of allegorical interpretation, its original nature never lost its power. Indeed, the unity of Western civilization seems to consist in that continuity of certain mythological concepts which have possessed creative imagination throughout the ages. The way in which the medieval mind transformed the ancient idols into living symbols of a new spiritual world is not the least of Christendom's contributions to our civilization.

100. The rider monument which the Emperor Maximilian, in many respects the last medieval emperor, planned to erect for himself "by the choir" of St. Ulrich at Augsburg, was to depict the riding emperor with crown and sword. It may be recalled that before the World War, equestrian statues were erected in Germany for monarchs only.

101. Cf. Schirrmacher, in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* (Leipzig, 1899), s.v. Eckbert.

102. Cf. D. Völter, "Die Sekte von Schwäbisch Hall und der Ursprung der deutschen Kaisersage," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* (1881), Vol. IV.

103. Cf. J. J. Morper, "Ein Symbol des Reiches," *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Sept. 3, 1939.

PRIMITIVE ARABIAN AND SEMITIC RELIGION

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Since Arabia was undoubtedly the cradle-land of the Semitic race, Arabian religion provides our best clue to the nature of primitive Semitic religion. It is essential then that an effort be made to gather up from the pre-Islamic inscriptions and monuments whatever information of a religious character has been preserved to us. This is rapidly being done. A great quantity of material has been published in recent years, and more is promised for the near future. Working on this material Nielsen has given us one of the most recent discussions of Arabian religion in the *Handbuch der altarabischen Altertumskunde* (Copenhagen, 1927), Chapter 5. While there is much that is commendable in Nielsen's treatment, it fails, in the estimation of the present writer, to elucidate properly the nature of North Arabian religion. The key to this particular problem lies in the correct identification of the goddess Allat.

Hitherto Allat has been identified with either the Sun or Venus. But an identification with Venus is ruled out by the fact that the northern Arabs called Venus *al-ʿUzza*, as numerous writers have demonstrated. Nor can the identification with the Sun stand, because in North Arabia the Sun was regarded as masculine, in proof of which we have the Nabataean Dushara, the Palmyrene Shams, and the Hebrew Shemesh "who is like a bridegroom coming forth from his chamber, and rejoices like a strong man to run the course" (Ps. 19:6-7). We are led, therefore, to propose an identification with the Moon. This theory was first suggested by G. A. Cooke, in his *North Semitic Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1903. P. 222), but met with no acceptance. A number of considerations, however, show that the theory is well founded. In the first place, the Moon was regarded as a feminine deity in the North Arabian and Palestinian regions, as is shown by the name *Sinai* (a feminine form of *Sin*), by the discovery in Palestine of figurines of the Moon-deity in female form, by the equation of Allat with the Minaean Moon-god Wadd in the Lihyanite inscription (JS 277), and by the fact that the betyls of Allat discovered by Père

Savignac at al-Hegr and Gebel Ramm have horns in the form of a crescent.[1]

The identity of the goddess Allat having been established, North Arabian religion at once becomes much more intelligible to us. It was, above all else, a worship of the Moon (Allat) and Venus (al-ʿUzza). Among the Nabataeans and Palmyrenes, and earlier among the Hebrews, the Sun held an honored place, but in Arabia proper the Sun was rarely invoked. In the Lihyanite and Thamudic inscriptions there is only one reference to *Shams* (in JS 301 lih.). It was no doubt natural that sun-worship never attained any popularity in Arabia proper. Arabia is a dry and thirsty land where the sun does not add to the comforts of life, but rather to its discomforts. The Moon, on the other hand, was a beneficent power, majestic, yet not burdensome, a light to the nomad on his nightly journeyings. Venus, the bright star in the western sky, was also his friend and guide.

Thus we perceive that North Arabian religion was essentially the same as South Arabian religion. For among the Southern Arabs also, Venus and the Moon held first place, with the Sun occupying a very subordinate position. Arabian religion as a whole, then, was predominantly astral in character. That is not to say that all the Arabian gods were astral. Many of the lesser deities were doubtless of chthonic origin. But the great divinities in the pantheon were celestial. Most scholars seem to maintain that even these astral deities were originally chthonic. For example, G. A. Barton in his *Semitic and Hamitic Origins* (Philadelphia, 1934. Pp. 203 ff.), makes all the Semitic deities pass through the chthonic stage. But if we adhere to the monumental evidence, the Arab has his eyes fixed on the skies as far back as we can follow him.

This being so, we feel justified in assuming that primitive Semitic religion bore a similar astral character. This assumption is supported by the fact that, as soon as the Semitic element in the population of Babylonia began to make its influence felt in the realm of culture, astral emblems appear on the cylinder seals. In the early Uruk and Jemdet Nasr periods stars and crescents are exceedingly rare, and when they do occur seem to form part of pictographic inscriptions rather

1. For a more detailed treatment of this evidence, see my forthcoming article on "The Daughters of Allah" to be published in the *Moslem World*.

than to represent celestial divinities (see L. Legrain, *Archaic Seal Impressions*, Philadelphia, 1937). In the Early Dynastic period true astral emblems begin to appear. H. Frankfort, *Cylinder Seals* (London, 1939), gives only one instance from this period, but Legrain lists several (the crescent in nos. 505, 508, 513; the crescent and star in nos. 518, 539), and W. H. Ward, *The Seal Cylinders of Western Asia* (Washington, 1910), gives still more in his chapters devoted to "Archaic Cylinders." But it is not until the rise to power of the Semitic element under Sargon that astral emblems become at all common. From Sargon on, however, the disk of Shamash, the crescent of Sin, and the star of Ishtar frequently appear. The Semites now imparted astral characteristics to the chthonic gods of the Sumerians, so that henceforth Babylonian religion presented a curious mixture of chthonic and astral elements.

But it was not only the Sumerian religion which was affected by the triumph of the Semites. The Semites' own religion underwent a transformation. Whereas in the Arabian world it was Venus who held first place, in Babylonian religion this position was occupied by the Sun. It may have been the more intensive practice of the art of agriculture and the development of monarchical institutions which favored the growth of sun-worship. The sun is manifestly a more important force to an agricultural people than is the Moon or Venus. And its superior power made kings identify themselves with it rather than with either of the other two. The historian of the Near East is aware how the development of imperialism and Sun-worship went hand in hand. Every emperor compared himself to the mighty Sun. And it was sun-worship which provided the basis for a fellow-feeling between peoples that was something new in the world. It really gave rise to the conception of the brotherhood of man.

While in Babylonia the Semitic religion underwent many modifications, in the Semitic home-land, Arabia, it retained its original character. Venus, "the Queen of heaven," continued to preside over the destinies of men, with the Moon as a close associate. On many South Arabian monuments the Star and Crescent appear, as if they alone were the chief divinities of the land, as indeed they were. They provided Mohammed with his toughest antagonists, and even after the triumph of Islam found a place in the banner of the Prophet's followers.

A peculiar feature which strikes us, as we survey the whole area where Semitic religion prevailed, is that the gender attributed to the three great planetary deities was not always the same. Thus, in South Arabia Venus appears as a male deity, but is feminine in the rest of the Semitic world. The Moon is masculine in South Arabia and Babylonia, but feminine in North Arabia, Sinai, and Palestine. The Sun is feminine in South Arabia but masculine elsewhere. Thus, from the point of view of the gender attributed to the chief deities, the Semitic world falls into different religious zones:

1. South Arabian—Venus (masc.), Moon (masc.), Sun (fem.).
2. North Arabian } —Venus (fem.), Moon (fem.), Sun (masc.).
   Sinai and Palestine }
3. Babylonian—Venus (fem.), Moon (masc.), Sun (masc.).
4. Syrian—in the early period agrees with Babylonian.
   in later period agrees with North Arabian.

It will be noticed, first, that the genders of the divinities in North and South Arabia are always opposed, and, secondly, that the Babylonian zone agrees with the North Arabian (from which it probably derives) except for the gender ascribed to the Moon. The Arabs made the Moon agree in gender with their chief deity, Venus. The Babylonians made it agree with their chief deity, the Sun. The Syrian zone presents a mixture of Babylonian and North Arabian influences, as we should expect. The original line of cleavage in the Semitic area as a whole seems to be that between North and South Arabia.

PRIMITIVE MONOTHEISM AND THE RELIGION OF MOSES

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So many students of religion today are being led astray by the widely publicized claims of primitive monotheism that it has become a veritable menace to clear thinking and a challenge to real scholarship. When its advocates assert that their methodology is absolutely objective and scientific, reaching results that are completely authoritative and final, although contradicting all previous results, it behooves us to take notice of the theory; and when a writer like Marston berates critical scholarship in the words, "It is surely time that distinguished scholars gave up the habit of representing exploded theories as historical facts,"[1] it is time to turn the tables on him.

Sir Charles Marston may not be a writer to whom scholars give serious attention, but he is, nevertheless, a writer whose books sell in thousands where theirs sell in hundreds, and his case is symptomatic of the impression that is being made by the theory of primitive monotheism. In his latest book, *The Bible Comes Alive*, he makes this astounding statement: "In the year 1931 these two Sciences [viz., archeology and anthropology] simultaneously reached the conclusion that the evidence in their possession pointed to the fact that Monotheism was the original Religion of Man" (p. 24). That is a sweeping statement, and it becomes still more sweeping and extravagant when we discover that one man is made to speak for the whole science of archeology and one man for that of anthropology. The man who is to be accepted as the sole and final authority in archeology, the most inexact of all the sciences, is one who himself never professed to be an archeologist, but an Assyriologist, and who in all his work was notoriously inexact, the late Professor S. H. Langdon of Oxford; while the authority who is to speak for the whole of anthropology, even though the most eminent anthropologists repudiate his theories, is the Catholic ethnologist, Wilhelm Schmidt, until recently Professor in Vienna. Let us examine these two men to see how strongly they

1. Marston, *The Bible Comes Alive* (New York, 1937), p. 250. Although definitely disagreeing with Marston in his interpretation of archeology, we heartily applaud his generous support of archeology in helping to finance several expeditions in the field, particularly those of Jericho and Lachish.

can speak for themselves, not to mention the two sciences which they supposedly represent.

Of all the advocates of primitive monotheism Schmidt is the one who makes the most extravagant claims for his method and its results. His most elaborate work, *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee* (1926-1937), already runs to six large volumes, each comprising over 1000 pages, but his theories are most succinctly presented in his *Origin and Growth of Religion*.[2] Schmidt is harshly critical of all methods but his own, and particularly so of any method connected with evolution, as being totally subjective, quite innocent of historical research (p. 158), and leading to "cloud-castles lacking positive, exact, and concrete support" (p. 156). In contrast, his own method, the ethnological, or historical, as he often calls it, is absolutely objective, scientific, and authoritative —so he says.

According to Schmidt the true origin and original character of religion is to be discovered from the study of the aborigines still found in remote corners of the world, and that study, he states dogmatically, shows that the further back one carries his ethnological investigation the less of magic he finds and the more of monotheism, proving that man's original religion was absolute monotheism, untainted by magic. The tools and weapons of prehistoric man, and those of the ethnologically oldest peoples of today, viz., the Pygmies, show primitive man to have been of a high order: "His mental powers made their way through nature and analysed her phenomena; his synthetic activities mastered her by forming generalizing and classificatory ideas; he grasped the conception of cause and effect, and then adapted that to the relationship of means to end" (p. 136). The desire to find a cause, combined with the tendency to personify, led man to the recognition of a Supreme Being back of all and the Cause of all, a personal, morally perfect, loving God, the father of all, omniscient and omnipotent, filling and dominating all time and hence eternal, filling and dominating all space and hence leaving room for no other, so great that by himself he sufficed for all needs (pp. 136, 262-283).

However, despite the high intelligence that Schmidt attributes to his primitives, which gave them a religion satisfying the sum total of human needs that should have made them the masters of the world

2. Translated from the original German by H. J. Rose (New York, 1931). The references in parentheses in this and the following paragraphs are to this work.

and not its slaves (p. 283), he recognizes that they lost out in the struggle for existence. Squeezed into unattractive and remote corners of the earth (pp. 252 ff.), these peoples, once vigorous and intelligent (p. 136), were socially and economically backward (pp. 254, 256), and hence lapsed into a condition of stagnation, poverty, and insignificance (pp. 255 f., 289 f.), overcome by peoples more advanced and self-confident and with keener intellects (pp. 159, 256). Thus the primitives never played any important part in the world (p. 256), but were succeeded by peoples of higher culture. The peoples of higher culture, however, developed from the primitives, perhaps indeed from a common Asiatic home (p. 234), and whatever elements of monotheism are found with them are to be accounted for solely as the survival of primitive monotheism, and not as an independent achievement (pp. 254 ff., 261, 285, 288). They were better fitted to live than the primitives, but their religion represents a decadence of the old, with many gods and much of magic (pp. 140, 203, 289). Where the primitives resorted to prayer alone (pp. 154 f., 279, 282), the later cultures, with their larger knowledge and greater self-confidence, introduced magic (pp. 152, 155, 158 ff.).

To Schmidt's contentions there are many objections. He unquestionably idealizes and overrates primitive man, and attributes to him an intelligence, an imagination, and a universal outlook that even modern man has not reached. The god of most moderns is a Hindu god, or a Muslim god, or a Christian god, or even a Catholic or a Protestant god; and the Great War showed us that with most peoples God is still a German god, or a French god, or an English god—scarcely a universal god, but one narrowly provincial. What man has always wanted, and still insists on having, is a god to meet his immediate needs, a god near at hand, a local god. When a Muslim finds himself in very great trouble, it is not to almighty Allah that he appeals, but to the local Weli, even as the Catholic in similar circumstances prays to his patron saint or the Virgin Mary. When modern man finds it so difficult to reach out beyond his environment and find satisfaction in a great High God, it must have been quite impossible to primitive man. With all peoples everywhere it has been to the friendly little spirits, near at hand and approachable, that man has looked for protection, and not to the great gods of the Pantheon or to the great High God when there was one. The great gods were never of much use in daily

life, but belonged to the cultus of the state. They were too far away to be trusted by the common people, or to be meaningful or useful.

What primitive man was first conscious of was, not the universe as a whole, but his immediate environment, the things at hand among which he lived and moved and had his being. He could not possibly know or think of the universe as a whole, and he assuredly had no occasion and no urge to think back of that universe to the First Cause and Creator of all. Primitive man was practical, not speculative, and the category of cause and effect simply did not exist in his psychology, as psychologists have long since recognized. What he had to do was to live, and to live he had to come to terms with his environment, and in doing this he introduced religion, because "religion is man's belief that there is that in his environment which is greater than himself and upon which he feels to some degree dependent and with which he accordingly attempts to establish a relationship of mutual interest and good-will."[3] If this is a correct definition of religion, and it agrees with that of Schmidt himself (p. 2), man's first religion could not possibly have been monotheistic. Primitive man had no occasion to feel a sense of dependence upon an omnipotent, omniscient, universal god, the creator of the world, but upon the many mysterious phenomena that constituted his immediate environment, phenomena which, he believed, did things to him with intent and purpose and may roughly be called powers. Primitive man had no conception of the regularity of nature (he had not lived long enough); he had no conception of forces and laws; the only activities of nature that he knew were these powers round about him that did things to him, and it was with these powers that he felt the necessity of establishing friendly relations, and not with Schmidt's hypothetical and impossible transcendent god, all-powerful, all-righteous, all-wise, the creator and ruler of all. That kind of god could only come after long centuries of profoundest thought and experience, as is demonstrated in the great historical religions, such as Judaism, Islam, and Hinduism.

It is true of course that most, perhaps all the aboriginal peoples known to us today have a belief in a Supreme Being, but it is not so clear that nowhere is the Supreme Being to be found in so clear, so definite, vivid, and direct a form as among peoples who are ethnologically the most primitive, as Schmidt contends. Nor is it at all certain

3. The present writer's definition in *Hebrew Origins* (New York, 1936), p. 77.

that this belief with them is a survival from primitive monotheism rather than an achievement on their own part or an acquisition from others. As all anthropologists have long since recognized, there is no such thing as a racially pure stock anywhere in the world, and there never has been since the appearance of mankind on the earth. From the very beginning there was intermixture of blood and ideas, so that it is utterly impossible that anywhere on the earth, no matter how remote or inaccessible the spot, peoples survive today who are untainted by alien blood and thought. As Schmidt himself recognizes, the primitives that survive today survive as such because they lacked the capacity of their neighbors, got shunted off into the remote corners of the earth, and there became stagnant, with the result that their religion ceased to grow and underwent "that fossilization and loss of inner vitality which is inseparately connected with such a state of rest, and is especially fatal to anything so essentially spiritual as religion," to quote Schmidt's own words (p. 255; cf. also pp. 289 f.). But man does not stand still; he must either go forward or back, and in the case of the primitives he has manifestly deteriorated, so that his religion may well be the survival of a religion developed in a higher stage of culture than the present food-gathering stage. The peoples who became the primitives of today are primitives because they were unequipped to grapple successfully with life, and hence must be decadent in physique, intellect, religion, and everything else. It is scarcely fair to take them, the dregs of mankind, as representative of the species *homo sapiens* in his first virility. The modern aborigine can never be a guide for primitive man because he is not primitive man, or at best he is primitive man at his worst, defeated and decadent. Schmidt himself recognizes this when he says that "the religious forms of the primitive cultures now available do not immediately and without more ado show us the primitive form of religion" (p. 255; cf. also pp. 285, 290). And yet he would argue back from the religion of these decadent primitives of today to the religion of primitive man—a most precarious line of argument, as speculative, subjective, and unscientific as anything which he condemns so scathingly in his opponents. Up to the present we have discovered no method whereby we can determine with absolute certainty what primitive man was and what he thought.

Furthermore, the religion of surviving primitives is not nearly so monotheistic as Schmidt affirms. In fact, it is strictly not monotheistic

at all. Besides the Supreme Being, who is "without exception unalterably righteous," Schmidt finds another being who is the source of evil, but he refuses to call this belief in two powers dualism, because "the good Supreme Being is represented as far the stronger and more important" (p. 271). Indeed, he goes further and asserts that the primitives are monotheists even though they have a plurality of gods, because there is one Supreme Being dominating all the others (p. 264). But this is begging the whole question. Schmidt and all others of his kind give to the word "monotheism" a meaning that it cannot and should not bear. According to the dictionaries monotheism is "the doctrine that there is but one god," and that means the worship of one god, and one god alone, and the denial of all other gods. The primitives of today may show a tendency in the direction of monotheism; at best they are henotheists, but not monotheists; and if Schmidt and his school insist upon calling monotheism what I and others call henotheism, then there is no difference between us on that particular point. If by "white" he means "black," then we mean exactly the same thing, but it is unfortunate that our nomenclature is so different. Schmidt and his followers profess to be objective and scientific, but their use of the word "monotheism" is anything but scientific and accurate, because it includes under a single term ideas that are disparate. As Barton has well said in his review of Shryock's *Desire and the Universe*:[4]

> A primitive tribe was not monotheistic because, in order to give unity to its world, it believed in a supreme god. There is inherent in real monotheism an element of hostility to other beliefs. Genuine monotheism differs from this kind of primitive belief as positive virtue differs from the innocence of childhood. It is something that has been won by struggle. The intelligent leaders of a monotheistic community are conscious of its cost, of its worth, and of its difference from polytheism. The real monotheist denies that other gods have jurisdiction at all or that they exist. . . . Whenever real monotheism has existed it is militant and hostile to the worship of any god but one.

To call the religion of primitives monotheism may save the face of Christian dogma and hoodwink the uncritical, but to call something monotheism that is not monotheism can never make it monotheism.

Marston's second supreme authority, Professor Langdon, reaches conclusions like those of Schmidt, but by a different method. He writes

4. *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, LV, p. 481.

as an Assyriologist, although Marston makes him an archeologist. Langdon's argument, as presented in his *Semitic Mythology* (pp. 89, 93), is that An is the only Sumerian deity whose ideogram in the cuneiform script, originally the picture of a star, is never preceded by the determinative for "god," that ideogram itself being the determinative for "god" used with all other god names. Hence the Sumerian wrote ^{d}Enlil, ^{d}Enki, etc., but never ^{d}An.[5] From this he argues that An, the sky god, was originally the only god that the Sumerians had, and that then, as they fell away from monotheism into polytheism, they thought of the several new gods as simply forms or aspects or manifestations of An, and so in writing their names they used the ideogram for An as the determinative of deity. The same argument was used many years ago by M.-J. Lagrange,[6] and more recently by Langdon himself,[7] in the effort to prove that the Semites as a whole were originally monotheists, having as their one god El, also interpreted as a sky god. From being a proper name originally, it is argued, El came to be used as a common noun to mean god in general, and hence the several gods, as they were introduced, were regarded as forms or manifestations of the original El and so each in turn was called an El.

In these arguments, however, Langdon fails to take account of two facts: (1) when the Semites and Sumerians began to write, they had by that time advanced far along the road to knowledge, and theology was already hard at work on the riddle of the universe; and (2) the Sumerians and Babylonians did not at first use the determinative before god names, the usage being only gradually introduced for the easier identification of the names as god names. When the Sumerians first appear on the pages of history, they are worshipers of many gods, and on this point all scholars are agreed. Out of the early welter of gods, goddesses, and spirits, the Sumerian theologians tried to develop some kind of order, and so in the Creation Myth they traced all the gods back to the father-god An, since he was the sky god and hence god over all, the god *par excellence*. What was more natural, then, than that the sign which represented the sky god, when a system of

5. The superscript *d* is the abbreviation used by Assyriologists for *dingir*, the Sumerian word for "god," here used as a determinative.

6. *Études sur les religions sémitiques* (2nd ed., Paris, 1905), pp. 70 ff.

7. *Op. cit.*, p. 93.

writing came to be invented, should be used as the ideogram of god in general, and the determinative of "god," when a determinative came to be written before god names; and what was more natural than that El, the sky god of the Semites, should likewise come to be the designation of god in general? Instead of seeing in the phenomenon a reminiscence of an earlier, prehistoric monotheism, we are rather to see in it the work of early theologians trying to bring cosmos out of chaos, order out of disorder.[8]

To his earlier argument Langdon more recently added another (in the *Evangelical Quarterly* for April, 1937).[9] This argument runs as follows. The Sumerian religion in its latest development contains about 5000 gods; the inscriptions of c. 3000 B.C. show only 750; the 300 tablets from Kish (strictly Jemdet Nasr)[10] contain only three gods, Enlil, the sky god, Enki, the earth god, and Babbar, the sun god; while the 575 tablets from Uruk,[11] which he dates c. 4000 B.C. (fully 500 years too early), contain the names of only two deities, An, the sky god, and Innini, the mother-goddess. In this statement, however, Langdon is no more accurate than he usually is. In the Jemdet Nasr texts there are more gods than three; he himself speaks of four a little later in his article; in the introduction to the publication of his own texts from Jemdet Nasr[12] he lists the names of five gods, An, Enlil, Enki, Babbar, and Lamma, with the last-named somewhat doubtful; and in some additional texts (published in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1931, pp. 837 ff.) he has discovered still another god, Shara, to make six in all according to his own count; while Falkenstein in the study of his Jemdet Nasr texts indicates the probability of a seventh, Shume, in the personal name En-dingir-shu-me (var., En-shu-me),[13] and still another god, Enlu, is manifestly to be found in the personal name En-lu-ti.[14] Since the archaic texts from Jemdet Nasr and Uruk are as yet very imperfectly understood and the god names are written without determinatives, there are doubtless a number of god names in them as yet unrecognized. With the larger

8. For a fuller discussion see the present writer, *op. cit.*, pp. 180 ff.
9. Reprinted in full by Marston, *op. cit.*, pp. 257-274.
10. Published by Langdon, *Oxford Editions of Cuneiform Texts*, VII (1928).
11. Published by A. Falkenstein, *Die archaische Texte aus Uruk* (Leipzig, 1936).
12. *Op. cit.*, p. vii.
13. *Op. cit.*, p. 36, n. 1.
14. Falkenstein, *op. cit.*, No. 626, II, 1.

understanding of the texts, and with the publication of additional texts of the same kind, the list of gods will unquestionably be extended, but the fact remains that we can never expect the number to be large. Hence Langdon has some right on his side when he says that the numerous pantheon of the late Sumerian period "dwindles down to four and then only two deities," proving, he holds, that earlier there must have been one god alone, the sky god An. To the layman this argument is most impressive and convincing, and particularly so when Langdon goes on to say that "if there really was a larger pantheon at the dawn of history, these numerous tablets, which are all temple records, would have mentioned them." But just there is the weakness of his whole argument. The argument *e silentio* is always a precarious one, and particularly so in the present instance. It is true that the tablets are probably temple records, but they are in no sense religious. With the ancient Sumerians the temple was the centre of business, and all the archaic tablets from Uruk and Jemdet Nasr, with the exception of a few word-lists, are account tablets, listing the quantities of various items (bread, barley, beer, sheep, land, etc.) administered by the temple in its capacity as business agent. In such tablets in the early period, or in any other period, there is seldom any occasion to mention the gods and hence they rarely appear. According to Langdon's line of argument the Old Akkadians of Nuzi had no gods at all, because none of their many tablets so far excavated[15] mentions any gods whatsoever; and yet it is ridiculous to say that they had none, but no more ridiculous than to say that the Sumerians had only four gods in the Jemdet Nasr period and only two in the Uruk period. Outside of texts definitely religious (myths, liturgies, prayers, and the like) the gods of a people are seldom mentioned, and when they do occur in account tablets they are found almost exclusively as elements in the proper names, but it so happens that in the archaic texts from Uruk and Jemdet Nasr there are practically no proper names. The further back we go the fewer are the religious texts, with none from the archaic period; and the earlier the text the fewer are the proper names, with the earliest texts consisting of itemized lists of articles only. Hence the diminution in god names is not at all a reflection of the religious ideas of the Sumerians and has a vastly different explanation from

15. Published by the present writer, *Old Akkadian, Sumerian, and Cappadocian Texts from Nuzi* (Cambridge, Mass., 1935).

that presented by Langdon. The ancient Sumerians might have been worshippers of only one or of a million gods, but neither situation could be reflected in the kind of texts that have been preserved to us from that early period.

Furthermore, these ancient Sumerians were far removed from primitive man, as Langdon himself notes, and he himself recognizes that pictographic writing, no matter how ancient, cannot take us back to the primitive period of religion, to the primitive concept of deity.[16] Even if the ancient Sumerians were monotheists, that does not prove or even suggest that primitive man was monotheistic, because thousands, if not millions, of years lay between them and him, and much can happen both for and against the development of monotheism in a thousand years, not to speak of thousands or millions. There is nothing at all in Langdon's arguments to show that primitive man was monotheistic, and he negatives his whole position when he records, as of course he must, that the antediluvian peoples, who according to the Sumerians themselves antedated them by thousands of years, were polytheists.[17]

Schmidt and Langdon, and their followers, are particularly hostile to anything smacking of evolution, but evolution is not something vicious and obnoxious—if it is not misunderstood, as it is so frequently. For example, Marston is absolutely wrong when he asserts that the theory of evolution is based on the idea of steady, consistent, unbroken progress from barbarism to the present day, and it is not at all correct for him to say that according to evolution the early Israelites should have been illiterates.[18] Like so many others, Marston sets up a man of straw and then proceeds to knock him down. Evolution, as everyone should know, is not a force in itself, and it never runs in a straight line, but has its flows and ebbs, with periods of retrogression as well as progress. In religion there have always been two movements: one toward monotheism, as man rationalized the universe, usually in the person of a religious genius, and one toward polytheism, as experience outran reason.[19] Sometimes one was the stronger, sometimes

16. See in Marston, *op. cit.*, pp. 261, 270 f.
17. See *ibid.*, p. 262.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 22.
19. This is, of course, a general statement and puts the matter too simply; for a more detailed discussion see Cook in W. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites* (3rd ed., New York, 1927), pp. 526 ff.

the other, with the result that all religions, if they lived long enough, became more or less monotheistic in the end, but more monotheistic at some times than at others. Man developed, not piecemeal, but as a unit—physically, mentally, emotionally, and religiously. When he lagged in one field, as he sometimes did, there were maladjustments, and progress stopped or retrogression set in until a readjustment was made. It is utterly impossible to isolate man's religious development and separate it from his general cultural development, from his history, "and that history [to quote Guillaume, *Prophecy and Divination* (1938), pp. 234 f.]—both sacred and profane—speaks with no uncertain voice of the slow and tortuous path which man has taken in his journey from swamp and jungle, hill and plain, to the city and the town." There is absolutely nothing in anthropology or archeology to show that monotheism antedated polytheism, and there is nothing whatsoever to discredit evolution, when evolution is rightly understood.[20]

However, even though we were to grant that the theory of evolution is all wrong and that primitive man was monotheistic, that does not prove that the early Hebrews were monotheists, because they, like the Sumerians, were far removed from primitive man. On the contention of Schmidt the only people in the Old Testament who were primitives were Adam and Eve, and they did not remain primitives long, but ate of the forbidden tree and became agriculturalists, a state of culture far beyond the primitive food-gathering stage, and one that conduces to polytheism, according to Schmidt.[21] The early stories in Genesis are generally considered to represent a monotheistic point of view, and that leads Marston to make another astounding statement to add to the one already quoted, a statement absolutely consistent, however, with the theory of primitive monotheism and the inevitable deduction from it. He says: "Since Monotheism, or the Belief in one God, antedates polytheism or the belief in many, then it is reasonable to regard the Creation, and other stories in Genesis, as representing the original version; and the polytheistic ones as corruptions of it."[22] That is, the Hebrews are to be regarded as having preserved the

20. Dr. Ralph Marcus has called my attention to a passage in Robert H. Lowie's *Primitive Religion* (New York, 1924), pp. 127-33, which supports this position.

21. *Op. cit.*, pp. 140, 209, 238 ff., 287 ff.

22. *Op. cit.*, pp. 29 f. On p. 38 Marston makes the same statement regarding the flood story.

original stories, of which the Sumerian stories are a late corruption, even though we have the actual Sumerian tablets containing the stories written long before the Hebrews ever came into existence. This is a preposterous statement, but apart from that, it is not so clear that the Genesis stories are as monotheistic as generally believed. The oldest of these is recognized to be that in Gen. 2, 3, universally assigned to the document J, and dating in its present form from the ninth century or thereabouts. In a story as late as this, one would expect a more or less monotheistic point of view, but as Alfred Guillaume has well said, a close examination of the story shows that the world of Adam and Eve was not a completely religious world at all, "but a state of society in which magic and religion lived uneasily side by side. The knowledge of God which Adam and Eve are said to possess is not what we understand by knowledge. They were not living in a world of innocence and beauty in the immediate consciousness of the presence of God, as Milton would have had us believe; theirs was the dark, semi-heathen world of polytheism and magic, in which Yahweh-Elohim narrowly escaped disaster through leaving a tree with magical properties within the reach of mortals."[23] The wily serpent, the prototype of Satan, was able to frustrate the purpose of Yahweh-Elohim by persuading simple-minded man to eat of one magic tree, and to prevent access to the other, Yahweh had to expel man from the Garden of Eden and station the semi-divine cherubim as guards to keep him out: "Then Yahweh-Elohim said, 'See, man has become like one of us [note the plural], in knowing good from evil; and now, suppose he were to reach out his hand and take the fruit of the tree of life also, and eating it, live forever!' So Yahweh-Elohim expelled him from the Garden of Eden, to till the ground from which he had been taken; he drove man out, and stationed the cherubim east of the Garden of Eden, with the flaming, whirling sword to guard the way to the tree of life" (Gen. 2:22-24). Yahweh was not the sole power in the world, and he had semi-divine helpers to assist him. He was stronger than man and hence was able to prevent his access to the tree of life, but he was not stronger than the magic inherent in the tree, a co-existent power that could thwart his purpose and endanger his prerogatives. Hence it is not so clear, after all, that the Old Testament teaches the fall of man from a pristine state of perfect religious knowledge and

23. *Prophecy and Divination* (London, 1938), p. 236.

moral perfection; it seems to teach something quite the opposite of this and more in line with modern ideas of evolution. If this were generally recognized, we should have less railings against evolution and less of the theory of primitive monotheism.

Among critical scholars today there is none who claims real monotheism for anyone earlier than Moses; but there are a number who claim this for Moses, and of these Albright is unquestionably the most outstanding. Unfortunately he has not presented his argument at any length. He discusses the matter briefly in his *Archaeology of Palestine and the Bible* (pp. 163-167), and in a recent article in *The American Scholar* (Spring, 1938, pp. 186 f.), entitled "Archaeology Confronts Biblical Criticism."[24] In that article he says "The only time in the history of the ancient Near East when we find monotheism in the leading cultural centers, Egypt and Babylonia, is about the fourteenth century B.C.; it is also then that we find the closest approach to monotheism in Syria and Asia Minor. Since it is now an historical commonplace that we find similar ideas emerging simultaneously in different parts of a given cultural continuum, we should expect to find Israelite monotheism somehow emerging about that time"—viz., in the time of Moses, according to Albright.[25] The argument is most unconvincing, and the statement can be challenged at a number of points. There was no great, onrushing movement toward monotheism in the Near East in the fourteenth century, such as Albright affirms. There is no evidence that Syria and Asia Minor were more monotheistic then than at any other period. The texts from Asia Minor do not show this, nor do the Ras Shamra texts,[26] to which Albright apparently has reference. El may have been a great High God to the people of Ras Shamra, but along with him were hosts of other deities, many of them little less important than he.[27] The Babylonians and

24. It is true, as Albright states, pp. 181 f., that "the majority of archeologists take a much more conservative attitude toward the historical records of Israel than do philologically trained men." But there is a reason for this: the archeologist is always looking for something to confirm the Bible because his investing public demands this.

25. *The American Scholar*, Spring, 1938, p. 186; so also his *Archaeology of Palestine and the Bible* (New York, 1931), p. 163.

26. These are texts written in a cuneiform alphabet recently discovered at Ras Shamra on the North-Syrian coast and still in process of publication. The latest treatment in English is C. F. A. Schaeffer, *The Cuneiform Texts of Ras Shamra-Ugarit* (New York, 1939). For complete bibliography see Schaeffer, *Ugaritica*, I (Paris, 1939), pp. 147-207.

27. See Bauer, *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, LI, 81 ff.; LIII, 54 ff.

Assyrians never became real monotheists,[28] and were no more monotheistic in the fourteenth century than they were later. As a matter of fact they were less so, because the texts over the following centuries show an ever-growing tendency to emphasize one god to the exclusion of the others, or through the absorption of the others, so that the most monotheistic of the texts date considerably after the fourteenth century. The only real monotheist in the ancient Near East was Ikhnaton of Egypt (and some scholars question this), and he had no great following. What following he got was obtained by force, and he made so little impression upon his own people that his religion was stamped out as a vicious heresy immediately following his death after a brief reign of only eighteen years. Instead of helping the cause of monotheism Ikhnaton killed it by bringing the Egyptian movement toward monotheism to a head too soon, by making too great a break with the old religion, by resorting to force to establish his religion, and by dying too soon, leaving no proper successor to carry on his work. If Ikhnaton was not able to impress his own people in his own life-time, it is surely unthinkable that he was able after his death to impress an alien like Moses, particularly so when Moses lived, as Albright believes, in the period of bitter reaction against Ikhnaton.

However, even though Moses and his people were surrounded on every side by the most monotheistic of peoples, it would not follow at all that they would necessarily become monotheistic themselves, nor is there a necessary presumption to that effect. In contrast with the tiny flicker of monotheism which momentarily developed in Egypt's religion in the time of Ikhnaton, is the dominating role of the resurrection idea throughout her whole history, and yet this idea, which had everything in favor of its adoption, made no impression whatsoever on the Hebrews or any others of the ancient Near East. It is one of the enigmas of history that the Hebrews were so little affected by the culture of Egypt, when both history and archeology show such intimate contacts between the two. Albright protests that "the history of religion in Israel was not a microcosmic reflection of the evolution of religion in world-history; it was just as homogeneous and as much an organic entity as the history of religion in Egypt, in Babylonia, or in ancient Rome,"[29] and yet he would derive Israel's monotheism from

28. See the present writer, *Hebrew Origins*, pp. 180 ff.
29. *The American Scholar*, Spring, 1938, p. 187.

a hypothetical world movement instead of having it grow out of its own roots in Israel, in and out of its own environment, influenced no doubt by world thought, but largely independent of it—a monotheism that became the religion, not of a single man or a few religionists, but of a whole people, and a monotheism that was strictly monotheistic, as the others, with the possible exception of Ikhnaton's, were not. Albright protests against giving a unitarian definition to the word "monotheism," but, as we have already indicated, the only acceptable use of the word is in its dictionary sense, and it is Albright and his kind, rather than his opponents, as he affirms, who are "highly misleading" when they read into the word a meaning that it cannot and should not bear.[30]

We heartily endorse Albright's dictum that "the history of Yahwism in Israel, north and south, becomes unintelligible unless we accept the clear evidence of Israelite tradition"; but Israelite tradition nowhere says or indicates that Moses was a monotheist—not even in Albright's sense of the word. Since we have no autobiography of Moses, it is impossible to say with certainty what he did or did not believe. At best the Old Testament account can only be credited with general and not with detailed accuracy, and in that account the most explicit statement on the subject attributed to Moses is the first command in the Decalogue. Even though we grant the Mosaic authorship of this command, the most that we can claim for Moses in it is henotheism. Neither here nor anywhere else does he deny the existence of gods other than Yahweh. Even Professor E. O. James, who is an anthropologist as well as an Old Testament scholar, and has decided leanings toward the theory of primitive monotheism, has to acknowledge that the command asserts nothing more than monolatry and not pure monotheism,[31] and so conservative a churchman as the late Bishop Gore has to concede that it neither proves nor disproves either monolatry or monotheism.[32] The command reads literally:

30. In answer to my request for a statement regarding his idea of early Hebrew monotheism Albright wrote, to make the whole matter crystal clear: "When the monotheistic orbit of Israel encountered the monolatrous carpolatrous orbit of Canaan, a secondary oscillation was produced, giving rise to an elliptic movement with two foci, one the original monotheistic one, the other an henotheistic one of secondary origin."

31. See *A New Commentary on Holy Scripture*, edited by Gore *et al.*, p. 673*a*; cf. also Brown, *ibid.*, p. 84*a*.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 84*a*, note.

"Since I, Yahweh, am your god who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of a state of slavery, there must not be to you any other gods against my face," the last phrase of which, *'al-pānay*, "against my face," is most uncertain in meaning. It may mean "in my presence," or "on an equality with me," or "alongside of me," or "to my disadvantage," or "in addition to me," or even "in defiance of me," as most recently suggested, but no meaning that anyone has yet suggested indicates anything other than henotheism or monolatry. As a matter of fact, the meaning of the command is too uncertain to permit its use as a proof-text of monotheism or henotheism or anything else.

Another statement attributed to Moses, but questionably so, is Deut. 6:4, which is usually translated, "Hear, O Israel; Yahweh, our God, is one Yahweh," whatever that may mean. If it makes any sense at all, it seems to mean that there was only one Yahweh and not many, as there were of the Baals; but grammar and syntax both indicate that the popular translation is wrong, the correct rendering being, "Hear, O Israel; Yahweh is our God, Yahweh alone." Again there is nothing to suggest anything more than henotheism.

Albright protests that "it is singularly lacking in historic logic to insist that because we find undoubted indications of henotheism in the traditions of early Israel all Israelites must have been henotheists";[33] but unless we have evidence that some were monotheists we cannot affirm it. Outside of Deut. 4:35, 39 and 32:39, there is absolutely nothing in all the reputed sayings of Moses to indicate that he was a monotheist, and no modern scholar would regard these passages as genuinely Mosaic. On the other hand, there is much to indicate that Moses was not a monotheist. Over and over again in the records of the work of Moses and his time, late though the records are, the Hebrews are represented as Yahweh's peculiar people, just as the Moabites are represented as the peculiar people of Chemosh. Take, for example, a passage as late as Judges 11:24, "Should you not occupy the territory of those whom Chemosh, your own god, drives out, while we occupy that of all those whom Yahweh, our God, has driven out of our way?" Yahweh and Chemosh are here represented on an absolute equality, and the reality and power of Chemosh here and elsewhere are no more doubted than those of Yahweh himself. Usually, however, inborn pride in one's own, common to all peoples,

33. *The American Scholar*, Spring, 1938, p. 187.

caused Yahweh to be represented as greater than the other gods, as, for example, in Exod. 15:11:

> Who is like thee among the gods, O Yahweh?
> Who is there like thee, so glorious in holiness,
> So awe-inspiring in renown, such a wonder worker?

Or Deut. 3:24:

O lord Yahweh, thou hast only begun to show thy servant thy greatness and thy mighty power; for what god is there in the heavens or on the earth who can do such deeds and mighty acts as thine?

However, this is nothing but flattery, quite after the order of that which we find in all polytheistic literature, as, for example, in the early Vedic or Egyptian hymns.[34]

Once Yahweh is represented as a great High God assigning to the different peoples their deities, viz. in Deut. 4:19:

Beware, when you lift your eyes to the heavens and see all the host of the heavens, the sun, the moon, and the stars, that you do not let yourself be allured into paying homage to them and serving them, whom Yahweh, your God, has allotted to all the peoples everywhere under the heavens.

In another passage, Deut. 32:8 f., Elyon seems to be the great High God, with Yahweh subsidiary to him:

> When Elyon gave heritages to the nations,
> When he made divisions among mankind,
> He assigned the realms of the nations
> To the various deities;[35]
> And Yahweh's apportionment was his people,
> Jacob, the allotment for him to receive.

As I have tried to show in my *Hebrew Origins* (pp. 35, 193), the new thing that came with Moses was not the worship of Yahweh to the exclusion of all other gods, but the exaltation of Yahweh above the other tribal gods and the united allegiance of the several tribes to him as their confederate god, Yahweh being to the confederacy as a whole what the tribal god was to the tribe. Moses organized his followers into a confederacy or amphictyony, and he made the old tribal god Yahweh the god of the amphictyony, and in his name made a cove-

34. See the present writer, *Hebrew Origins*, pp. 184 ff.; Barton, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, LV, p. 481.

35. This translation follows the superior text of the Septuagint and Old Latin; the Hebrew text reads "To the various Israelites."

nant with the people. This was henotheism and not monotheism. It was the selection of one god out of many for exclusive worship by a particular group as a group, and such theological particularism, as always, was the inevitable outgrowth and accompaniment of a political particularism, a movement toward nationalism. As Principal Graham has well said in answer to Albright, "Modes of theological thought never establish themselves as disembodied ideologies. They develop along with, and inside of, corresponding institutional structures."[36] In the words of Breasted,[37] "Monotheism is but imperialism in religion," and a world dominion, a world concept is the necessary prerequisite to the idea of a world god. In the time of Moses the Hebrews were just getting their first lessons in nationalism and could not possibly reach up to a world concept or a world god. Moses unquestionably sowed the seeds of monotheism, but the real fruitage did not come until centuries later, in the time of Deuteronomy, Jeremiah, and Second Isaiah, who were the first to claim Yahweh as the one and only god of the world and not of the Hebrews alone (Deut. 4:35, 39; 32:39; Jer. 5:7; 10:2 ff.; 16:20; Isa. 41:21 ff.; 44:9 ff.).[38]

36. *The American Scholar*, Autumn, 1938, p. 423.
37. *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, p. 315.
38. For the origin and development of Hebrew monotheism see the present writer, *Hebrew Origins*, pp. 176-203.

COMMUNICATIONS

A REPLY TO PROFESSOR MACINTOSH

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If it were not for the request of the editor, filial piety would have dissuaded me from answering my former teacher's rigorous criticism of my theological views. I owe so much to him (though he will find it difficult to believe this since I have strayed so far from his position) that I would prefer to remain silent under his castigations, particularly since I cannot defend myself without calling attention to the fact that he has taken less trouble to understand his former pupil than the latter took to understand him. But that is undoubtedly a senior scholar's privilege.

Professor Macintosh's primary concern about my position is that in defining religious concepts as "mythical" I have disavowed their "literal truth." He assumes that in having disavowed their literal truth I have emptied them of all truth. Whereupon he compares me with a whole host of *Als Ob* philosophers of religion as varied as Feuerbach, Bishop Brown, Santayana, and Vaihinger, and can find no difference between them and myself, except some degree of "moral earnestness" which he generously ascribes to me. This is just about as sensible as to declare that Hegel and the logical positivists hold to the same metaphysical convictions because both deal with logical concepts, though obviously the one regards logic as a way to metaphysical reality and the others do not. I use the word "myth," and therefore I must in his opinion, be put into the category of "mythical fictionalists." He quotes with approval the words of the late Professor Charles Bennet: "To take religious knowledge as literally true is impossible, yet to assign it merely symbolic value is disastrous." I can, of course, heartily subscribe to those words. The trouble with Professor Macintosh is that he is unable to distinguish between truth and literal truth. He believes that at least the basic concepts of religious faith, "such as that of God as a superhuman and rational intelligence and moral will, are to be taken as literally true and their contradictories as literally false." I should think that Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* would have proved pretty conclusively that it is not possible logically and

literally to ascribe concepts which are loaded with connotations of the finite world to the divine. Far from following Bradley's example and landing in an acosmic and undefined and indefinable absolute, I believe in making assertions of faith about the wisdom and will of God, but with the reservation of not regarding these or any other human assertions about the divine as "literally true." They are true with reservations.

When Professor Macintosh accuses me of having for God nothing "but the night in which all cows are black," he proves how completely he mistakes my purpose. It is by purely rational and not by "mythical" methods that we arrive at the sorry alternative of having either a naïvely anthropomorphic god, or a god whom we can not "name lest we blaspheme him." Either we ascribe absolute significance to finite values, or we are so afraid of doing this that we define God in terms of the "final nothingness." To speak of the mythical character of religious concepts is not to assert their merely subjective significance. On the contrary, it is assert that poetic, or symbolic, or mythical concepts may be true, even though they transcend rational forms.

It would be interesting to know whether Professor Macintosh would carry his crusade for literal truth so far as to demand that artists cease from giving the illusion of depth and perspective to their pictures by painting angles as they really are, and not as they must be made to appear to be, if two dimensions are to be suggested on a one-dimensional canvas. Or would he suggest that Walt Whitman's poetic appreciation of Abraham Lincoln is a purely subjective fantasy and has no objective reference, simply because it is poetic and symbolic? It might be necessary to question scientific symbols as much as poetic and religious ones, if Professor Macintosh's passion for literal truth is to be taken seriously. I have never seen an atom and have no way of testing whether this is a literally true symbol of reality in its most microscopic form. I have a suspicion, however, that it could not pass Dr. Macintosh's test.

How completely beside the point Professor Macintosh's criticisms are, may be seen from his effort to find a core of literal truth in some of the myths of religion, in order to prove that they are not "wholly and without remainder of the nature of myths." He believes that there is "literal truth in the doctrines of the Incarnation: spiritual values worthy of man's absolute devotion found fuller realization, probably

in the will, character and active self-sacrificing love of Jesus of Nazareth than in any other human being known to us in history." My difficulty with this minimum of "literal truth" is that it is too minimal to have any real significance. St. Paul speaks of Christ as the "express image of His person," and Professor Macintosh, despite his certainty that God is both superhuman intelligence and moral will, finds in Jesus only the incarnation of "spiritual values" worthy of man's devotion. Thus Jesus may define a moral ideal for him, but not absolutely, for no person immersed in the relativities of history can be an absolute ideal. Hence he inserts the word "probably." The spiritual values worthy of our devotion "probably" find fuller realization in Jesus than in any other character of history.

While I am unable to accept the orthodox theory of the two natures of Christ, which I regard as the inevitable consequence of seeking to rationalize a myth, I believe that Christian faith rightly intended something more in its belief that Christ reveals God to us than Professor Macintosh's pale confidence in the "probable" full realization of spiritual values in the Jesus of Nazareth. The question to which the Incarnation was the answer was: What is God like? More particularly it was the question: How is divine mercy related to divine judgment? Christian faith saw in the life and death of Christ upon the Cross a symbol and revelation of the relation between the divine mercy and the divine judgment, in which mercy does not cancel out judgment and yet is triumphant in the end. The message of the Atonement is that God finally overcomes the sins of the world in his own heart, and only thus is sin finally overcome. This is an answer to a much more ultimate problem than those faced in liberal theology, which imagines that if we only had a clear knowledge of the highest spiritual values, we would be true to them.

In the same way, Professor Macintosh wants to convince me that there is "literal truth" in the story of the Fall, and that therefore it is not "merely a myth." The truth which he extracts from the myth of the Fall is precisely the rationalized version of human evil which I find inadequate. I believe the myth of the Fall has much more truth content than he finds in it. The Fall means to him that man repeatedly fails "to do as well as he can, with the evil consequences of that repeated failure in his own character and in his social influence." This

is practically identical with Schleiermacher's rationalization of the myth of the Fall, and I think it is too pale and uninteresting. The myth of the Fall interprets sin, not as the weakness which prevents us from doing as well as we can, but as the evil which arises from our pride and our unwillingness to recognize our weakness as creatures. It interprets evil in human life, not as the sloth and inertia of the particular self against the claims of the universal self, but as the pride of the partial and limited creature which pretends to possess universal truth and absolute moral perspectives which no finite creature can possess. "Original sin" stands for the inevitability of this error of pride in all human history, and does not mean the perpetuation of a mistake in my character and social influence.

Professor Macintosh closes with the admonition that "mere external theological conservatism" is not enough to revive our "languishing modern religion." I do not know of a single word that I have written which would suggest any interest in conservatism and orthodoxy as such. As a matter of fact, nothing fills me with more dismay than the tendency of some theologians to flee from the superficialities of liberalism to the discredited dogmatism and obscurantism of orthodoxy. I have no interest in reviving orthodoxy. My only interest in orthodox symbols and concepts is derived from my belief that they contain truths, and that these truths are answers to problems and questions which have been obscured in the past centuries of Renaissance and Enlightenment. These problems are more ultimate problems about the tragic character of human history than the problems which the age of reason regarded as final; and the answers have significance only if these problems are recognized as real.

I do not see very much in most liberal theology except the addition of pious phrases to the characteristic faith of the bourgeois-liberal period, faith in the essential goodness of man and in the idea of progress. It seems to me curiously ironic to defend a Christian interpretation of life and history as being "literally true" because it is in essential agreement with this liberal faith. My own conviction is that the Christian religion is profounder and deals with more ultimate issues than the faith of the modern period, and that the tragic character of contemporary history may give the basic affirmations of the Christian a new relevance, which they have not had for the modern man. At the

same time, the modern mind is affronted if it is asked to accept as "literally true" symbols which deal with the relation of time and eternity, and which can not possibly be literally true. In fact, I should think it would not be unfair to say that, in the field of religion, any statement which is literally true has no particular significance.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Culture Historical Method of Ethnology: The Scientific Approach to the Racial Question. By WILHELM SCHMIDT. Translated by S. A. SIEBER. New York: Fortuny's 1939. xxx + 383 pp. $5.00.

Primitive Revelation. By WILHELM SCHMIDT. Translated by JOSEPH J. BAIERL. St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder Book Co., 1939. ix + 309 pp. $2.75.

Pater Schmidt has long been a forceful figure in ethnology, or, as we more commonly designate it in this country, anthropology. In 1906 he founded the Austrian journal *Anthropos,* to which he has been a frequent contributor. His article in its first volume, on "Modern Ethnology," shows his early interest in ethnological method; an interest which has persisted to the present. At an early date, too, he published in that journal articles on "The Origin of the Idea of God," a theme which has occupied his attention to the present. Other journals, in particular, the *Mitteilungen der anthropologischen Gesellschaft zur Wien,* the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* and, latterly, the *American Anthropologist,* have published contributions by him. These articles, however, constitute the smaller portion of his writings; and most of their contents have been incorporated in later books. Linguistics also has been a major interest.

He has published a book on Australian languages, the languages of Melanesia, Polynesia, and Malaysia, and the Mon-Khmer, of southeast Asia. Another work deals with the pigmy peoples of Africa, Asia, and the Oceanic islands; a people who, he believes, represent an earlier physical strain and therefore (his therefore) an earlier culture, than any other existing people. He has published also, with Wilhelm Koppers, a treatise on *Race and Culture,* a general ethnology of world-wide scope. He has been in touch, by correspondence and often through personal contact, with Catholic missionaries the world over, and has stimulated many of them to study, and to describe in *Anthropos,* the customs and beliefs of the tribes with whom they were working; so that this journal became a valuable storehouse of much excellent ethnography.

In 1928 a *Festschrift* was published in homage to Wilhelm Schmidt, a hefty volume with contributions from many anthropologists, representing nearly all countries and many out-of-the-way regions.

Pater Schmidt has been an assiduous reader of ethnological and ethnographical literature, and his thought has compassed almost all major phases of the field; including, in addition to the special interests referred to above, myth, material culture, social life, and even, in one of his latest volumes, physical anthropology. In nearly every instance, these have been worldwide in scope. Among contemporaries, perhaps only Boas could be said to have a comparable record. One turns, therefore, with considerable eagerness to his most recent productions, these two books.

Professor Clyde Kluckhohn contributes a Preface to the *Culture Historical Method of Ethnology*, in which he expresses the hope that American colleagues will study more carefully than they have done in the past the theories of Pater Schmidt; and the translator contributes at the end of the volume a Glossary to aid the reader of the book. Professor Kluckhohn finds the book "chiefly remarkable for that erudition which has made Dr. Schmidt world famous." It seems to the reviewer startlingly innocent of erudition and remarkable as an exercise in logic without the compunction of adducing illustrative data.

One reads pages by the score filled with logical propositions and—there are a few exceptions—without a single citation of ethnologic data to confirm a point or illustrate it; so that this reader, at least, is for the most part kept guessing as to what precisely, in ethnologic fact, is referred to. For example (I aver that I opened the book at random), we read:

> *Logical Demonstrative Value of the Methodological Criteria.* Precisely then, when we maintain that culture always and everywhere, also in the so-called material culture, is nothing else than either a passive manifestation of the spirit (which the spirit itself experiences and in which it itself is formed), or an active manifestation (which, by activating and confirming the spirit's own inner disposition, molds it anew and influences other persons or things), can we give epistemological-theoretical proof for the demonstrative value of the criteria which we shall presently put forward. Graebner did not concern himself with this epistemologico-theoretical basis. It appears that he did not feel the philosophical and logical necessity for this (p. 141).

The reviewer sympathizes with Graebner in this matter. I suspect that one can put ethnologic meaning into the above statement; but also I suspect that there is no self-evident ethnologic meaning in it.

Assuredly Pater Schmidt has a method, or thinks he has, and he

is not overcome with humility in his claims regarding its validity and utility. It is the method described by Graebner in 1911, now in some details modified by our author, but otherwise held fast.[1] The Graebner-Schmidt method is not a maybe-method, but a certainty-method; it carries no half-way measures of culture reconstruction but bridges all space throughout the world and all time throughout human history. Lest it seem that here and there the reviewer is slightly distorting the claims of the author, we shall present much of the argument in the words of the book. The reader who checks with the book will find, I believe, that none of the following passages out of their context misrepresents the direct argument or the implication of the context. In the logical and statistical sense they are typical and not exceptional.

"It is," he says, "essential to true science that it strive after certainties, that it aim at certitude. A study that rests content with probabilities and possibilities, that consists of mere hypotheses and theories would not be a science" (p. 3). Elsewhere (pp. 46-47), we are told that "Steward very fittingly recalls that the most exact scientific laws also are philosophically but statements of high probabilities." The last quoted statement is repeated (p. 143), and is followed by the following sentence: "This fact is also generally recognized by modern higher mathematics and by the theory of the natural sciences." Whether the author has changed the basis of his science from certitude to probability; or whether he has made claims for greater certitude in historical ethnology than can be claimed by the natural sciences for their data, is not made clear by the text. I suspect it is the latter, for he nowhere, I believe, admits any exceptions to his rules.

The ground is cleared by sweeping away the poisoned tidbits that have fallen from time to time from other writers not of the Graebnerian school; which it to say, practically everyone in this country, and the misled Graebnerians in England, notably, Rivers, Smith, Perry; leaving, mainly, Schmidt and Koppers, who feel able to hold the fort unaided.

Pater Schmidt finds it "much easier and less painful to subject

1. Pater Schmidt states that W. Koppers has written pages 13-19 and 81-124 of the book immediately under review, but for the purposes of this review I have treated the entire book as the work of Pater Schmidt.

authors to a heartless criticism as to their trustworthiness who lived hundreds or thousands of years ago than our present-day colleagues! However, this, of course, in no way denies that the latter operation is nevertheless often necessary" (p. 115). He expends several pages in this painful penance; calls a spade an outmoded crudity, and the wielder of the spade an ignorant dupe. Thus Radin is said to indulge in "quite unrestrained criticism of ethnological colleagues" (p. 54), and to indulge in "impudent censure" (p. 55) when he says (quoting Radin): "There is something compelling in the effrontery with which Graebner lays down the laws that govern culture growth, and this is probably the reason for his very great influence in Germany and Austria." Father Schmidt finds repellent Radin's acknowledgment of what, to him, Radin, seems compelling; and says so. But then Radin, who "knew how to criticize the others with such caustic eloquence . . . has written monographs exclusively, excellent, indeed, but still mere monographs. His other works are [listing three]. . . . These are of a non-historical nature. Had Radin thoroughly and earnestly devoted himself to the discovery of such somewhat larger relationships, he would have soon experienced how wholesome a little bit of 'chronological obsession' also would have been for him. For his particular critical judgments would certainly then have been essentially more wise and useful" (p. 58).

Other American ethnologists come in for scarcely less caustic criticism and chastisement. Thus, of three who imply that they had read Graebner's *Methode der Ethnologie* Schmidt states outright that obviously no one of them had read it. This is asserted of Sapir, of Radin, and of Wallis. If these several assertions are samples of the author's caution in drawing inferences from ethnologic data his inferences must be viewed with caution; this reviewer is able to state that to his knowledge each of these three men had read Graebner's book on *Methode*. This, of course, only proves Pater Schmidt's point that they are unable to grasp Graebner's thesis; as he says of Sapir, "who . . . had not yet read this important work (which we must certainly assume, if we do not wish to come to even less gratifying conclusions)" (p. 39).

The reviewer admits that the truth is not always gratifying; but under certain circumstances it ought to be preferred to invective and even to wrong inference. (The title page of the book, by the way, bears the motto *Deus Una Veritas,* inscribed within the motto *In Prin-*

cipio Erat Verbum. Whether symbolically or not, the word encompasses the truth.)

"For the culture historical method there are almost no lengths of spatial distance nor any spans of temporal duration which it cannot bridge with the means at its disposal" (p. 173).

Certainly this can not be said of any other method known to us in the field of the social sciences. What are some of the results? Here are two elucidations as to what occurred in Australia and in the New World. Of Australia: "For almost all the cultures of this continent, because of the meager development of their means of water travel, no other immigration is possible than to cross from South New Guinea over the maze of islands of the Torres Strait to land at Cape York in the northeast and then to penetrate southward through the narrow neck of this peninsula. Most probably the oldest cultures continued their journey under the pressure of subsequent waves of culture into the eastern half, which is provided with water and, therefore, with flora and fauna all the way to the extreme south and southeast, where therefore the oldest tribes are to be looked for in the Kurnai-Kulin. Only when East Australia had been inhabited did the following younger tribes branch out toward the west, where they came upon the desert and therefore went along the coast. The very last immigration, the Aranda tribes and their relatives, were forced to be satisfied with the desert region of Central Australia." Having thus disposed of Australia, without regrets, save for the desert-bound Aranda and their relatives, it is comforting to know that "the connection between North American and (Northeastern) Asia is, you might say, still more clear. [Why still more?] Here the present-day chain of islands of the Bering Strait, which was a continuous strip of land at the end of the Miolithicum and the beginning of the Neolithicum, forms the one narrow entrance to the extensive continent of America during those ancient times. Besides, South America is separated from Asia by the whole breadth of the Pacific and the tribes living farthest from the porta invasionis, the Fuegians, belong to the oldest tribes of the whole American hemisphere" (p. 197). If one asks for the demonstration, or the evidence, that thus it was, the answer for the Australian data is a reference to Pater Schmidt's book on Australian languages, and for the latter, the American data, the reference is to Volume VI of his work on religion. He does tell us, further, that "not only the greatest distance of the

tribes from these points of entrance characterize their extremely high ethnological age, but also in cases of smaller distances other factors can bring about the same effect" (pp. 197-198).

By "Primitive culture" Schmidt means the *Ur*-culture, a culture which preceded existing known historic cultures. Thus do we recover some of these nonhistoric Primitive cultures:

> The home of some Primitive cultures could be established with some certainty. All the American Primitive cultures, the South American (Fuegians, Gez-Tapuya) and the North American (north central Californians, the Algonkins) once formed an old culture together with the Arctic culture (Samoyedes, Koryaks, Ainu, Ancient-Eskimo), whose habitat was somewhere in (North) Eastern Asia. To the southwest, the Pygmy culture joined in and was the first to separate from there and split up into an African and a (South) Asiatic group. On the Southeast, the preparatory stages of the later Southwestern Australian Primitive culture joined, which migrated from there over the present Indonesia and New Guinea to Australia. . . . The criteria for the most part already proposed by Graebner have proven themselves sufficient, with several corrections and supplements, to attack with success the particularly difficult and important problem of the home of the culture circles (p. 223).

Here, too, we believe it because it is so; the method pulls the answer out of the bag; and, inasmuch as there are no competing answers, one can not draw a contradictory answer. Q.E.D.

What, briefly, is the culture historical method? This reviewer has failed to discover it. We are to make inferences of culture depth and culture spread; of stratifications, migrations, and (inferred) adaptations in new environments. But when, how, and with what justification we are to make any or all of these inferences I can not discover from this book. Of principles, sub-principles, and so on there is great plenty; but nowhere a succinct statement, much less an illustration of what the method is and how it works under specific conditions. Inasmuch as, then, the entire treatment is of this a priori logical character it would seem possible to answer it only on that level; though the answer, of necessity, must be as bare of ethnologic content as the thesis which it discusses. Let us say, then, that to be valid in the historical or cultural field a method must not only yield results—what method will fail to yield results?—but it must be clear also that it yields correct results, or at least a certain measure of correct results. But how can we know that the results are correct? Obviously, so at least to us it seems, we can

know this only when we have an independent check on those results, a check which does not presuppose their correctness. We could elaborate our above statement at great length; but it seems to me that it is sufficient in this form as a declaration of what is wrong with the so-called culture historical method. Unless we presuppose its truth, we can not prove it; and if we merely presuppose it, we prove nothing. We merely show that the facts can be marshalled in this fashion, and that if we do so, we draw certain types of inferences. But we have no way of discovering whether these inferences are true or false. In short, here we have, not science, but theology; the laying down of dicta and dogma, with abundance of logical demonstration, no empirical findings to support the thesis, and a Viennese School inquisition for ethnologic heretics. In other words, we are asked to take a big dose of wishful thinking.

The Graebner-Schmidt method is not historical; it is logical; and it has to do, professedly, with nonhistorical facts. It is not a device to record or clarify history, in the sense that history refers to documented knowledge whether documented by writing, archeology, myth, or hearsay, but is a device to recover the nonhistorical, to resurrect the dead of which no bones or dust remain, to read an inscription where none was written, to see something where there is nothing to be seen, to imagine what happened when there is no way to determine whether or not it probably did happen. The above observation is not a travesty; it is the plain fact of the case which any reading of the exposition of the theory will show. It is indeed, the boast of the Graebnerian-Schmidt School that it does these things.

It is precisely because it has no validity that "for the culture historical method there are almost no lengths of spatial distance nor any spans of temporal duration which it cannot bridge with the means at its disposal" (p. 173). The only system of thought which in any wise exceeds it in this respect is primitive myth, as told by Australians, North American Indians, Bushmen, and other preliterate folk. Just how, fundamentally, such myth systems differ from the method of the cultural historical school it would be interesting to know. To those who listen to them with assent, their assertions are plausible; and the plausible, it seems, must be true, or it would not be plausible. If you do not believe it, that is merely because you do not accept it. Or you

have not read Graebner; or, having read, nevertheless, do not comprehend the master.

Ethnology, we are told, endeavors "to become ever more and more a real historical science" (p. 340). But will all the logic in the world enable us to dispense with a knowledge of how things happened? Can we by any scientific principles not derived from the very facts in question, possibly resurrect by logic the civilizations of the ancient world, or the events of European history, at any time in the past or present, by the laws of logic or of methodology? In the historic cultures, we can check our logical inferences against the facts inferred; for preliterate cultures we have, for the most part, no such checks. When we can not check our inferences for preliterate cultures, is there any reason to suppose that we shall be correct with regard to them, even though, as we know is the case, we can not be correct in the spheres of the historic cultures? There are too many unknowns in the equation. And what, indeed, is the equation? Whatever the laws of culture development, if there are such laws, I suspect they can not be legislated but must be discovered.

I have dwelt at some length with this book of Father Schmidt, because it seems to me that his diatribes and lengthy exposition call for a response; and a prayer that if he has some data in support of his theory he adduce it. After his barrage of logic we should like to see a few ethnologic facts moved up toward the front and put into action. And, subsequently, we should like to examine the casualty list.

Primitive Revelation, to which we referred above, was not written in its present form by the author. It is composed of "several of Dr. Schmidt's recent publications; although we confess," the translator writes in the Preface, "that this task would have had far happier issue if he himself had the leisure to undertake it personally" (p. v). Among the works utilized is the six volume work on the origin of the idea of God (*Der Ursprung der Gottesidee. Eine historisch-kritische und positive Studie*. 6 Vols. Münster in Westf., 1926-1935). His several other treatises on religion have also been consulted by the editor-translator. The reviewer has not checked any portions of this book with the original passages, but believes, from internal evidence, that the translator has done his work well; however, as the translator indicates, the result is his selection and not Dr. Schmidt's.

I was a bit befogged when I read *The Culture Historical Method*

of Ethnology, for I had encountered a theological (or certainly a logical) approach to ethnology, and did not know whether my favorite horse had become a newfangled Arabian pony, or had been transformed with a coat of paint into a new species of striped zebra. In this new dress, the ethnology, so-called, runs, but makes some strange streaks.

It was a relief to take up *Primitive Revelation;* for here, as though to complete the turn of the wheel, we have an anthropological theology; and I hoped to be able to comprehend at least the anthropological part of it. The book is well named; it is a revelation. The purpose of it, presumably, is lucidly stated by the Translator's Preface in his opening sentences: "Apologetics is the comprehensive and scientific vindication of the grounds of Catholic belief" (p. iii).

This means, he states, that the Catholic church holds the true doctrine, which eventually must be accepted by all men. Christ, the center of Christian doctrine, "did not appear in history abruptly and unannounced. His way was prepared by gradual and progressive revelations. Our task is to show the credibility of these, from the very threshold of history to their fulfilment in Him." The light of revelation was for some time dimmed, "yet it continued to glow among those peoples who remained at the most primitive levels of culture; until at last it was entrusted to the keeping of God's chosen people, Israel, and thus became man's common heritage once more" (pp. iii-iv). In primitive peoples, then, that is, in contemporary preliterates, we are to find the beginnings of Christianity, or, at least, a survival of the early revelation which eventually led to Christianity. Pater Schmidt finds it there in prevalent monotheism.

As we have mentioned, one of Father Schmidt's interests has been primitive languages; he has written books about some of them. In *Primitive Revelation* he has a sub-section entitled *The Origin of Language*. Anthropologists, of course, are interested in origins. This is what we are told (the passage deals with the second chapter of Genesis):

> With a naïve and almost childlike simplicity, the origin of language is here related with an unsurpassed profundity of thought. To say that God brought the animals to Adam for him to name them, is but an abbreviated expression of the truth that, as he became more familiar with the untouched beauty of nature, Adam gradually learned to know the animals about him. And each time a new animal came into his ken, its qualities and powers were

quickly gauged by his keen mind; each new marvel loosed the bond of his tongue and brought a sound of jubilant wonder to his lips to characterize unerringly just that trait in the individual creature which appeared to him most striking.

Thus did the first man unconsciously and spontaneously become the creator of language by His God-given prerequisites of intellectual perception and a suitable bodily organ (p. 14).

The matter intrigues the author, and subsequently he returns to the topic, with another sub-topic on *The Origin of Language*, and several subsequent related topics.

He does not say whether the idea expressed at the end of the next to last quoted sentence above is original. As an ethnologist, the reviewer suspects borrowing, for this is precisely Mark Twain's interpretation, if not his precise words. Thus, according to Mark Twain (I rely on memory), when the animals were led before Adam, Adam was at first nonplussed for suitable names, then bethought him: "That one looks like an elephant, so I will call it an elephant; that one looks like a giraffe, so I will call it a giraffe." And so on. In support of which interpretation is the fact that today each animal looks like what it is called—an elephant looks like an elephant, and not like a mouse; a hen looks like a hen, and not like a hippopotamus. One wonders whether these numerous correspondences in interpretation came about by sheer chance; perhaps they illustrate convergence.

Father Schmidt reasons further, as follows:

An especially profound insight into the nature of the animals, particularly of the individual species, is by no means demanded by the conferring of names itself; and, for that very reason, it cannot be inferred from this fact. The names of the animals, as well as those of other things, could be derived from a single attribute which for some reason or other (not always the most profound) appeared to man the most obvious and outstanding quality; as, for example, when the gazelle was called "the slender one," the lion was designated "the strong one," the elephant "the great one," etc. (p. 162).

These sentences occur in a section on "Prerequisites for the Creation of Language," wherein is set forth, also, that

the creation of language, as recounted in Holy Writ, admits of only two presuppositions: first, that man grasped his essential distinction from all animals, even the higher ones; secondly, that he also recognized somehow the qualities of the animals and of other things (p. 161).

Further, for Schmidt has a good deal to say regarding the passage

which states that God led the animals to Adam to name. There could be no design and intent in all this, and at the same time its casual character be preserved. A mechanical and simultaneous marshalling of the animals before Adam seems inappropriate and unnecessary. The meaning is rather this: God directs the movements of a particular animal so that at some time or other it crosses the path which Adam chances to be treading; at another time He could impel Adam interiorly to walk upon paths where he would happen upon animals. . . . Holy Writ . . . when it narrates that Adam gave the animals their (first) names, . . . recounts nothing less than the invention of language by him. . . . If this achievement be attributed to Adam, he is one of the greatest geniuses of all time. And in fact, we have every reason for crediting him with this accomplishment (p. 159).

We may also be grateful (observation by the reviewer) that he did not keep the invention to himself.

Father Schmidt is troubled by the serpent and its machinations in the Garden of Eden and devotes a sub-section to it.

The account of Adam's naming the beasts in the second chapter asserts that he found none like to himself, precisely because no animal could reply to his speech or hold converse with him. [This seems to imply that Adam had speech before he gave names to the animals; whereas we had inferred from the passage quoted above that the naming of the animals was the beginning of speech.] This wide chasm separating man and beast is referred to in other portions of Scripture, with never any attempt to minimize it. And so, when the Bible alleges as a motive for the appearance of the serpent that it "was more subtle than any of the beasts of the earth which the Lord God had made," the object is evidently to suggest why the guise of this facile animal could be so appropriately used by the enemy to hide his identity. Furthermore, God's cursing of the serpent is directed both to the form and the bearer of the form. [Presumably, God distinguishes between the two.] As to the further behavior of the serpent, such a conservative exegete as G. Hoberg writes: "How can we explain the serpent's speech? That it expressed its own thoughts by means of articulate sounds is impossible. Therefore we propose the following explanation: At the sight of the serpent Eve experienced the temptation to break God's law. So intense did this temptation become that Eve ascribed to the serpent the power of human speech. . . . The latter acted immediately upon the woman's senses and so brought about the notion of the serpent's having spoken." In other words, the woman, with her more active feminine imagination, imagined and believed that she heard the serpent speaking; the man, Adam, having previously recognized that the animals had no power to commune with him, could not have been deceived by any beast and was immune to the devil in the serpent guise (pp. 32-33). . . . Neither may the fact of the serpent's speaking be interpreted as signifying converse between animal and man, as we have

seen above; and in no other place of Holy Writ is an animal in any way exalted to the position of man's companion (p. 215).

Perhaps; but nowhere in *Primitive Revelation* is there reference to the conversation held by Balaam's ass. I assume this is an oversight upon the part of the author and is not attributable to ignorance of the text.

Eve gave the plants their names. The flowers were properly her sphere. In the Andaman Islands—which, however, are not said to be the location of the Garden of Eden—girls have flower names (pp. 219-220). (So do they in parts of India, Mexico, and South America; which gives considerable regional support to the author's hypothesis.)

A sub-section on Eve chivalrously states:

> The prominence given to Eve in the narrative of the fall is in no way a reflection upon woman; rather it is intended to make the sin of our first parents appear less heinous than it would have been otherwise.
>
> Woman is so constituted physically and psychically that she is aptly termed the link between man and child. Even as a mature being, she retains, so to speak, certain characteristic traits of childhood as part of her essential nature, enabling her the better to train her child. Among her spiritual faculties, the imagination and affections seem to predominate over the calm deliberative faculty of reason far more than in man. So she could be seduced more easily by a temptation aimed particularly at the imagination and affections. Her guilt, too, might appear mitigated; and, to a certain extent, she could rightly seek to justify herself by pleading that the serpent had deceived her. (pp. 33-34).

I suppose she might plead also, in extenuation, that if she had not been deceived by the serpent there would be no mankind to worry about the original sin and subsequent sins.—But these matters are beyond the reviewer's competence.

A Summary section dealing with economic conditions reaffirms the underlying principles of the culture historical School:

> The numerous details which we have set forth make it plain that the scriptural narrative referring to the times of primitive revelation really belongs to the eldest period of mankind's evolution; on all the later evolutionary levels such a narrative would be incongruous and anachronistic. From the coign of vantage of our present twentieth century, and after countless ethnological investigations, we of today can reconstruct a picture of the first beginnings of the human race; in many points this picture harmonizes with reality. But, of course, it is utterly out of the question that such a picture could have been sketched by the Israelites, could have been excogitated out

of nothing at some later period in their history. Had the Israelites really set themselves to compose such a picture, it would have proven to be something totally different, perhaps something like the Babylonian histories, which from beginning to end are stamped with their later origin or transition (p. 221).

In *Primitive Revelation,* as in the six volumes of his *Ursprung der Gottesidee* and other books and articles, Pater Schmidt asserts the monotheism of preliterate man. In this case he does not infer it, but finds it. And finds it universally. Our comment is that what one finds by way of monotheism will differ very much from one region of the preliterate world to another; and will differ according to the refinement of categories used in making observations of types of preliterate beliefs. Some generalizations can be made. It can be said, for example, that all peoples believe in a world of supernatural phenomena which pass human understanding; and they are apprehensive of some at least of these phenomena.

Personification of certain natural forces is wide spread; and belief in spiritual incarnation in natural forces, or some of them, is also widely held. All peoples, moreover, have a mythic past, an era when men or other creatures lived which had powers not possessed by men or by any known creatures of the present day. In many areas, some of these beings created or transformed the world or assisted in its creation or transformation.

Often a god is conceived as more powerful than any other, and sometimes as more powerful than all others. Usually, however, the creator is not a present god, in the sense that he is conceived as exerting or being capable of exerting supernatural power at the present day. Like a deluge of old which has expended its power, he is a figure of the past, an otiose personage who long since retired from cosmic and even from mundane and human affairs; he was a god, but now is not potent. Such is the case among creators, transformers, or initiators of the present order of the world, among Algonkin, Iroquois, California tribes, in short, in practically all parts of the preliterate world. These have-beens constitute the great mass of Pater Schmidt's cloud of witnesses to monotheism, assembled in his six volume work on religion.

There are, to be sure, higher gods among the lower peoples: the sky god of Bantu peoples and other African folk; Sedna, among the Eskimo. Middle American higher cultures have a rather elaborate

pantheon of respectable gods, or, at least, of potent gods, each powerful in his sphere. But these pantheons are scarcely instances of monotheism. Instances of monotheism are, indeed, difficult to find either in historic or in nonhistoirc cultures. In this respect Mohammedanism and Judaism stand alone among historic cultures; and surely preliterate monotheists are rare. More often there is a hierarchy of powers; or if not a heirarchy, a gradation of powers; or a separation, sometimes rather rigid, of spheres of influence and effectiveness.

In Father Schmidt's ethnological and religious theories I find not the establishment of theses, but superabundant assertions of theses, and enough dogmas to found a dozen cults and confound the judicious. I find exercises in logic, but no patient examination of hypotheses with supporting data and weighing of alternative hypotheses; I find no attempt to apply these hypotheses so that one can say that they are correct or that they are incorrect. For that reason they appear to be useless, and in their present nudity, without a fig leaf of fact, irrelevant. A theory which can not be proved or disproved, which can not be shown to be probably correct or probably incorrect, will not profit historical research.

Though one speak forever with the voice of wrangle, and have not the clarity of facts, it availeth nought. Critics are not demolished by hurling abusive terms at them, or by asserting that failure to agree with Graebner demonstrates that they have not read Graebner, or that, if they have read him, have not comprehended his message. Religion, as has been surmised, may have had its birth, or at least its conception or inception, in humility. Without too much vaunting of ethnology, there is much to be said in defense of a little humility toward ethnologic data before converting hypotheses into incontrovertible principles and gaily charting the regions of the unknown.

Perhaps, too, there is some validity in the procedure of the natural, biological, psychological, and historical sciences which proceed from the known to the unknown, rather than conversely. How we can know more about the unrecorded past of culture than we know about its recorded present, remains a puzzle. I do not believe Pater Schmidt and his follower, or followers if he has them, have resolved that puzzle or in any wise aided in the reconstruction of an unknown past. The historian who reconstructs the past by logic is not esteemed a good historian; and I believe that an ethnologist who proceeds in that wise is

not a good ethnologist. To that proposition, I believe, every professional logician and every professional historian will agree.

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Glaubensgeschichte der Indogermanen. Erster Teil: *Das Religiöse Artbild der Indogermanen und die Grundtypen der Indo-Arischen Religion.* By J. W. HAUER. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer: 1937. xvi + 357 pp. RM 10.

With a sterling name in scholarship, the author has ventured in this first part of his new work once more into the field of Indology and the history of religions, yet not without conveying, even in the thinly veiled title, a pregnancy that almost amounts to a confession. This treatment of the history of the faith and beliefs of the Indo-germanic peoples is fraught with a special significance, in that it heralds a more comprehensive understanding of the religio-philosophical undercurrent, if not full-fledged movement, that is bound to affect the outlook of a large number of people, by giving them a historic foundation at once in agreement with the new drift in the Third Reich and devoid of the bombast of an iconoclast mythology. The Professor's views, enlarged by extensive travels, are wide enough, and his presentation philosophical and psychological enough to appeal to the modern intellectual who keenly senses the presuppositions of his own skepticism, yet is thankful for a solid foundation for his devotional urges and aspirations. Hence the book, though it may not declare it quite so blandly, is more than a history; it is exposition, guide, and source of inspiration all in one. Those who might have scruples may be assured that there is really no antithetical development of the theme; instead we get an objective treatment of a *geisteswissenschaftliches Problem* which happens, as the author sees it, to have a biological basis. Beyond this, there is nothing particularly alarming or even startling in this first part of the work which we are reviewing. As a novel presentation of the main currents of original Hinduism it is far too important for the student of the Orient to pass it by. To the student of ethics and of religion, it will assume an even greater importance when the second part, so long promised, and probably appearing this year, will be available.

Of axiomatic statements the book is remarkably free, despite its

dealing with things of faith. Philosophical excursuses are not rare where they help to elucidate certain meanings. Careful study has been bestowed upon the correct translation or paraphrasing of terms, one of the chief neglects of most writers on Hindu philosophy and religion. The elusive German *Gemüt* for *buddhi* is splendid. Very helpful also is the translation of the much misunderstood *prakṛti by* "production," "creation," and "primal nature" (*Urnatur*). The brief statements concerning the original form of the *Bhagavad Gītā* might appear rather dogmatic, yet have as much force as all other attempts in this direction. Professor Hauer's own translations will surely be welcomed, as well as his vigorous defence of the protean Rudra as a genuine Vedic deity. The treatment of Buddhism within the *Weltanschauung* of the Indo-germans appears weak in many points, except where Prince Siddharta, or the Tathāgata himself, is the object of a searching enquiry after deeper values. It requires complete readjustment with the aid of Professor Hauer's philosophy to see in Buddhism a radical optimism instead of, traditionally, an unorthodox philosophy and the prototype of pessimism. But on that account the seventh chapter invites close scrutiny.

These few remarks however do not convey the proper scope of the work which lies in the evaluation of the religious, ethical, and thought life of the ancient Hindus, in so far as it shows certain idiosyncrasies which the author deems not only worth-while but essential within the entire group that possesses biological and psychological kinship with these Vedic and post-Vedic conquerors of India. A parallelism has often enough been attempted. What Professor Hauer does is to trace what he, in his chapter on the comparison of Kant's "intelligible subject," succinctly describes as the character of the metaphysical thought of this kinship in its tendency toward an organic whole, more specifically, the interlacing of a species of analytical psychology with an ontically oriented metaphysics. The genial Paul Deussen had done it before, but with a monomania for monism; Rudolf Otto had done it, too, in his *West-Oestliche Mystik* and elsewhere, but with more theological reserve; others have done it also and differently, but none with the rigorous discipline of a belief in *Artgebundenheit*.

Perhaps we make too much of this approach. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that from a non-Christian world of ideas virtues have been deduced which have always been considered intrinsic to Christian

ethics. We said interesting; from another point of view dangerous might have been the word, if the as yet relatively small circle around the Professor expands, which it doubtlessly will in virtue of the cogency of his liberal philosophy. If we confine ourselves to the German scene alone, there is no doubt that neither the Confessional nor the German Christians, nor any other denomination, Christian or otherwise, have to offer such a rationalization mixed with as strong an appeal to the deeper, humanistic, and spiritual emotions, as does the faith portrayed here. Whoever wishes to avoid surprises in the development of the German religious consciousness must needs study this phase if no other.

What does this faith consist in? A rather complete answer may be found in the first chapter, and an epitome in some of the titles of the following ones from which we gather these key words: Discovery of the Self; vision of the eternal ground of life; mysticism, the tragic heroism of those taking refuge in God; the pious view of the world; the passive heroism of him who has conquered the world; Yoga, the noble restraint. Except in one case, the typical Indian reference has been left out by us purposely in order to show better the spiritual appeal. The Christian parallels everyone may draw for himself when we now broadly outline the implications of this faith which the land of the Ganges has preserved so well, and which strikes a harmonious chord on the banks of the Rhine, and on the slopes of Mt. Fujiyama, where the Samurai believes in his Zen Buddhism.

It should be said that Professor Hauer rejects the all-too-convenient theory of the evolution of religious beliefs. He maintains it is highly artificial to postulate only one species of experience which is then followed by others; he strongly holds that there are several phases, and that their manifestation must be explained by the general character of the person or people. The laws of religion to be found intimated on pages 7 and 192, for instance, should be consulted in this connection.

Perhaps the most interesting discussions have to do with mysticism, the inclination toward a philosophical attitude, and a certain ethicism to which the Indo-germans are given. The elements of wonder and the urge for salvation are said to be generally human. But the concept of God always allegedly developed according to a certain tension which allows him to be neither exclusively transcendent nor exclusively im-

manent, neither wholly personal nor yet utterly impersonal. In fact, the belief in the personality of God is one of the most distinctly Indian traits. God does *not* disappear in nature. Personality is the symbol under which he appears; the I-thou pervades all Indian religious speculation, while the form of prayer is wholly determined by this relationship. The free personality (cf. Sanskrit *svabhāva, svadharma, svarājya*) has, according to Professor Hauer, always been the ideal within those communities of which he is writing.

The solution of the problem of freedom must then be looked for either in the ontological nature of the self or subject, or in the general attitude toward the Real. The pivot of the moral life within this *Weltanschauung* is not the adjustment, in life and thought, toward dogmatic concepts of good and evil, but the inalienable longing to realize the universal law and order in human society and the unquestioned subordination to it as the right. Duty, honor, and obligation to fight for law and justice are vital and intrinsic to this view; justice, not in the juridical sense, but a justice with a larger validity. Hence, we have an activism, a heroism (of action *and* renunciation), a bringing of sacrifices for the sake of the higher Being under whom we live, not by fate, but in whose bosom we work world history. The highest and ultimate answer of the Indo-germanic mind to the problems of eternal things, was a theomonism (cf. p. 320).

In conclusion, may we just briefly refer to the problem of tolerance which is surely a formidable one, in view of the parallel developments which Professor Hauer sees, for instance, between the emphasis on the dark sides of the Rudra-Śiva belief in India such as it was and is, climatically, hygienically, and geographically, and the post-World War theologies, particularly that of Barth with its "character of wrath," or the recurrent periods during which, as in the *Bhagavad Gītā*, there has appeared the tragic conflict of the duties of the soldier who must fight for honor and country, yet not without inflicting harm on his own kin.

In this book, Professor Hauer squarely stands upon the doctrine laid down by Kṛṣṇa-Viṣṇu that "Everywhere men follow in my traces," and, "I am offering myself to each in whatever way he is seeking me" (cf. p. 10). How typical and widespread this attitude of magnanimity and respect for other religious convictions is, is further illustrated in the book by the quotation of one of the Rock Edicts of the Buddhist

Emperor Aśoka. And this tolerance is also part of Professor Hauer's faith.

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Three Chapters from the Samādhirājasūtra. By KONSTANTY RÉGAMEY. (Publications of the Oriental Commission No. 1.) Warszawa: The Warsaw Society of Science and Letters, 1938. 112 pp.

The Bhadramāyākāravyākaraṇa. Introduction, Tibetan text, translation and notes. By KONSTANTY RÉGAMEY. (Publications of the Oriental Commission No. 3.) Warszawa: The Warsaw Society of Science and Letters, 1938. 135 pp.

These excellent Warsaw publications painfully recall the loss to science and culture caused by the recent European events. That at least their author may be allowed to accomplish his intentions, which are only partially brought out in the present volumes, is to be hoped sincerely, in the interest of our still inadequate knowledge of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

In the meantime, Mr. Régamey presents us with chapters 8, 19, and 22 from the *Samādhirājasūtra,* which he intends to edit completely, in a careful critical edition of both the Sanskrit original and the Tibetan translation, accompanied by a translation into English. His English translation, which seeks to restore the exact meaning of the text, makes copious use of the Chinese version and of the *Kīrtimala,* the commentary by *Mañjuśrīkīrti* preserved in Tibetan. In the Introduction, the author deals in detail with such matters as metric and language of the Sanskrit text, which, especially in the *Gāthās,* shows many peculiarities owing to the effort of giving a literary form to a local dialect. An index of proper names and technical terms occurring in the selected chapters, in their Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese equivalents, and a list of the Chinese words, further enhance the scientific value of this volume.

The *Samādhirājasūtra,* the importance of which is testified by the fact that it is one of the "Nine Dharmas" of Nepal and by extensive quotations in Buddhist works, has never been critically edited. Its full title is *Sarvadharmasvabhāvasamatāvipañcitasamādhirājasūtra,* "King of meditations, expanding the quality of all the *dharmas* in their essence." This fundamental *Samādhi* here denotes a verbal formula to

be meditated upon, which is treated rather as a *dhāraṇī*, a text to be read, recited, learned by heart. Loosely connected with this main *Samādhi* subject are passages bearing on collateral subjects of meditation, as is the case with the chapters here selected for their doctrinal importance. Thus, Chapter 8 teaches the non-existence of all the *dharmas*, illustrating the usefulness of this meditation by the story of the Bodhisattva "Born of Non-existence" by name. In Chapter 19, the old conception of the point of the hair on which the entire universe is placed, is used in order to show the equality of all the *dharmas*. Whether this hair containing the universe is identical with the consciousness immanent in every being is not stated expressly, but seems likely according to the interpretation by *Mañjuśrīkīrti*. The latter, however, represents a pure *vijñānavāda*, whereas the *Samādhirājasūtra* stands rather in the middle between a strict *śūnyavāda* and an elaborate *vijñānavāda*, thus leading Mr. Régamey to suppose that the scheme of the so-called "Three Swingings of the Wheel of Doctrine" is too rigid to be applied indiscriminately. In the Chapter 22 (corresponding to Chapters 22 and 23 in the Tibetan), for instance, which deals with the nature of the Buddha's bodies, the idealistic point of view is evident in the identification of *nāmarūpa* = *citta* (mind). The knowledge of only two bodies of Buddha, on the other hand, and the opposition which is stressed between the illusory *rūpakāya*, or material body, and the real *dharmakāya*, or absolute body, are akin to theories found in the *Prajñāpāramitā* texts. The assumption that the *Samādhirājasūtra* originated in the age of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*, i.e., in the third century A.D., is, according to Mr. Régamey, further borne out by the fact that, already in A.D. 557 there existed a complete Chinese version of the *Samādhirājasūtra*, known in China as the *Candrapradīpasamādhisūtra*, which was made by *Narendrayaśas*. It differs considerably from the original as well as from the Tibetan translation, the latter being made by the Indian scholar *Śīlendrabodhi* and the Tibetan translator *Bande Dharmatāśīla* in the ninth century A.D.

Mr. Régamey bases his edition upon four Sanskrit manuscripts in Nepalese script of recent date, and upon the Peking and the Narthang editions of the Kanjur. By comparing the Tibetan text with that of the Co-ni xylograph at the Library of Congress, the following variants were obtained, which, because of the difficulty of access to Tibetan originals, may not be unwelcome here. In some cases, they so obviously

present the better reading that some typographical error on Mr. Régamey's part may be suspected. The *Samādhirājasūtra*, or, with its complete Tibetan title, *'Phags-pa chos thams-cad-kyi raṅ-bžin mñam-pa-ñid rnam-par-spros-pa tiṅ-ṅe-'dsin-gyi rgyal-po*, is to be found in the *Co-ni* edition volume *da* (11) of the *Mdo* section, f. 1-200.

Chapter 8: §3, 6th line: after *dri daṅ*, C adds *ro daṅ*; §5, 6th l.: *rigs*; §9, 8th l.: *gsuṅs-so*; §12, last l.: *pa*; §19, 5th l.: *spras*; §22, 2nd l.: *'dug-nas*; last l.: *tu*; §24, 4th l.: *rtsi*; §28, 3rd l.: *mdzad*.

Chapter 19: §4, 2nd l. from below: *na, skrag*; §8, 7th l. fr. bel.: *pas*; 2nd l. fr. bel.: *nas*; §9, 5th l.: *rjed*; 6th l.: *dbyaṅs*; 9th l.: *de 'di-mtar*; 11th l.: *sgrub*; §12, 1st l.: *ja'i*; 9th l.: *daṅ*; §13, 3rd l.: *po*; 4th l.: *baṅ*; §14, 3rd l.: *bya-ba*; 8th l.: after *cad*, C adds *kyi*; §16, 3rd l.: *chi*; §20, 2nd l.: *bzad-pa, tsha . . . tsha*; §26, 4th l.: *gdon*; §27, 4th l.: *'dzin*; §29, last l.: *dag*; §35, 4th l.: *nags*; §37, 1st l.: *baṅ*; 3rd l.: *sgrub*.

Chapters 22, 23: §4, 3rd l.: *de*; §7, 1st l.: *de-yaṅ*; §8, 7th l.: *bklag*; 8th l.: *gdon*; §11, 4th l.: *brtag*; §12, 5th l.: *sbyaṅ*; §13, 4th l.: *'jig*; 6th l.: *sgom*; §19, 1st l.: *rlabs*; §20, 4th l.: *rñed-de*; §22, 2nd l.: *kyi*; §23, last l.: *goms*; §29, 1st l.: *de*; §32, 1st l.: *stoṅ*; §33, 3rd l.: *maṅ*; §34, 3rd l.: *naṅ*; §35, 4th l.: *klan-ka*; §36, 2nd l.: *par*; §38, 18th l.: *ṭū*; §39, 2nd l. fr. *bel.*: after *sla* adds *ba*; §51, 3rd l.: *brtag . . . gis*; last l.: instead of *bsam-du-med* reads *ma brtags-so*.

In his Introduction to the *Bhadramāyākāravyākaraṇa*, Mr. Régamey states what in his opinion constitutes the requirements for a translation of a Buddhist text which is not preserved in the original. Because the translation into a European language makes up to a certain degree for the reconstruction of the lost original, he demands that such a translation, which may be based on the Tibetan version as the most accurate one in most cases, should, nevertheless, indicate in the footnotes all existing *variae versiones* including the seemingly absurd ones. Such a "critical translation" he finds desirable even in cases where the original has been preserved.

Following his own very reasonable demands, Mr. Régamey, therefore, in the foot-notes to his English translation quotes all deviations from the Tibetan text occurring in the two Chinese translations of the third and the seventh century A.D. respectively, trying to explain them if possible and translating according to them in a few cases where the

Tibetan version of the ninth century A.D. is undoubtedly wrong. He also refers to the commentary of the *Dhammapada*, and especially to some Khotanese fragments which give different versions of the narrative, if not the doctrinal matter, of the *Bhadramāyākāravyākaraṇa*. The theme of this story is the one, well-known in literature, of the sorcerer who, defeated in his art by one mightier than himself, is unable to revoke his charms. In this case it is Buddha who, invited to the sorcerer Bhadra's feast, turns his treacherous machinations to shame him, into means to his own humiliation and subsequent conversion. This story is cleverly used to illustrate the doctrine that, not only Bhadra's magic but everything, including even the person of Buddha, is illusory, which culminates in the words (§18): "The enjoyments and gains of all the beings are created by the magic [*māyā*] of *Karma*, this order of monks is created by the magic of the *Dharma*. I [i.e., Buddha] am created by the magic of wisdom, the universe . . . is created by the magic of all the productions; and the entire reality is created by the magic of the complex of conditions."

Apart from an enumeration of the tetrads of *dharmas* characteristic for a Bodhisattva, the *Bhadramāyākāravyākaraṇa* shows a remarkable unity of contents which give it a definite literary value besides that of being an important source on the conception of *māyā* in Buddhism. Mr. Régamey incidentally suggests a connection of the name Bhadra and its variants with the spreaders of schisms and doubts in Buddhist tradition, and believes its identification by Kern with Śiva to be not without foundation.

The *Bhadramāyākāravyākaraṇa* (Tib. *Sgyu-ma-mkhan bzaṅ-po luṅ-bstan-pa*) belongs to the collection of texts called *Ratnakūṭa* (*Dkon-brtsegs-pa*) which Mr. Régamey, just because of its late compilation, believes to contain some of the oldest and most important texts. Since only a few of the forty-nine works collected under this title have been edited so far, the edition of a series of "*Minor Ratnakūṭa Sūtras*," intended by Mr. Régamey and done in the same thorough manner of the *Bhadramāyākāravyākaraṇa*, will be extremely valuable.

The three recensions used for the edition of the Tibetan text of the *Bhadramāyākāravyākaraṇa* are those of the Peking and Narthang xylographs and of the Berlin manuscript. Besides a list of proper names and technical terms in Tibetan and their reconstructed Sanskrit forms, Mr. Régamey gives a list of Chinese words occurring in the text and

a tabulated list of corresponding paragraphs in the Tibetan text and the two Chinese versions in Taishō which will be appreciated by scholars interested in Chinese Buddhism.

GERDA HARTMANN

Library of Congress

The Qur'an; translated with a critical rearrangement of the Surahs, by RICHARD BELL. Vol. II. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1939. vii + 345-697 pp. $6.00.

The first volume of this new critical work on the Qur'ān was noticed in the *Review* for November, 1938. This second volume contains Sūras XXV-CXIV, with a note on dating, and Indices to the whole work. It is somewhat of an advantage that the two volumes, save for the Table of Contents, are paged continuously.

The same system of using printing devices to separate out the component parts of the Sūras has been followed, and the author's conclusions as to the composition of each Sūra are given in brief introductions set at the head of the Sūra before the translation begins. This higher criticism of the Sūras, attempting to show their composite structure and its historic development, is of course, highly speculative, since it depends almost entirely on the delicate weighing of numerous little pieces of internal evidence, each of which has itself first to be interpreted and assigned its place in one of the various categories of evidence with which the critic is dealing. It is not to be expected that there will be universal agreement with all Dr. Bell's conclusions, nor with all his interpretations, nor with the weight he gives to this or that piece of evidence. What impresses one, however, is the care with which the weighing has been done. It is a fairly safe prediction that those who have spent longest at the study of the Qur'ān will be the slowest to reject the results that have been reached in this work.

Perhaps the most apparent result is the revision of our estimate on the relative amounts of Meccan and Madinan material in the Qur'ān. In 1860 Nöldeke, himself using largely internal evidence, made a fourfold division of the material in the Qur'ān as belonging to the Early, Middle or Late Meccan, and the Madinan period of the Prophet's activity, and, though recognizing that many of the Sūras were composite, had listed them in what he imagined must have been their chronological order. This order is familiar to most readers from

Rodwell's translation, which, for the most part, follows Nöldeke's order. Investigations since Nöldeke's time have shown a decided tendency to reduce the amount of material ascribed to the Meccan, particularly the Early Meccan period, and to increase that coming from the Madinan, a position which is supported by other lines of study, particularly that on the *Sīra*, which indicates that a great deal of what we were wont to consider Meccan material must have come from a much later period. As we now see it, the great bulk of the revelations in the Qur'ān would seem to belong to the Late Meccan and Madinan periods of the Prophet's activity, and perhaps our next step will be to see if we cannot subdivide this Madinan material into early and late. In any case, Dr. Bell's work offers us a great deal of evidence that even early material was worked over in Madina. His own theory is that the Prophet himself did this working over, preparing the material for a book which he wished to leave to his community. The reviewer is still inclined to attribute much of it to the Committee appointed by the Caliph 'Uthmān to compile the Qur'ān, who had to fit together as best they could the material from various sources that was brought them, though it is quite possible that the Prophet had in Madina reissued early revelations in a form revised to suit new conditions, both the revised and unrevised forms at times coming into the hands of the compilers. Each of these theories explains some phenomena better than the other, but whichever is correct, the fact that the revelations as we have them are in a form in which they had been worked over in Madina, seems no longer a matter of question. Some Early Meccan material was doubtless incorporated, perhaps quite untouched, and other early material was combined with later, but by far the greater part of the book consists of revelations coming from the later years of the Prophet's activity, which have been worked up into book form.

Occupation with this question of the composition of the Sūras should not, however, be allowed to obscure for us the other important fact that this is a new translation. Snouck Hurgronje, in his section on Islam in the fourth edition of the Chantapie de la Saussaye *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, complained that all European translations of the Qur'ān have fallen between the critical treatment and the desire to give the orthodox Muslim interpretation (1. 655), and, now, more recently, August Fischer in the *Berichte* of the Saxon Academy (Bd.

89, 1937, No. 2) has questioned "der Wert der vorhandenen Koran-Übersetzungen" on the ground of their lack of philological method, most of our translations being from persons who were only Arabists in a secondary way (or even translations at third or fourth hand). Dr. Bell, however, is primarily an Arabist, and his translation is definitely made from critical premises, having regard to orthodox Muslim interpretation only when it has some independent interest or importance.

Naturally there will be dispute as to the validity of many of his renderings, as when the root *why* is rendered "to suggest," or *mirra* as "forceful," etc., but the renderings given are always possible ones, for which a case may be made out. It is perhaps a legitimate criticism that he has at times been too much influenced by root meanings of words in suggesting new renderings. In Arabic, as in English, words often come to have meanings far removed from that of the root from which they are derived, so that derivation is not necessarily a key to meaning. For instance, it seems a little hazardous to translate *taṣaddā* in LXXX, 6 as "thou makest thyself an echo," on the ground that *ṣadan* means "an echo" from the root *ṣadā* "to clap the hands," when the verb *taṣaddā* (Form v) is not uncommonly used in the sense "to apply oneself attentively to," so that in this verse the natural meaning would be "thou art all attention to." But these are small points. More serious is the fact that, in an endeavor to be literal and follow the Arabic construction as far as possible, the English diction has suffered, so that occasionally the reader has to look at the original to see what the English means.

There is a curious slip in proof correcting in n. 2 on p. 577, where the transliterated Greek words have been transposed, and the second one, which should have been the first one, has been misspelled. For the rest the preparation and printing of the book are excellent. At the end there is a note on the principles involved in the attempt to date the various passages, and lest there should be any confusion as to the meaning of the rubrics giving relative dates, a Table of the main events in the Prophet's life is included, with the Hijra year given. One could have wished for a more elaborate Index, but the matter of costs would seem to have made that impossible.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

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Gott und die Sünder im Palästinischen Judentum nach dem Zeugnis der Tannaiten und der apokryphisch-pseudepigraphischen Literatur. By Erik Sjöberg. (Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten und Neuen Testament. Vierte Folge, Heft 27.) Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1939. xxiii + 286 pp.

Dr. Sjöberg professes this book to be a re-examination of the sources of George Foot Moore's section on "Man, Sin, Atonement" in his *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era* (Vol. 1, pp. 445-552). The dependence on Moore's work is, truly, far more than casual. There are many places, where Sjöberg writes without acknowledgment, in which the very words are those of Moore (e.g., pp. 2, 3, 4, 6, etc.). In other places, precisely the same documentation is used to point the same conclusions yet Moore is not cited. Finally, there are many places where Moore is either quoted directly or used as documentation. This comment is not made to detract from the work of Sjöberg, but to re-emphasize the outstanding merit of Moore's treatment of this period.

The conclusions reached by Sjöberg do not differ radically from those presented by Moore, despite the greater intensity possible because of Sjöberg's concern with the single problem of the relationships subsisting between God and the sinner. The contribution of this book lies neither in the novelty of its conclusions nor in its author's examination of unusual sources. Its value is to be found, rather, in the systematization of this material into a clear body of doctrinal information.

Broadly, the author distinguishes the attitude toward sin and the sinner in Rabbinic (i.e., Pharisaic) sources from that to be found in the Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphic literature. Here he follows Travers Herford (*Talmud and Apocrypha*, 1933) as well as Moore's famous article, "The Rise of Normative Judaism" (*Harvard Theological Review*, 1924, pp. 307-73), in declaring the difference between the two attitudes to be one of degree than than of kind. Normative Judaism, Pharisaism, he maintains, is catholic; it "represents the product of long reflection, by many different people, of different temperaments, working under different conditions" (pp. 263-64); it is a full and rounded presentation of a religious doctrine compounded by compromise out of the many varieties of Jewish belief. The Apocryphal-Pseudepigraphic literature, on the other hand, "presents only

the religious ideas which were those of their respective authors in specific, actual situations" (p. 264).

This difference is manifested chiefly in the lessened importance of the attribute of mercy in the Apocryphal literature. Through Pharisaic Judaism, mercy and justice are Divine attributes of equal importance to the doctrine of sin and atonement. Justice, however, predominates after death; mercy, before. The sinner who repents can, because of God's mercy, be assured of complete forgiveness; the sinner who dies unrepentant and unregenerate can, because the operation of God's mercy terminates at death, look forward to the application of strict justice. Since much of the Apocryphal literature is eschatological in character, and is concerned with the last judgment, the operation of mercy would naturally tend to be minimized. In those parts of the body of Apocryphal literature which are not apocalyptic, both mercy and justice are equally emphasized.

The analysis of the working out of justice and mercy is carried on under three main heads: Sjöberg discusses the operation of the dual attributes first in relation to the entire people of Israel as a sinful people, that is, as a people neglectful of the fundamental links between itself and God, manifested in God's love for Israel (the "Chosen People" doctrine), and in Israel's possession of the Torah, entailing certain "covenanted" obligations; then, in relation to the heathen, where justice is less tempered with mercy; and finally, in relation to the sinful individual. This discussion is supplemented by an elaborate treatment of the terms and the nature of repentance, of "return" to God.

The author reaffirms Moore's conclusion that there was no inconsistency felt by the Jew in the dual attribution of justice and mercy, and is at pains to point out that both attributes are typical of Jewish theological thought. The reason for this emphasis appears in the conclusion to the book, where Sjöberg denies firmly that the appearance of mercy as a Divine attribute in Rabbinical literature can be ascribed to Christian influence. There is simply, he maintains, in Rabbinical literature, "an increased emphasis upon a factor which was always present in Judaism, and of which we can find definite traces even in the Apocryphal-Pseudepigraphic literature" (p. 264).

There are many points at which exception might be taken to Sjöberg's work. For example, his placement of the Apocalyptic material in

a consistent "mystical" stream of Jewish thought of which the Cabala is one later manifestation, though it has the authority of Ginzberg (not as on p. 191, note 2, Kohler), is in need of much qualification and probably even more sophistry, if it is to stand up at all. So, too, in his treatment of the "heathen" the author does not distinguish, as all the Hebrew sources, from the earliest period, do, between the various different degrees of strangerhood, towards each of which a different combination of justice and mercy is manifest.

On the whole, however, this is a satisfactory re-examination of the Tannaitic and Apocryphal sources relating to the doctrine of sin and atonement, and an excellent ordering of these materials and the conclusions to be drawn from them.

Joseph L. Blau

New York City

The Hebrew Moses: An Answer to Sigmund Freud. By Trude Weiss Rosmarin. New York: The Jewish Book Club, 1939. 64 pp. 60¢.

This is an answer to Freud's book, *Moses and Monotheism* (New York, 1939), whose thesis was: (a) that Moses was an Egyptian; (b) that the monotheism which he taught the Israelites was, in the immediate though not necessarily in the remote or ultimate sense, of Egyptian origin; (c) that the Israelites killed Moses; (d) that the memory of both the monotheistic teaching and the crime was repressed, but persisted in the unconscious; (e) that, first, the classical prophetic activity and, second, the Christian conception of a god murdered by men are both to be understood as the "return of the repressed,"—the first, specifically, as the re-emergence into consciousness of monotheistic ethical teaching, and the second, specifically, as the psychic recapitulation of ("atonement for") an earlier crime; (f) that the religious history of Israel argues, among other things, for a special mass capacity for "instinctual renunciation," which is what the abstractness of the monotheistic view, as well as its relatively greater emphasis on fatherhood (as against the maternal principle) demands; (g) that the relation of the Jews to Christianity, and vice versa, is partly to be understood in the light of the refusal of the Jews to accept psychic guilt; and (h) that the phenomenon of tradition in religion, and in cultural life generally, bears a close affinity

to, and is to be understood by analogy with, the phenomenon of "latency" in individual psychic life.

Dr. Rosmarin's book deals mainly with points (a) to (c) inclusive. Points (d), (e), (f), and (h) she largely or wholly ignores. (Considering her point of view and purpose, the inattention to point (f) is especially strange.) Point (g) she misunderstands so badly as even to miss the implication that Freud finds the Jewish stubbornness on this point rather admirable than otherwise. (But she is not alone among Freud's critics, both favorable and antagonistic, in having wrenched this point out of its psychoanalytic and allegorical context into a sociological and historical one, where it does not belong.)

With reference to points (a) to (c), she reviews evidence from the Egyptologists, the Sinaitic, Palestinian and Mesopotamian archeologists, the historians, and the textual critics, to refute many of Freud's assumptions and conclusions—those, e.g., as to the real nature of Ikhnaton's religious reform, the date of the Exodus, the ethnographic distribution of the practise of circumcision, the cultural level of ancient Israel, the real significance of the Pentateuch's linguistic debt to Egypt, or the crucial one (after Ernest Sellin) that Hosea records a tradition of the murder of Moses; and the insufficient or self-contradictory nature of other parts of Freud's case.

Finally, Dr. Rosmarin propounds a "psychoanalytic" theory of her own as to Freud's motivation, to the effect, namely, that it is his "Jewish self-hate" speaking in *Moses*. This allegorical foray could well have been dispensed with, since, though "self-hate" may be as reprehensible as self-love, as a phenomenon of the culture-process it needs, if a reality, some understanding prior to judgment.

Analysis of the issues involved is in most cases spared the reader, and reliance is had largely upon citation of authorities. This would seem justifiable in the case of a popular tract, such as Dr. Rosmarin is self-evidently writing, but it also makes for the unjustifiable impression that Freud has been merely intrepid and wrong-headed; whereas the truth of the matter is that these issues are extremely controversial at best, and that the speculative method cannot be ruled out, a priori. For instance, Sellin's interpretation of Hosea is generally regarded as eccentric and unacceptable; the reader ought to know, however, that the relevant passages in Hosea do remain a puzzle.

Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of Dr. Rosmarin's brief review

is to cast considerable doubt on the archeological sub-structure on which Freud's thesis is partly based. It serves therefore to confirm a suspicion which some of Freud's early work, e.g., *Totem and Taboo* (New York, 1927), aroused, and which some of his later work, e.g., *Moses and Monotheism,* deepened. This is the suspicion that the psychological method should properly stop short of assuming *specific* events of early cultural history when the assumption of such events is unsupported, or in the nature of the case unsupportable, by the results of other methods.[1]

Thus, from the ubiquity and persistence of certain kinds of tension in the psyche it is reasonable to make certain genetic inferences, e.g., that earlier situations in the history of the race contributed in some way (and the possibilities may be subject to a certain amount of delimitation) to the formation and intrenchment of the pattern of tension; but to make the further inference of a *specific* etiology, that, e.g., persistent ambivalence toward the father testifies to *a* primeval murder, seems excessive, and no more justifiable than to argue from the same psychological facts to any other kind of specific fall or original sin, e.g., the one described in *Paradise Lost.* Perhaps the same amount of justification lies in both cases.

It may be argued, and has been, that there is psychologically very little difference between the phantasy of a murder and a murder in fact. But there is some historical and cultural difference, and this ought to be conserved. In its application to the problem of Greek materials the psychoanalytic reconstruction of cultural history has had more than psychoanalytic logic to go by; e.g., it has had an actual story of a parricide in the Oedipus tradition and its many parallels adduced by Otto Rank in *Das Inzest Motiv in Dichtung und Sage* (Leipzig, 1912). In the case of the Jewish materials, Freud has sought similar independent clues, and apparently thought to have found them in Sellin's exegesis of Hosea. Dr. Rosmarin's small book makes clear that in the present state of historical, archeological, and textual knowledge, the clues are doubtful and insufficient, and that we ought to reject Freud's thesis as not proven.

On the other hand, this thesis is not confined to the archeological points. It has at least as much to do with the new approach to the

1. Cf. R. Money-Kyrle's contribution to psychoanalytic theory of religion, *The Meaning of Sacrifice* (New York, 1930), where the complaint is registered that in *Totem and Taboo,* Freud does appear to have deserted psychology for history.

problem of "tradition" which Freud suggests when he draws the brilliant parallel with individual psychic "latency." If the analogy be a valid one, then from the re-emergence of tradition we may infer persistence of structure and function in cultural history *underneath* the super-position of apparently anti-traditional forces and forms. The problem of tradition, in both its sacred and profane aspects, is of new interest today, particularly in view of the use, misuse, and abuse to which it is subjected in social controversy, and Freud's suggestions on the problem should not be neglected, however incidental they may be to the main thesis of his book. Perhaps they are not incidental.

For the rest, it seems a pity, both from the standpoint of Freud and his critics, that so much crucial to-do is made (on grounds of principle) as to whether Moses was or was not an Egyptian. The present reviewer believes he was a Hebrew. But, as Dr. Rosmarin reminds us, both Scripture and Aggadah (as well as modern critics like Yahuda) reckon candidly with the Egyptian circumstances of Moses' upbringing and with Egyptian cultural *influences* (not determination) upon both him and his people. Therefore, it seems to be making altogether too much of a bio-ethnic point to *argue* whether Moses was an Egyptian or a Hebrew in origin. Suppose he was a naturalized Hebrew, like Ruth, or the descendant of such a one, like David, or (according to rabbinic tradition) like Rabbi Meir? It would still remain true that all those mentioned had one father, and that one God had created them all; or would this be questioned?

HENRY M. ROSENTHAL

New York City

The Prophets: Their Personalities and Teachings. By BERYL D. COHON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939. 232 pp. $2.00.

The author, Rabbi of Temple Israel in Boston since 1929, is also on the faculty of Boston University, where he conducts studies in Judaism and the Old Testament. In this book he intends to retell the story of the Hebrew prophets for our days. His purpose is not a scholarly one; he rather speaks as a teacher and interpreter of the biblical word. About half of his book consists in quotations. They are interspersed by accounts of the biblical events, both objective and colorful. From the dramatic background of the ancient Orient each prophet utters his own message.

Dr. Cohon is not bothered by the fact that the original wording of prophetic speeches sometimes seems far from being literally preserved; he uses his numerous quotations, not only for introducing the reader into the wide field of biblical problems, but also for depicting the personalities whose names appear in the prophetic writings. It is true that a great historian like Eduard Meyer once called Jeremiah the first great personality in world history, but the danger still persists, that, in so doing, we carry our own idea of personality into the realm of conceptions quite different from our own. In writing about Jeremiah, Dr. Cohon proves this in the contradictory remark: "The whole book of Jeremiah is the confession of a suffering soul. Unfortunately, the records are confused and blank pages are many" (p. 107). It seems that in this case confession and confusion are put too close together.

For Dr. Cohon, the teachings of the prophets are inseparable from their personalities. But can we rely on the teachings as they are handed down to us, taking them as a basis for individual characterization? Looking back at the results of biblical investigations during the past ten years, we see, for instance, in the case of the book Ezekiel, that various scholars, such as Ch. C. Torrey, J. Smith, Battersby Harford, and G. A. Cooke, arrive at highly contradictory conclusions. It seems almost impossible to use those results as building material for the composition of historical portraits. This difficulty produces the danger that the biblical texts may be selected according to preconceived ideas. But what is truth? In our day, it may be found in an organic fusion of the present methods in biblical investigations with the interpretation of the Holy Word. The obstacles lie not only in the considerable variety of biblical theories, but also, and even more, in the necessity of harmonizing the single parts of the text concerned with the spirit of the whole. Here in particular Dr. Cohon's book needs a better foundation. After a characterization of the Hebrew prophets in general and a description of the idolatry in ancient Israel and Judah, the author immediately turns to Amos. He gives no previous history. The name of Moses is mentioned only one single time, in an unimportant quotation. Certainly Moses, whom the Bible itself calls prophet (nabi), is a problem for the interpreter of later prophecy which must be faced. As Moses stands at the beginning of prophecy, Jesus stands at the end of it. Dr. Cohon discusses this question briefly—too briefly. After having reflected the misunderstanding of associating the Hebrew prophets

with some kind of reform movement, he says that "the second common misconception of the prophets is crediting them with the foretelling of far-off events, centuries removed, on the basis of some occult power of prediction." No question that he is perfectly right in repudiating this opinion, already many times repudiated. Then he continues: "We note here the application of this misunderstanding to the announcement of the coming Christ. Isaiah, especially, is credited with the foretelling of the coming of Jesus. The solid fact is that there are some seven hundred years between Isaiah and Jesus. Isaiah may have hoped for a type of leader to arise which, later, Jesus approximated; but that is not to say that Isaiah announced his coming. The supposed prediction rests on a misunderstanding of the verses in Isaiah that are involved, and on a more basic misunderstanding of the nature of Hebrew prophecy" (pp. 222-23). Whatever one's attitude to the—we may say metaphysical—question of what Jesus and the Hebrew prophets may be, to call the discussion of Isaiah's mysterious reference to Jesus a misunderstanding does not seem to be an adequate expression.

The essential purpose of Dr. Cohon's book is to show the fervent aim of the prophets in teaching justice, mercy and humility, as well as their incessant endeavour to transform the inner man. Emphasizing the prophetic words concerned, Dr. Cohon knows how to put in relief this main feature of the prophetic acts. In accordance with this purpose, he also includes the book of Ruth in his interpretation of Hebrew prophecy. In the introduction to this chapter he makes the pertinent remark: "The spectacular prophets, not prophecy, ceased in biblical Israel" (p. 216). One should like to see this thought pursued further through the Bible, down to the book of Daniel.

The ethical conception of Dr. Cohon's book seems to have prevented him from pointing out more fully the theological significance of the prophetic writings. It lies in the development of the idea of God from nationalism, in the old Oriental sense, into a universalism through which God is not bound any more to the soil of the homeland, but goes with his exiled people. That is the importance of the Second Isaiah, not only the bringing of comfort and confidence to his listeners, as Dr. Cohon emphasizes. By the way, once again Deutero-Isaiah figures in this book as the "unknown" prophet. The confusion of "unknown" and "unnamed" in this case seems to be ineradicable.

Ewald originally called him "unnamed." Then, as a curious result of the success of Sir Walter Scott who first became famous as the "great unknown" author of the Waverly novels, the Second Isaiah changed from the anonymous to the ignotus in the world of letters. So it happened that this prophet, about whom our knowledge is growing more and more, remains "unknown" for the same author who writes chapter after chapter about him. A joke of biblical history.

In general, Dr. Cohon's book may be considered as a good introduction to the books of the latter prophets, written from a special viewpoint, more conventional than it should be, and rather avoiding the problems than facing them.

STEPHEN S. KAYSER

New York City

The Book of the Ways of God. By EMIL C. KRAELING. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939. xiii + 270 pp. $3.75.

The Book of Job has its special difficulties. There is no book in the Bible quite like it. It belongs to the Wisdom literature, yet its problems and chief characteristics are quite distinct from those of Proverbs or Koheleth. It is strongly Oriental, as its numerous affinities with Semitic literature show, yet there is a universality in the book which has always excited the minds of those who have "discovered" it. In large sections, it is great poetry, and much like the poetry that we have in certain of the psalms such as Psalm 104, yet it reaches a height of sublimity and power which is quite *sui generis.* Its universality, even, has its close kin in the Old Testament, as in the great poems of the Second Isaiah and in the story of Jonah, but its universality has quite its own stamp. It may not be fair to say that it is not so Hebraic as Second Isaiah, but the Hebraism of Second Isaiah is of so profound and far-reaching a character, so historically grounded and conceived, that I suspect that this is the best way of expressing it. It wrestles with the problems of theodicy in an almost epic fashion, yet here too Job has its antecedents and forerunners like Jeremiah, some of the psalms, and, if one hold to the usual dating for Habakkuk, then he too must be mentioned. Yet, despite all this, Job is quite itself, and it is more than a sentimental romancing which is responsible for its place among the classics of the world. For whatever conclusions we may reach as critics, the total impression of the central figure is of one of noble

proportions whom the Aristotle of the *Poetics* might approve and understand; the "debate" has a prevailing high seriousness which Matthew Arnold could appreciate; the problem is set in such a context as to give the impression of a titanic wrestler whom Carlyle could admire. Professor Kraeling is guided by a sure and deep-going intuition when he draws upon the cathedral and its making through the centuries as adequate imagery to direct him in his discussion.

But the predicament of the student of Job has its special reasons. Externally, it gives the reader the impression of admirable ordering and structure. Biblical scholars who are aware of the processes of compilation to which all the books of the Old Testament were subjected are not deceived by such external marks, however. The fact may be that such severity of structure protests too much; this is, indeed, the case. As a scholar who has won high distinction as a critic, Professor Kraeling knows how to approach this kind of literature. As something of an artist and a poet, he gives us that for which we had perhaps forgotten to ask, a deep appreciation of the kind of material with which he is dealing. The problem of the student of Job is to be both critic and artist at the same time, but to be both an *excellent* critic and a *sensitive* and *appreciative* artist. The general appearance of the book is innocent enough: a "prologue"; a lament of majestic proportions; three cycles in which the speeches of Job alternate with those of each of the three friends, Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar (all except the broken third cycle); a Wisdom poem, the Elihu speeches, the sublime poetry of the Deity, and an epilogue. Moreover, there is the lofty and inspiring theme that dominates the poem as a whole, exaggerated no doubt by misunderstandings of certain famous passages, yet clear enough even to the tutored and the *bien instruits*. The various answers proposed by the different speakers, even though they be contradictory at times within the same speech, are such as have intrigued the thinking of all those who come to grips with the greatest problem the intelligent person faces in respect to religious faith and commitment. Again, Job seizes the imagination of readers as one of heroic mold, despite all qualifications which the scholar feels tempted to register. There is, too, the tremendous impression made by the prologue with its celestial councils, its piercing question from Satan, "Does Job serve God for naught?", its minor antagonist, its reminding of Milton's immortal poem, its fixed organization, which as Professor Kraeling bril-

liantly and convincingly suggests, originally included seven scenes in which the final scene pictured the translation of the sufferer, the patriarchal associations with Job (cf. Ezekiel 14:14 and 20 and Kraeling's comment). Not least of all, there is the sheer magnificence of the poetry, which even Professor Kraeling, with all his appreciation, does not over-rate. From all this, it is not difficult to see why and how, much literature has gathered about Job. Professor Genung's *The Epic of the Inner Life* and Professor Kallen's *The Book of Job as Greek Tragedy* are representative of this kind of emphasis. Yet, it is not a justifiable emphasis, or rather, not a sufficient emphasis, because it leaves out of account another side of what may appear to some a Janus-like reality.

The other side of the picture is this: the Book of Job is a compilation of exceedingly diverse materials, emanating from different persons, different ages, different mentalities, different environments. The compilation is, moreover, a complex and even a complicated one. The "prologue" and "epilogue" are not of the same piece with the rest; the Elihu speeches are quite independent; Chapter 28 is a Wisdom poem quite complete in itself; the third cycle, not to mention the second, is extremely confused; extraneous material has crept in here and there from almost the beginning to certainly the end of the whole forty-two chapters; there is a frequent lack of sequence and continuity. In short, the Book of Job is like the rest of the Old Testament in the general character of its composition. It is a book of Wisdom literature with Job as its central figure; just as we have "Moses" and the Torah in the Pentateuch; "David" and the hymnody of the psalms in Israel's great devotional literature; "Solomon" and the gnomic wisdom literature of Proverbs; "Isaiah," "Jeremiah," "Ezekiel," and the "Twelve" in the *debarim* of the prophets, and "Enoch" in the vast and chaotic literature which goes by his name in the 108 chapters of apocalyptical writing. This is surely a radical shift in point of view from that of the preceding paragraph. The problem is to do justice to the truth contained in both sides of the picture. Professor Kraeling is sensitive to these various facets and factors, and of many more. His work is, therefore, a many-sided one. The task to which he sets himself is stupendous. It requires amazing erudition, a sure-footed progress through the labyrinth of literary criticism, appreciation of world literature, understanding of the theological and philosophical problems

discussed here and there, and literary understanding. It is not an exaggeration to say that Professor Kraeling has these qualifications. If the book is not the work of a genius, a great poet, or a philosopher, it is the performance of a competent, learned, and appreciative scholar. And this is much!

As expressive of one aspect of the Book of Job, we are given eight drawings of William Blake, which deserve long and patient study, for they grow on one with their strangeness and their infinite suggestiveness. We are given, too, frequent quotations from the poetry of the world, and what is more interesting in a book like this, some of the author's own verse, which sang itself to him as he toiled and lived within the cathedral. One feels at times that the tour of the cathedral is a little studied and measured in its tread; I hope it is not unkind to say so, and it is possible that the writer is himself somewhat a victim of the romancing to which Job has been so long subjected. Few things capture one's imagination so much as the profuse illustration from world literature, and precisely from those cultures and nations which were closely related to Israel. Professor Kraeling deserves warm approval and thanks for this important service to all students and lovers of the Book. At the beginning of the last chapter (p. 235), we have these important words which might well have come much earlier, because they would have helped one to come to a better evaluation of what the author was really saying after all the work of critical analysis had been done: "These works have a life that lay beyond their first authors, their editors and revisers, but which their combined labours helped to create. A reconstruction of their history cannot reveal it, any more than dissection can discover wherein lies the charm of a beautiful creature. It has to be sensed and its significance divined by an act of intuitive understanding." Of course, Professor Kraeling's cathedral says this too, but these words of his are very re-assuring to those who ask scholarly understanding and artistic appreciation at one and the same time. The specific contribution and the distinction of the book which Professor Kraeling has written lie in the direction of its literary criticism. This is surely the author's forte, and the thing that will give the book its importance and lasting quality will be those sections, like the fine chapter on "The Genesis of the Book of Job," which show the writer in his most effective if not his most characteristic mood.

Like a cathedral, the Book of Job has behind it a long and noble

history; it is a work of many centuries and of many persons. It does not belong to just one time and generation, but betrays only too clearly that it is the final harvest of a number of books. We do well to begin with 2:11-12 and 42:7-9, which are the partially preserved framework narrative of an "earlier," perhaps seventh century, Job dialogue, in which the friends and Job discourse quite differently about God from what is now the case; it is a work of which a few other snatches (e.g., 27:2-12) may still be preserved. "Without this latter . . . material (now abridged at the beginning, and possibly also at the end), the whole dialogue would become meaningless, for it not only gives us the occasion of this series of speeches, but it also gives us the outcome" (p. 226). The original dialogue is essentially the first cycle of speeches (minus the "accretions made to tone down Job's self righteousness," "thou" passages of a distinct type, 7:1-10, 12-21; 9:25-31; 10:1-22; 13:23-27; 14:1-22; cf. the somewhat similar view of Baumgärtel). The portrayal of Job in this section which Kraeling sees running through Chapter 19 and even beyond, is striking in its consistency. The book was subjected to a "sceptical revision," and this material is deposited for the most part in Chapters 26, 28, and 38:1-42:6, all of it in tone with Chapter 21 where the sceptical material first appears. Chapters 29 and 31 are unique; "an editor derived this material partly from the original dialogue (so 30:16-31) and partly from another source (so chs. 29 and 31), the title of which may be preserved in the colophon 31:40c, and put it here for the purpose of bringing the argument back to the problem of Job's righteousness." Of course the Elihu speeches are to be rejected. But the last step in the growth of the book was the great introductory section 1:1-2:10, the frontal facade to the cathedral, written in prose, not poetry. It was added subsequently to the creation of the original dialogue, though its date is early, probably eighth century B.C. It is a work of high literary art, rather than a folktale, at present incomplete, for 42:10-17 is no real consolation, as we all recognize, and originally contained seven scenes. 42:10-17 is a makeshift conclusion, made up for the most part of fragments.

The foregoing comment does scant justice to Professor Kraeling's own discussion. It is possible that his analysis is not correct in all its detail, but it is certain that subsequent study of Job will have to consider the issues raised by him. A chapter that will appeal more than any other to many readers is the concluding discussion on "The Mean-

ing of the Book of Job." It is careful, judicious, and appreciative, and if one has grown restive in some of the earlier chapters (chapters which are absolutely essential and indispensable to a proper understanding of the book), he will find here the kind of penetrating observation for which he has been looking. The too little known work of Immanuel Kant on Job is treated with great felicity.

We do not have too many books on Job, though the literature is large. Professor Kraeling's *The Book of the Ways of God* must be read with care to be appreciated; the reviewer found it necessary to read it twice to do it justice. But its value and importance were greatly increased with the second reading.

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"Perish the Jew!" By DAVID GOLDBERG. New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1939. vii + 282 pp. $2.50.

Under the ambitious and enigmatic subtitle, *A Clinical Treatment of Anti-Semitism,* David Goldberg presents a spirited interpretation of the connection between anti-Semitism and reactionary forces. The book is very uneven in presentation and emphasis. Its best parts are those dealing with ancient Christianity and the role of the Church today in the conflict between totalitarianism (in the eyes of the author fascism is the only form of totalitarianism in existence today) and the different forms of democracy. Particularly good is the chapter "I Know I Am Girding," in which the author proves that anti-Semitism has not always been in existence. Its weakest parts are those which deal with internal Jewish affairs. Mr. Goldberg's emphasis on the fate which befalls a religion, the leaders of which view its observance more in terms of rites and theology than in social content and practical ethics, is certainly illuminating and deserves to be read. Equally forceful is his appeal for a concrete expression of social consciousness on the part of the Churches. As a corollary, he advocates that Jews and Christians "should make a common cause" against Caesar—the fascist state. Only thus, he maintains, will the Western churches survive, for the Eastern Church in Russia fell a victim of historical retribution because of the role which it had been playing for centuries as the handmaid of Tsarist despotism.

Though the thesis proclaimed in the book is so clear and obvious,

its understanding is made more difficult by the author's form of presentation. He is fond of metaphors, Midrashic interpretations, lengthy examples and introductory passages. The busy reader of today will need a good deal of patience in order to weed out the chaff and get at the essential contents. Unlike other more "factual" books on anti-Semitism (as, for instance, Hugo Valentin's unsurpassed study, *Antisemitism Historically and Critically Examined*), this work, whatever the word "clinical" may mean, is certainly an involved and not easily digestible analysis. Numerous proof errors detract further from the enjoyment of the book and the perusal of the author's ideas.

In addition to these shortcomings the book also suffers from the tendency on the part of the author to rely on his memory and not to check on facts, which in many cases could be most easily ascertained. Thus it is obviously impossible that Nazi legislation should ferret out "one third blooded Jews." It is incorrect that the Jew "really spoke out his heart" in only two languages, Hebrew and Yiddish. Ladino, Arabic, Aramaic, Judaeo-Persian, and other tongues also served, and most of these still serve as the vehicle for intimate expression on the part of the Jewish masses. The Jews have not lived in Russia for a number of centuries. Herod was not a great man to the Roman politician, at least not in the estimate of Augustus, who stated that "he would rather be Herod's swine than his son." The Church existed in Poland before the Crusades of 1106. It is inexact to say that the Nazis gave the number of "less than a million Jews" as an excuse for their own subjugation of "80,000,00 of their own 'racial comrades,' " when the number of Jews in Germany previous to the Hitler regime amounted to about half a million. These may be petty details, but when the reader encounters them too frequently in the book, he is bound to doubt the quality of the "analysis."

The reader's doubt is bound to increase upon reading a condemnation of what David Goldberg calls "Orthodox Socialists" in general, and the followers of Kautsky in particular, for their attitude in advocating assimilation as the solution of the Jewish problem, which excludes (is it conveniently?) the mention that both Lenin and Stalin were firm believers in the same solution, at least until November 1917. It also seems a bit optimistic, in view of present developments, to read in 1939 a statement by Kalinin made only in 1930 that "in about ten years hence Birobidjan will be the cultural center of the Jewish

masses." This pro-Soviet sympathy, arising no doubt from the influences of the "pro-democratic" period in Communist diplomacy which culminated recently with the new totalitarian partnership, caused the author to overlook the downgrade course of Jewish survival in the Soviet Union. It is probably also the reason why he failed to observe that the "retribution" which religion received at the hands of the Bolsheviks in Russia did not extend merely to the guilty party, namely, the Greek Orthodox Church, but to the opposition churches as well, and particularly to the minor independent sects which had been the chief sufferers from Tsarist-Church oppression and even welcomed the new economic order.

The reviewer would have liked to see Mr. Goldberg break lances with Borochov or Ezekiel Kaufman, instead of Ahad Haam. An inclusion or even reference to names like Klatzkin, Martin Buber and Herman Cohen would also be of more use, in his discussion of survival theories, than the reference to "a Bil'am type among the gentiles." They are more pertinent today. Nor is Hilaire Belloc the typical "adversary" of today. Likewise the reviewer maintains that it is an evidence of wrong historical perspective to select Jehudah Halevi as an anti-assimilationist. Assimilation or anti-assimilation are modern terms or phenomena. In the Middle Ages it was a question either of apostasy or retaining one's Judaism. The reviewer does not agree that "the ghetto Jews developed a morbid tendency toward glorifying all pain as martyrdom." This is the unrealistic view of the ghetto as a punishment rather than as a social community, and of the medieval Jew as a man who went out of his way to look for martyrdom. The chief complaint of Jewish historians is that Jews forget too quickly. The analysis of Messianism as not constituting a real belief among orthodox Jews, particularly when repeated in a form almost approaching a *bon mot*, definitely overlooks this potent hope and, at the same time, the optimism with which Jews of the old world accepted their lot. The lack of documentation is also a serious one.

There are many more similar points on which this reviewer disagrees with Mr. Goldberg. He is particularly surprised at the mystical interpretations of "punishment" and "retribution" in a book whose thesis is almost completely based on a materialistic interpretation. Space is a consideration in a review as well as in a book. The reviewer does not, however, wish to leave the reader with the impression that Mr.

Goldberg's book is not interesting reading. On the contrary, it presents a great many challenging questions to serious readers, and is certainly an inducement to thinking, with plenty of mental gymnastics, in spite of the shortcomings enumerated.

ABRAHAM G. DUKER

Contemporary Jewish Record
New York City

Die Jesusfrage im Neuzeitlichen Judentum. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung. By GÖSTA LINDESKOG. Uppsala: Lindequistska Bokforlag, 1938. xi + 369 pp.

This volume embodies the results of a careful and comprehensive investigation of Jewish studies dealing with the life and times of Jesus of Nazareth. The investigation was carried out under the direction of the New Testament Seminar at Uppsala, and its objectivity in dealing with the data, as well as its scope and erudition, reflect credit upon the Seminar, as well as upon the author.

Preliminary to the main survey are several chapters dealing with the rise of liberal Judaism. Modern Judaism began with the last decades of the eighteenth century. Three words sum up the process, "Emancipation, Assimilation and Reform." Judaism, released from its centuries of isolation and self-dependence, was gradually brought into the main current of Western culture. It was inevitable that it, or at least that part of it which responded to the change, should undergo the same development that took place in Christianity, namely, a gradual modification of its basic ideas under the impact of the critical spirit of the era. Neither could escape the *Historismus* of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Liberal Judaism parallels liberal Christianity. It is interesting to note, though not vital to Lindeskog's study, that both have shown in the last few years the same reaction. Hans Schoeps views liberal Judaism in the same manner that Karl Barth regards liberal Christianity and shares to a considerable extent his basic ideas.

The task of re-examining its attitude toward Jesus has been a necessity for liberal Judaism. The motivation here has been not merely that of apologetics, but also that of endeavoring to understand itself. For through assimilation, Judaism had entered deeply into the Christian world, and a clearer definition of its attitude toward Jesus was

an essential element in a process of self-awareness and inner integration (pp. 63 ff.).

The guiding force in this new concern with Jesus has been the pervading liberalism of the nineteenth century. Specifically, it has been Jewish Biblical scholarship. Lindeskog dates the beginning of this from the publication in 1839 of Salvador's *Jesus Christ et sa doctrine*. With Klausner, he believes the cycle can be regarded as having reached its end. For that which began as a by-product of western assimilation was completed when Klausner published as one of the first fruits of the new Jewish culture in Palestine his biography of Jesus composed in Hebrew.

This tracing of the constantly growing stream of Jewish critical literature dealing with the Gospels occupies the greater part of the book and is its main task. It is at times dull reading, as any review of the successive stages of a developing body of knowledge is likely to be. But there are certain general results which reward even the reader who has little interest in the detailed record. Jewish scholarship tended to follow and to utilize the work of Christian scholars. In two areas, however, it made decisive contributions of its own. The first of these was in the study of the Palestinian world of the first century. Geiger was the great pioneer here, but among his successors can be named Derenbourg, W. Bacher, A. Bücher, L. Ginzberg and many others. The second was the elucidation of the similarity between the ethical teachings of Jesus and those of the Synagogue. It has been Jewish scholars who have been primarily responsible for the emphasis on the Jewishness of Jesus, which more than any other factor probably has tended to break down the idealized and modernized picture of Jesus which liberal Christianity maintained at the close of the century. A point of special importance is the little interest which *Formgeschichte* has aroused among Jewish scholars, and particularly their negative attitude towards its skeptical conclusions. "Eine solche Stellung zur Tradition ist dem Juden unbegreiflich. Ihm ist es selbstverständlich, dass die Schüler des grossen Rabbi Jeschua gespannt auf seine Worte achtgaben, sie sich tief einprägten and sie später in der Gemeinde vortrugen und kommentierten."

The results of the century of Jewish interest in this problem are clearly stated. For orthodox Judaism, Jesus must remain a foreign figure, for he has been adopted by a religion which for centuries has

been hostile and oppressive. Liberal Judaism is not in complete unity on the subject, but for a large section he is not only, in words quoted from Montefiore," the most important Jew who ever lived," but also one whose teaching can be taken into their permanent tradition. But for Judaism he must remain one among many teachers; Jewish anthropology, soteriology, and ethics forbid that he should ever occupy a position similar to that which he has had in Christianity. In any such attempts to forecast future developments, however, one has to deal with two unknowns—the effect on the Jewish spirit of the experiences through which it is now going, and the future course of liberal Christianity.

One of the most valuable features of the book is its several bibliographies. The final one covers forty-one pages. The chief criticism which can be leveled at the author is his evident unfamiliarity with American scholarship. Though several American names appear in his bibliography, there are a number of omissions. There is no mention of the work of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis, in which Jewish and Christian scholars have been associated for many years with the most fruitful results. G. F. Moore, whose contribution to the problem is emphasized, is regarded as an Englishman ("die beiden Engländer Herford und Moore" (p. 135). It is, however, natural that the author should know European scholarship better than he does American, and this only makes the book the more useful for American readers.

HARVIE BRANSCOMB

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Untersuchungen über den Ursprung der johanneischen Theologie. By ERNST PERCY. Lund: Gleerupska Universitetsbokhandeln, 1939, xx + 370 pp.

The publication of the Mandean *Ginza, Book of John,* and *Liturgies* in translation by Mark Lidzbarski has given new impetus to the study of the Gnostic or semi-Gnostic background of the Gospel of John. A great number of parallels have been found, and are frequently cited in recent works, e.g., in W. Bauer's *Commentary* on the Gospel. Several books and many articles dealing with the problem have been published to date, and all serious present-day work on the Fourth Gospel has had to take into account the question, What lies back of

the Mandean literature? Is it a post-Christian type of Gnosticism, whose references to John are borrowed from Christianity? Or do the Mandean terminology and ideas go back to a pre-Christian time—perhaps representing the survival, even to this day, of the movement inaugurated by John the Baptist? Several important factors are involved in the choice between these two alternatives: chiefly the derivation of the cult-terms, Life, Light, Darkness, Truth, Lies, and a whole series relating to Redemption, terms found in the Gospel of John and in the Mandean writings, and also in other and surely not unrelated literature of ancient Gnosticism, Hermeticism, Manicheanism; above all, the really decisive factor—according to Dr. Percy—is the conception of the Redeemer, either as historical person or as purely mythological idea.

The present work is the most thorough examination of the problem that has appeared thus far, and undertakes not only to find the *Sitz im Leben* of the Mandean movement but also to account for the rise of Gnosticism. It is clear enough that Mandeism is a Semitic religious development; and the author holds that the explanation of Gnosticism as the result of Greek speculation working on the data of the New Testament is quite inadequate (pp. 9, 287). But whether the Gnostic dualism is derived from some earlier system, say Iranian—that is another question. In his general view of the background of the Fourth Gospel, at least, the author is in accord with the interpretation of the "Logos-doctrine" as set forth in the new and still unfinished Commentary by Bultmann in the Meyer series: its true background is not Greek philosophy (Heraclitus, the Stoics, Philo) nor even the Memra-speculation of the Jewish Targums (it is a mistake to call it "speculation"; the term was only a circumlocution designed to get away from anthropomorphism); the true background of the "Logos-doctrine" is oriental mythology.

Following the Introduction, which states the problem, its importance for exegesis, and discusses the proper method for its solution, the book opens with a clear, brief, readable account of the Mandean religion (pp. 17-22). Succeeding chapters deal with the basic terms and ideas expressive of its dualism: Part II examines the idea of the Redeemer; Part III, the Redemption as conceived in Gnosticism, the Mandean literature, the Hermetica, and related literature. Gradually, as the parallels are examined, the thesis is developed that the "col-

lective soul" or "macrocosmic man" delineated in these religious movements appears as *Redeemer* only when he is identified with Christ. The evidence for belief in the *Urmensch* who becomes Redeemer of man or of the world simply fades away: the Christian doctrine of Redemption cannot be merely one form of an age-old Near Eastern doctrine of redemption. The derivation of Gnosticism from ancient Iranian religion is equally untenable (pp. 278-287). Where did it come from, then? Its involved metaphysic is simply a reflection of the experience of redemption through knowledge (p. 289); and the only adequate account of the origin of the system is as a derivative from early Christian belief and experience (p. 291). Although Paul did not open the door to Gnostic speculation, still Gnostic speculation developed on a Pauline basis: it was an attempt to set forth in more speculative and especially more dualistic terms the presuppositions of the experience which lay at the heart of the Pauline Gospel. The Mandean religion in turn was only Gnosticism later brought to earth and become a popular religion: "Der Gnostizismus ist hier zu einer völkischen Religion geworden"—and is a relatively late development in the history of Gnosticism (p. 299).

The demonstration is practically complete that the conception of *Redemption* found in Gnosticism is post-Christian: but one may still hold that the materials out of which the systems were built go back a long way—the conceptions of life, knowledge, light, and so on: these are "old-oriental." But the doctrine of redemption, as found in Gnosticism—e.g., in Valentinus and the classical Gnostics—is undoubtedly post-Christian; and since Mandaism reflects this type of Gnosticism, it cannot belong to the background of primitive Christianity—or of the Gospel of John.

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Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings. Selected and edited by M. C. D'Arcy. London: J. M. Dent and Sons; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co. 1939. xvi + 287 pp. 90c.

The importance of St. Thomas Aquinas for our contemporary world of philosophical and theological thought is indicated in a special way by the appearance in the Everyman's Library of a volume of his selected writings. J. M. Dent and Sons should be congratulated in giving Aquinas the place he undoubtedly deserves in a library dedi-

cated to serve the needs of everyman and to guide him in his thinking on questions which vitally concern him as a man. Many readers will welcome the book as an introduction to the writings of St. Thomas and will be grateful to the publishers for placing at their disposal a guide in the study of his thought and outlook. Some, however, who are more familiar with the works of St. Thomas will be inclined to dispute with the editor, Father D'Arcy, over the selection he has made in order to "convey the main theme of his (St. Thomas') philosophy." For example, the purpose being such as Father D'Arcy stated, one might legimately ask why three sermons with apparently no philosophical import were included in the book, while the passages dealing with St. Thomas' philosophical proof of the existence of God were omitted. Further, while St. Thomas as a priest in the Order of Preachers did occasionally preach sermons, it was not as a preacher but rather as a teacher that he was known to his contemporaries and to posterity. It is, of course, difficult to make a selection from the works of so prolific a writer as Aquinas, and Father D'Arcy himself was quite aware of the task which confronted him when he was asked by the publishers to edit such a volume. Under the pressure of the work of his busy life at Oxford and elsewhere it would seem humanly impossible for him to give the consideration and time that a specialist engaged exclusively in Thomistic studies would give. Such a carefully edited study, however, would well repay the effort in serving as an invaluable aid to both teacher and student of philosophy. In giving not only the important texts in which St. Thomas develops his five ways of proving the existence of God, his theory of human knowledge and his classification of the special sciences, it would also include an up-to-date bibliography, which the work of Father D'Arcy does not contain. In his Preface the editor thanks the Oxford University Press for permission to reproduce the bibliography from his own book on St. Thomas. That book was published in 1930. Considerable progress has been made in Thomistic studies in the past nine years in Europe and America, and many first class studies on the philosophy of St. Thomas have been written and published by competent scholars in Europe, Canada and the United States. To mention only a few available for English readers, we have: A. C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the 13th Century* (Toronto, 1934); Jacque Maritain, *Degrees of Knowledge* (New York, 1938); *An Introduction to Logic* (New York, 1937), and *True Humanism* (New York,

1938); Etienne Gilson, *Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy* (New York, 1937), *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (New York, 1937), and *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1938); Mortimer J. Adler, *What Man Has Made of Man* (New York, 1937) and *St. Thomas and the Gentiles* (Marquette, 1938). These and many others too numerous to mention here ought to be included in the general works of reference in a volume of selected writings that would have an appeal to every man.

The selections in the present volume concerning the nature of God and his knowability by creatures, the analogy of created things to God, the act of faith, Christ's manner of life, the priesthood of Christ, the sacramental character and the effect of love, are borrowed from the Dominican Fathers' English translation of the *Summa Theologica* and the *Summa Contra Gentiles* which Father D'Arcy mentions in the bibliography along with Father Rickaby's translation of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. The latter work, however, is not, strictly speaking, a translation but is rather a paraphrase and published under the title, *Of God and His Creatures* (London, 1905). The selection on being is from Clare Riedl's translation of the *De Ente et Essentia*, which is mentioned only in the Preface. The English translations of the *De Regimine Principum* and the *Compendium Theologiae* done at the Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto, and wrongly referred to by the editor as the Thomist Institute, are not mentioned by him at all. The selections from the Commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *De Anima*, the nature of the mind from the *De Veritate*, the Divine Names from the Commentary on the work of the Pseudo-Dionysius, and the contemplative life from the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, are newly translated, and the translations on the whole, in the opinion of this reviewer, are good.

Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings should prove interesting and perhaps stimulating to anyone desirous of making short excursions into the various fields of Thomistic thought. Such a reader will find much to engage his attention on this or that question. If, however, he should attempt to read the book through in the hope of finding any unity of presentation in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas he will be disappointed.

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Fear and Trembling: A Dialectical Lyric by Johannes de Silentio. By Sören Kierkegaard. Translated from the Danish by Robert Payne. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939. 192 pp.

With this translation of *Fear and Trembling*, the English-speaking world is given another opportunity to establish contacts with the thinking of the Danish philosopher, Sören Kierkegaard, who lived more than a century ago. His emphasis on the *Enkelte*, the Individual, is peculiarly timely now in our own era of mass propaganda, and possibly the generous response to his ideas may represent a real revolt against the tyranny of the herd and the totalitarianism that prevails in many countries today.

As a background for *Fear and Trembling*, one needs to recall the strangest of chapters in the Kierkegaard life story—his breaking of the engagement with the sweet and artless Regine Olsen and his many subsequent attempts to "explain" that step in terms of his own philosophy. Nearly all commentators and biographers dwell on the hypothesis that the reason for the break constitutes the great secret of his life. To be sure, he himself insisted that the real secret would never be known, but even more insistently he kept trying to tell Regine, his contemporaries and posterity why he had acted as he did. And nowhere else in his writings, perhaps, does his elucidation of his conduct shine more brilliantly than in this dialectical lyric, *Fear and Trembling*.

Kierkegaard, under the pen name of Johannes de Silentio, begins with the Old Testament story of Abraham and Isaac, and, through a succession of four portraits of Abraham, aims to give a key to his own philosophy. Making Abraham a knight of the faith, the father of faith, Kierkegaard contrasts him with the tragic hero, a hero who always remains within the domain of morality. Abraham went beyond that stage, and so his story involves a teleological suspension of the ethical. He sets himself as the Individual in an absolute relationship to the absolute. "A man can become a tragic hero by his own strength," Kierkegaard writes, "but he can never, by his own strength, become a knight of the faith. When a man enters what is, in a sense, the difficult path of the tragic hero, there are many who could give him counsel; but when he enters the narrow path of faith, there is no one who can give him counsel, no one who can understand him. Faith is a miracle, yet no one is excluded from it; for passion is common to all men, and faith is a passion."

In a brief summary it is impossible to trace the successive stages by which the author, using the faith of Abraham as his springboard, makes the generalizations that apply to his own personal struggle. He, too, kept hoping all his life that through his act of faith, whereby he renounced love and gave up Regine, he would win back both Regine and the love he desired. For his failure he blamed not her but himself. But out of the failure comes this stirring dialectical lyric, certainly one of the strangest and most compelling "love lyrics" in all of modern literature.

And naturally the renunciation is symbolical. All his life Sören Kierkegaard kept insisting on the need for subjectivity, for the personal evaluation, for the individual response to truth. Always he was contending that only the truth which possesses you wholly is truth for you. His own life as a hermit in society partly expressed his own groping. Had he been content to be the tragic hero, he might have spoken and disclosed his "secret," for he suggests that "the tragic hero in his culminating moment, like every other man is not deprived of speech, can say a few words, perhaps a few appropriate words, but the question still remains whether it is appropriate for him to say them." As for Abraham, knight of the faith, he can at any moment break off, and "he can repent of it all as a tribulation; and then he can speak and be understood by every one—but then he is no longer Abraham." When those words are read in their right context of this little volume as a whole, it is impossible to maintain that Kierkegaard the philosopher left any stone unturned in his endeavors, "without speaking," to make the whole world understand his great and impelling "secret."

For this English rendering the translator has occasionally swerved from the more literal to the freer version, and by doing so he has caught much of the rhythm and beauty of the original "lyric" in prose. There is only one departure that seems a bit puzzling: repeatedly he translates *det etiske* as not "the ethical" but as "ethics." For instance, *det etiske er det guddommelige* becomes "ethics is to him the divine," where one might expect the rendering, "the ethical is to him the divine." Nearly all commentators use the Kierkegaard term, "the teleological suspension of the ethical," which here is converted into the variant, "the teleological suspension of ethics."

Alma Luise Olson

New York City

Social Religion. By Douglas Clyde Macintosh. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939. xvi + 336 pp. $3.00.

In view of the all but exclusive emphasis of the present book upon the social aspects of Christianity, fairness to the author requires that attention be called to a point mentioned in the Preface, namely, that the present book is the first part of a work on *Religion Today and Tomorrow*, the other parts dealing with personal religion and with theology. In view, however, of the importance attached to the social phases of religion, the nature of the author's transition to the last named topic, theology, will be awaited with interest by those who are concerned especially with the philosophy of religion. Doubtless there is a metaphysical view appropriate to the present interest in the "social," but the view is still inadequately represented in philosophical writings, and it would seem as if the position taken in the present volume committed its author to a further development of this metaphysics when he undertakes a theological treatise.

Although the title of the volume is general, it is probably no ground for surprise that the book itself discusses but one religion, namely Christianity. Professor Macintosh would not, I am confident, deny that the social aspects and implications of other great historic religions are worth examining, even though they fall outside the scope of this book. In any case, the reader must be grateful to him for the candor and thoroughness with which he has dealt with the problem facing every Christian believer who insists upon the intrinsic social message of the Christian faith—the relation existing between this insistence and the teachings of Jesus as they are recorded in the New Testament.

Mr. Macintosh's book is divided into two parts, the second part being given to certain specific practical social problems of contemporary western life, with reference to which the author believes that the Christian gospel has something significant to say. These problems are the prevention of war, the abolition of poverty, the safeguarding of civil liberties, and the reformation of government and political methods. Doubtless for many persons what Mr. Macintosh has to say about the bearing of Christian faith upon these concrete matters will prove the most vitally interesting part of the book, and this reviewer would not minimize their significance. But the author is, after all, a professor of theology in a school of divinity, and his purpose would be misrepresented were it not explicitly noted that his views on prac-

tical points are applications of a conclusion reached in the first and theoretical part of his work.

This first part, "Principles of Social Religion," is an examination of the meaning of the idea of the Kingdom of God as that is presented in the New Testament when it is taken to be *the* central and controlling principle of the Christian faith. Whatever be thought of the conclusions arrived at—and Christian theologians as well as non-Christions will differ in their judgments on this point—there should be complete agreement as to the fairness and completeness of the author's discussion of the topic. For, while there is no parade of scholarship, the author's range of reading is very wide; it includes, not only the literature, English and foreign, expounding the social quality of the Christian gospel, but also writings that are adversely critical of this view. Of the first, he mentions some twenty authors who have presented the social interpretation of the teaching of Jesus. But he then proceeds to consider with complete candor all the main dissenting and opposed interpretations, at least as far as they have been put forward by Protestant and non-Christian scholars.

Special attention is given to writers who hold that the moral teachings of Jesus were so deeply influenced by his acceptance of the current idea of the speedy ending of the existing world that his moral principles were intended to refer (according to one group of commentators) either to a Kingdom still to come, after the catastrophic destruction of the existing order, or (according to another group) to the short interim remaining between the time in which he taught and the coming of the supernaturally introduced order.

As far as the present writer can judge, Mr. Macintosh does full justice to what has been urged regarding the influence of eschatological beliefs upon Jesus. He also accepts many of the conclusions of what used to be called "higher criticism" regarding interpolations in the record and attributions to Jesus of interpretations made in the light of later events. But he holds that, even when the mode of expression of Jesus is influenced by the idea of a sudden eschatological change, what he asserted were ethical principles intended to be universally applicable. This position is supported by examination of the social contents of the Old Testament literature with which Jesus was presumably familiar, and by a detailed examination of the records of his teachings, especially the parables. Mr. Macintosh is a constant

critic of the view that the undeniably ideal character of the moral principles set forth is consistent only with faith in some supernatural intervention by which they will be applied in practice, upholding the view that they are consistent—and *moral* principles consistent *only*—with the view that they are directions and inspirations to a life to be lived now. His treatment of recorded passages about wealth and pacifism are peculiarly pertinent in connection with this point.

There can be no doubt that many Christian theologians will feel that Mr. Macintosh is taking too literally the teachings of Jesus. They will continue to prefer a more esoteric interpretation which places a lighter burden of responsibility upon the professing Christian. Non-Christians may feel that the author's emphasis upon the strictly moral character of the principles set forth in the New Testament is more consistent with a naturalistic-cultural moral position than with one which gives a unique position to the Christian religion; or, otherwise stated, that Mr. Macintosh has gone so far in his "liberalism" that he should go further. But no reader who vies with the author in simple candor can fail to be impressed with the sincere and courageous spirit which shines through all the pages of this book. It should not be necessary to urge every reader to begin with the Preface, where personal acquaintance may be made with the humane attitude which animates Mr. Macintosh throughout.

JOHN DEWEY

Columbia University

A Testament of Faith. By P. G. S. HOPWOOD. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939. xii + 215 pp. $2.00.

This fourth book of the *Great Issues of Life* Series, being edited by Rufus Jones, is an effective testament of a living faith. Dr. Hopwood, having shown in his earlier book, by a scholarly analysis and a convincing interpretation of New Testament records, the validity of the religious experience of the Primitive Church (*The Religious Experience of the Primitive Church*), now makes a forceful proclamation of the validity of faith and the meaningfulness of religious experience for the normal man or woman in our present-day world. The purpose of the book, and the inclusive reading public for whom it is intended, make appropriate the popular style with which the author writes.

In his constructive presentation Dr. Hopwood affirms that the hu-

man self, or mind, or soul, possesses certain structural capacities by which it apprehends, organizes and interprets the many elements of its environment. These native energies are manifest in the four forms of experience by which the mind responds to its environment—rational experience, aesthetic experience, moral experience, and religious experience. These four types of experience are similar in that they *all* require the functioning of the intellect, the will, and the emotions; they differ in that each of the forms of experience is aroused when the mind is directed to different phases of reality. The author shows how the validity of each type of experience is grounded in a great faith, an assured confidence that the "object" which is being sought after, apprehended, and known, is real. The faith which supports religious experience is the fulfillment of the faith which gives creative dynamic to the other three types of experience.

> The claim of religious experience to be in living touch with a vital, spiritual reality is in line with the scientist's faith in truth, the artist's faith in beauty, the good man's faith in moral goodness, and the heart's faith in love as revealing the nature of reality. At its best expression religious experience gathers up into itself the affirmations and discoveries of rational experience, aesthetic experience, and moral experience, and concentrates them all in the self-unfolding of God as the Supreme Reality (p. 82).

Thus mature religious experience is simply "man's life experience shot through by his awareness of God, . . . the response of the whole self to the living God," with every element in personality making its contribution.

The faith in God which gives life meaning, and which grounds religious experience, is not merely a stab in the dark. It is a faith, to be sure, but Dr. Hopwood points out how reasonable a faith it is, when one considers all the facts and values and the manner in which these become "objects" of man's experience. Moreover, such a faith, with the resultant religious experience, is self-attesting on the side of feeling, even though there have been and will continue to be aberrations in this phase of the experience; it is self-attesting on the side of mind, finding "its proof within itself, in its own universality and inevitability," even though it is not free from error; it is self-attesting on the side of action, leading to a life-building and a life-enriching integration. Thus the author concludes that

> As with other forms of experience, so religious experience can stand on

its own feet and look the universe in the face. It is no hybrid growth on the emotions, no beggar asking alms of the intellect, and no fungus on the healthy progress of the life urge. Religious faith attests itself on the side of feeling, on the side of mind, and on the side of action. It gathers up these aspects of man's personality and unifies them into one harmonious spiritual development (p. 214).

Throughout the book Dr. Hopwood writes against the background of the lingering materialistic bias and the many "bogies" of recent psychologies. His criticisms are apt and sound, but the manner in which they are sometimes made may not be congenial to some. The practical, average man, however, who is wondering whether the religion he professes is valid or inane, will find this book helpful and invigorating. The author's deep and well-rooted conviction that religious faith is a pathway to Ultimate Reality and that religious experience is a native and normal experience for normal personality are needed and legitimate emphases.

J. R. WILLS

Akron, Ohio

The Mystery of the Buried Crosses. By HAMLIN GARLAND. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1939. 352 pp. $3.75.

Since the middle of the last century, when the Fox sisters popularized spiritualism with their table rappings and other feats, countless mediums have brought forward evidence purporting to show that disembodied spirits can communicate with the living. The phenomena offered in proof of survival fall roughly into two classes: physical and mental. Among the physical phenomena are the production of ectoplasm, spirit photographs, impressions of limbs in plaster of Paris, voices from megaphones and trumpets, and the movement of physical objects without apparent cause. The mental phenomena include clairvoyance, clairaudience, psychometry, and the ability to discover lost or hidden objects. In this, his third book on psychic research, Hamlin Garland records his finding of crosses which were supposedly made and buried by Indians. "Voices" of dead Padres, issuing from the mouth of the medium or through an instrument, indicated to Garland the places where the crosses were found. On some occasions the clairvoyant or clairaudient powers of the medium were responsible for the discoveries. The evidence for spirit return is therefore based on both

physical and mental phenomena involved in the finding of the crosses, although their manufacture and burial were admittedly normal. As the author of this book already enjoys considerable reputation as a writer of border tales, anything from his pen is bound to attract a certain number of readers, some of whom may succumb to the fallacy that competence in one line of endeavor implies equal competence in others—psychic research, for example. Considering the quality of his evidence, it cannot be denied that Garland has made the most of it from a literary standpoint. Its scientific value, however, is open to serious question.

It is impossible in the space at my disposal to enter into a detailed criticism of the contents of this book. Certain salient features can be mentioned which have convinced the reviewer that here is offered nothing of scientific value. To assess the evidence directly concerned with the crosses and the Indians and Padres, supposedly communicating through the medium, the reviewer has obtained the judgment of his colleague, Dr. Frederica de Laguna who is thoroughly familiar with the anthropological and archeological data of the peoples and regions referred to in the book. Dr. de Laguna reports as follows:

"It is possible that a few of the crosses were genuine, that is, made by whites or Indians under white direction, distributed to the Indians, lost, and later found. The letter to Garland from the Mexican National Museum, which had only photographs of the crosses, supports some such view, but this does not mean that the crosses were found as a result of spirit intervention, that all the crosses in Garland's possession were genuine, or even that any were genuine. The fact that the Mexican museum denied having any crosses like them would argue against their authenticity, provided the photographs were clear enough to warrant any judgment at all. Garland (p. 45) admits that the Smithsonian Institution, the Museum of the American Indian, the American Museum of Natural History, and the Southwest Museum were "all against" him so far as validation of the crosses as products of the early Padres and Indians is concerned. It involves considerable stretch of the imagination to believe that any Indians would produce crosses with Arabian heads on them, or that Pre-Columbian Indians would make crosses decorated with domesticated animals and fruits which they had never seen.

"The explanations of the origin of these crosses become more and

more fantastic as the narrative develops. We are finally told of Pre-Columbian voyages across the Atlantic to middle America bringing elements of high civilization and a subsequent mass exodus of Indians from Yucatan and Guatemala to California, and even Alaska. All the information that the spirits give about these immigrants is on the level of popular Indian lore: blond Indians, sun worshipers, monkey gods, invoking of the Great Spirit, *etc., etc.* To the anthropologist it would have been more convincing if the spirits had guided Garland to one of the numerous Indian sites in southern California where artifacts of unquestionable Indian manufacture may be found. The information supplied by the spirits at times contradicts the best and most authoritative sources."

The criticisms which a psychologist must direct against the evidence offered in this book for spirit return can be briefly summarized. The author continually gave his medium information which the "spirits" promptly repeat to him, and which is apparently accepted as evidence (cf. pp. 53 and 54). Too often only the medium's word is taken as proof of what she was doing during a sitting or while out on a hunting expedition and on how she obtained her information (cf. pp. 174, 177, 187). When Garland's questioning becomes too "hot" the spirits show a tendency to change the subject, so that the communications are by-and-large banal and non-evidential in the extreme (pp. 248, 270, 278). Strange anachronisms are found: Father Garces could not tell the mode of his own death, but he understood what a "chief Boy Scout" is (pp. 184-5). No knowledge of a supernormal character is betrayed anywhere in the book, and one supposedly supernormal feat, conversations with the medium by means of a "one-way telephone" fails to be convincing, because of the obvious lack of control throughout the investigation.

Finally, in justice to Mr. Garland, who is now well advanced in years, it must be stated that he mentions his own doubts several times in the course of his narration and presents negative, sometimes damning evidence against the spiritistic hypothesis (pp. 42, 271, 296, 313). To him the evidence, nevertheless, seems worthy of presentation to the public whom he charges as a jury ("Charging the Jury," chapter 26). This member of the jury must render a verdict of "no true bill."

HARRY HELSON

Bryn Mawr College

BOOK NOTES

Mahatma Gandhi: A dialogue in understanding. By P. A. WADIA. Bombay: New Book Company, 1938. 73 + iii pp. Rs. 1/8.

This little book may help us to understand the great significance of Gandhi for Indian nationalists who nevertheless today depart from his methods. The author seeks to accomplish this through an imaginary conversation between representatives of four different points of view. Despite the differences, one can not help noting that three of the speakers are professors and the fourth also a university man. Confinement of the discussion to such a group of intellectuals has limitations of which the reader may well be more conscious than the author.

The principal speakers are Mr. Alfred Eden, an English professor attached to the Secretariat of the League of Nations, and Mr. Chetan, a young professor in Bombay University who undertakes for Mr. Eden's benefit a critical appreciation of Gandhi's career and of the Indian national movement. The conversation between these two is interrupted briefly by Mr. Sushil, a more conservative Hindu professor who expresses an ardent faith in the method of non-violence, and again by Mr. Surendra, a Bombay liberal who "has a large stake in the country and is immensely perturbed by the national movement under Gandhiji." He maintains that the development of English constitutional traditions offers the best prospect for India, and also claims that Gandhi disturbs the old Indian order too profoundly.

The discussion between Eden and Chetan embraces both politics and world-view, though chiefly the former. Interest centers largely in Mr. Chetan's effort to resolve the conflict in himself between "the idealism he has caught from his culture and heritage and classroom" and that "hard-headedness and realistic outlook fostered by his travels and environment." After a sympathetic, and in many ways persuasively concrete, account of Gandhi's policies and methods against the background of traditional Indian culture and ideals, Chetan frankly declares his own belief in an industrial development for India which may involve violent conflict with those that pursue "economic exploitation of the so-called backward races." Nevertheless, he concludes, "Gandhi has extended the power of the soul force over the collective life of man, as far as it can be extended under unfavorable circumstances. . . . And when in later times the accidents and irrelevancies of the present float out of the vision, permitting us to see unclouded the results of his work, Gandhiji will be regarded not only as the great saint and seer but also as the great statesman of his age, who laid the foundations of the new India of the future, converting a listless and apathetic humanity into a unified nation, proud of its past, prepared for danger and responsibility, aroused into a sense of shame for the social wrongs embodied in child-marriage and caste organization and untouchability, chastened by

their sufferings to be the bearers of a new nationalist dream which will teach mankind to abhor war and aggrandisement and to live in peace and friendliness as members of God's family. . . . The increasing purpose of Providence which may be traced through the winding mazes of European history, now in the raging struggles of warring nations, and then again in the disfigured product of Wilson's dreams that emerged as the League of Nations, has been made more clearly manifest in the life and work of Gandhiji, whose figure and personality stand out, much like the figure on the Cross two thousand years ago, a source of comfort and hope to the nations of a weary world."

H. L. F.

A Companion to the Bible. By ABRAHAM J. FELDMAN. New York: Behrman's Jewish Book House, 1939. xiii + 174 pp. $1.50.

The heart of Rabbi Feldman's little book is a brief and workmanlike introduction to the Bible, written entirely from a Jewish point of view, and designed largely as an aid to teachers and beginning students. There is a touch of hysteria in the insistence of the author on the Jewishness of the Bible; perhaps this is a product of the contemporary world situation; perhaps it is simply that the author feels this strained insistence to be a pedagogic necessity.

The introductory material on the nature, value, and influence of the Bible suffers most from Feldman's homiletical and hortatory hysteria. When the main section of the book is reached, he settles down to a simple, lucid presentation of the nature of the Scriptural canon, an account of the different divisions in vogue in the different Biblical religions, and a clear analysis of the content and significance of the various books of the Bible. The last three chapters form what seems to be an appendix containing largely useless material included, apparently, for its curiosity value.

The book is larded with many quotations, chosen felicitously and with excellent taste. The recommended selections from the Biblical books are all interesting, and bear out the statements which Feldman makes about the nature of the books.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the work is the author's consciousness of the interplay of social forces in the development of Biblical literature. He sees the prophets, for example, not so much as God-intoxicated individuals, but more as the embodied social conscience of an entire people. This necessarily involves a heightening of the significance of the prophetic writings for our age. It is somewhat surprising that Feldman did not extend this conception to the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha. Had he done so, he would have had considerably less difficulty and more consistency in his explanations of the development of the Scriptural canon.

Beyond these merits and demerits, the book has value as a corrective to the exaggerations of those scholars who, by judicious placement of incorrect

or subjective emphases, conceive of and present the Old Testament merely as propaedeutic to the New.

JOSEPH L. BLAU

The Prophets Tell Their Own Story. By ELMER A. LESLIE. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1939. 307 pp. $2.00.

In modern Bible study the prophets occupy the chief place. Without disparagement of what the other leaders of religious thought, the priests, the wise men, and the apoclyptists, have contributed to religious thought, the contribution of the prophets, culminating in the Prophet of Nazareth, have influenced our social, ethical, and religious ideals more than any other teachers. Consequently a book on the prophets is sure of a welcome if it aids in their understanding and appreciation.

The new element that the book under review has introduced into the study of the prophets is its biographical or rather autobiographical approach. The author has made the prophets to address us in the familiar first person manner. They talk to us. This is not entirely new; for in many instances, as in Isaiah's story of how he experienced his call to engage in the ministry of a prophet, the prophets themselves have used this free and easy manner to speak to us. But the author has extended this method to all the prophets have to say. In choosing to do this the author faced the danger of becoming monotonous, or of bringing the speaker too much into objectionable prominence; he has skillfully avoided both. The method, on the other hand, has proven helpful in bringing out the psychological aspects of the person of the prophet and his message. It lends itself to describing more realistically the mode of thinking and the emotions of the prophet. The account thus becomes more lifelike, with the charm of personality. To be really effective, this kind of procedure involves not simply imagination but deep reflection, breathing the atmosphere of the biographical subject, and becoming one with it. The treatment reveals such virtual identification and fine intensive workmanship.

But the approach is not merely a literary device and an end in itself, but a means to an end: that being to see the prophet in his historical, ethical, social, political, and religious environment. These studies are based on biblical research; they are objective and not merely subjective; they reflect the consensus of critical biblical scholarship up-to-date. The evidence for this is found, not only in the text but in the Notes, and in the Bibliography. The author shows his familiarity with the original text as well as with its latest interpretations. The last statement is not quite true of the treatment of Hosea, the reviewer must say; for Hosea's metaphor of Yahweh as father and Israel as son might have been improved by following the suggestions in the reviewer's *Old Testament History*.

But from what has been said it is evident that this book is not simply another book on the prophets. It has the distinction of being a new approach,

the new psychological approach, to the interpretation of the prophets. It is to be highly commended as a valuable contribution to the understanding and appreciation of the great prophets of the Old Testament from Hosea to Jeremiah.

ISMAR J. PERITZ

The Gospel Sources: Some Results of Modern Scholarship. By DOROTHY F. WILSON. London: The Student Christian Movement Press, 1938. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939. 7 + 99 pp. 75c.

One of the most serious handicaps to religious knowledge and influence is a general unfamiliarity with the results of the modern scholarly study of religion. This is conspicuously illustrated in the case of the Bible. Careful and critical investigation and research have been carried on for many years; but there is an unfortunate gap between the findings of scholarship and a popular understanding of the value of its methods and positive achievements. There still lingers the impression that modern scholarship is "picking the Bible to pieces," that it undermines the spiritual and sacred significance of the Scriptures. In an age of highly specialized learning, it is often difficult for those who reject the miscalled "literal" interpretation of the Bible, but whose subject of study is in another field, to gain a clear comprehension of the present viewpoint and conclusions of biblical scholarship.

This small book, *The Gospel Sources,* by Miss Dorothy F. Wilson, may therefore be called a welcome contribution to a better knowledge of the Bible. The author is frankly a "mediator" of scholarship, a role which requires trained ability on the part of the writer. She has selected the important book by Canon (later Provost) Streeter, *The Four Gospels,* in "an attempt to make the original work of scholars available and intelligible for non-specialists." It must be stated that, in this undertaking, she has excellently succeeded.

Questions are often asked as to the trustworthiness of the Gospels. What is the bearing of the fact that the four Gospels are relatively late in the time of their writing? How accurate is the information which they contain? How far were the actual life and teaching of Jesus modified by the practical aims and personal convictions of the writers, and by the adaptations that were made to meet the needs of the growing Christian communities? Did the writers draw only on memory and oral tradition, or did they make use of early written records which they incorporated? And if so, what is the nature and historical value of such documents?

These are some of the matters which the book succinctly and in non-technical language explains. And it is interesting to note that the material of the book was first given in the form of lectures by the author in connection with her Church work, and that the response was a request for their publication.

In a recent article by Professor Stanley H. Cook, of Cambridge, there

is this statement: "The future of Christianity, of religion, turns upon the interpretation of the Bible. . . . The Bible has been of incalculable cultural significance in the past, and continued criticism will give it a new cultural value. It will mean a new Bible." In unbiased scholarship, assisted by an intelligent impartation of its results, such as Miss Wilson has afforded, there is the promise that the Bible will again become "the people's Book."

R. C. K.

La Strophe sacrée en St. Jean. By A. OLIVIER. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1939. 48 pp. Fr. 36.

This pamphlet hardly needs a review, since it is only a sequal to another study already criticized in *The Review of Religion* (1939, vol. III, pp. 317-21). We affirm once again a skeptical attitude in regard to the so-called discoveries of the author concerning the composition of the Book of Revelation.

The reader may recall that, in order to reach the total of 666, Olivier adds to the number of the lines the number of the pericopes and the number of the principal parts, namely—600 + 60 + 6 = 666. If it is to be supposed that the author of the Book of Revelation had made such a calculation, why did he not include the number of the stanzas, namely—200? Of course, since each stanza, according to this system, consists invariably of 3 lines, the mention of 600 lines implies 200 stanzas. However, we no longer understand the system when Olivier (who replies to one or two of our objections, but ignores carefully the others, in a note addressed to us personally) states that he divides the Book of Revelation into 600 stanzas, although everywhere else in his two studies he mentions only 200 stanzas. We should like to believe it is a matter of *lapsus calami.*

We shall ask again why Olivier includes the Epilogue (Rev. 22:6-21) when he computes the number of the stanzas and the number of the pericopes, and then excludes that same Epilogue when he deals with the number of the grammatical elements of each of the principal parts. Olivier repeats that it is a matter of fact, not of view a priori. We confess that we do not understand this type of argumentation. It is a matter of fact only if we admit that the author of the Book of Revelation has actually and consciously composed each of the six main part of 888 grammatical elements. However, this statement is only an hypothesis, which requires further demonstration. We need to know the criterion for the division of the sentences into grammatical elements, to which Olivier assigns from one to eight words without any apparent consideration for rhythm, euphony, meaning, syntax or arrangement of the sentences. In his first study Olivier divided each of the six main parts into 888 elements. Now he proposes some 70 corrections, and yet, manages to keep for each of these main parts the total of 888 elements. In his first study, Olivier divided the Epilogue into 180 elements. Now he finds 186. Obviously his insight did not discover any significance in this number.

It is a well-known fact that some exegetes are candid when they defend the value of their hypotheses and defy common sense in twisting the texts to fit their systems. Fortunately there are but few who indulge in such Procrustean devices. We had hoped that Olivier might have been discouraged from pursuing his laborious researches, but he announces now a third study based upon the same principles. May we ask whether persistance, at least, does not deserve praise?

SAMUEL L. TERRIEN

Essential Christianity. By S. ANGUS. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939. ix + 226 pp. $2.00.

The author of this book is Professor of New Testament and Historical Theology in St. Andrew's College, University of Sidney, and is well known in America as Visiting Professor at various institutions, as well as for his scholarly works, such as *The Mystery Religions and Christianity*, *The Religious Quests of the Graeco-Roman World*, etc.

In this book there is discussed the perennial question, what is essential Christianity, and how far are the historic creeds and dogmas a satisfactory formulation of its fundamental nature and principles? The author writes primarily for laymen, and the treatment of his theme is indicated by the statement: "Christianity was at the beginning a layman's religion, and the day has come for the layman with his practical sense of values to take his place in healing the divisions arising within Christianity on grounds of polity and theological differences due so largely to clerical specialists" (p. xi). Dr. Angus is outspoken in his criticism of traditional doctrines and dogmas, and much that he says may lead to debate—an effect which he would welcome. But it is important to remember that his objection to dogma is, not that it is unnecessary, but in the constant danger of identifying dogmas or doctrine with faith. "In order to understand Christianity," he says, "we must keep before our mind the obvious—but sorely neglected—distinction between faith and doctrine without denying their relation" (p. 9). Faith is defined as "the venture of the soul on the spiritual interpretation of life, whereas doctrine is the attempted formulation of the reasons faith offers to intellectual inquiry as to the justification of such a venture" (pp. 9, 10).

Throughout the book the centrality of Christ and of His revelation of God is stressed, with the need of a personal faith in Him which is shown in newness of life. As this faith has been given expression in the doctrinal formulations of the past, so it is held that this same faith now demands expression in terms of the knowledge and thought of the present. "A great and living theology is requisite for a living religion" (p. xv).

It was the stanch Churchman, Bishop Gore, who pointed out some years ago: "We must learn to preach 'the ever-lasting Gospel' so that the men of our time may catch it in the reflection of their own best thoughts and aspirations. . . . As of old it spoke in terms intelligible to the spirit and philosophy of the Greco-Roman Empire, and again of the Middle-Ages,

and again of the Renaissance—correcting the current spirit and philosophy but also assimilating it—so also it must be able to assimilate the movement of God in the heart of our own age as well as to correct what it interprets" (*Christ and Society*, pp. 25-26).

This book by Dr. Angus is a sincere and scholarly attempt to carry out that undertaking. It is provocative and constructive. It has to do with an issue which deserves the candid and thorough examination of both laity and clergy.

R. C. K.

The Flowering of Mysticism: The Friends of God in the Fourteenth Century. By Rufus M. Jones. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939. 263 pp. $2.50.

Rufus Jones has written another mellow book about mysticism, and, although no one can "live by mystics alone," he still remains the most clear-headed American interpreter of that type of religion which has been his chief interest for half a century. This newest book, unpretentious in scope and unimpeded by weighty scholarship, crowns a noble and valuable career.

This is the book that Dr. Jones has been "itching" to write for three decades. It deals with a flowering cluster of mystical roses that grew in the Rhine valley towards the end of the medieval time: Meister Eckhart, Johannes Tauler, Rulman Merswin, the "Green Isle" Community, Heinrich Suso, the women mystics, the anonymous writers, Jan Ruysbroeck, and Gerard Groote. There is an additional chapter on the fourteenth century English mystical writers, two chapters on background, and an excellent epilogue on the nature of mystical experience. It is a good book.

The author makes no pretense at exhaustive accounts of his writers either theological or historical. He sets himself a modest goal, the recreation of the pulsating spirit of those fourteenth century mystics who gave to the literature of Christian devotion some of its greatest books. Perplexing questions of authorship and historicity, of subtle theological nuances, interest him only in so far as they aid him in reinterpreting the warmth of the age. Although he is aware of the profound, unsolved problems of fact and falsehood, he refuses to be sidetracked into a detailed discussion of the authorship of the *Imitation of Christ*, or other works. He states his belief that Gerard Groote probably wrote the *Imitation* as a diary of his spiritual experiences; he even prophesies that it will be proven that Groote is the author; but it is the spirit of Groote the man, more than a pedantic discussion of historicity, that interests him. And this clear-headed refusal to be bogged down by picayune needle-hunting in the haystack of scholarship gives this book its outstanding characteristic, a mellow, moving spiritual appreciation of deep and pious hearts.

Dr. Jones neither argues nor persuades; he tells his story with a convincing simplicity—the story of a type of religion which opens new windows on the soul, so that in the damp gray days of life man looks into the world

of reality and finds, not a cold formal idea, but a living, loving person who nurses a wounded soul and answers a fervent prayer. "There will always be in any audience," he says, ". . . someone who will . . . say appealingly, 'Will the speaker kindly tell us in two or three plain words what mysticism really is?' It is always possible to meet that demand . . . (for) religious mysticism is an immediate, intuitive, experimental knowledge of God. . . . One can pack that phrase into his mind and take it home to Aunt Jane or Grandmother Ann, but the phrase will mean much or little or nothing as it awakens or does not awaken in consciousness some memory of high tide moments when the Spirit flooded in and changed the old levels of life." And this quiet evangelism dominates, not only this book, but most of Dr. Jones's writings, for, although his "fundamental conception of mysticism has profoundly altered" since he began his work half a century ago, he is still interested in changing the hearts of men and opening for them new windows to the sky's golden gate in the west. And, to us, the man whose faith softened the hearts of modern German race-mystics has a right to tell about the men and women of the Rhineland during the fourteenth century who have been the treasured companions of his dreams.

JOHN JOSEPH STOUDT

Malebranche nel terzo centenario della nascita. A cura della facoltà di filosofia dell' Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. (*Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica.* Supplemento speciale al volume XXX). Milano: Società "Vita e Pensiero," 1938. xiv + 380 pp. L.30.

The seventeen essays in this volume may be divided into two groups. Tavecchio's article on the religious motivation—an intense theocentrism—of Malebranche sets the stage for the first group which explores the results of this Augustinian attitude in the fields of ontology, theory of causation, epistemology, cosmology, the relation of reason and faith, and the relation of human liberty and divine grace. The second group is concerned with Malebranche's relations to such widely diverse themes and persons as Platonism, Cartesianism, the Enlightenment, Italian thought from Vico to Rosmini, Montaigne, Pascal and Hume. The first group, marked by clarity and niceness, seems in general superior to the second, which is marred by a certain vagueness.

But such a division is rather artificial, for the entire book is devoted to a critique of the "Augustinian-Bonaventurian" tradition from the point of view of Thomism, which, given Malebranche as the subject and the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart as the sponsor, is rather to be expected. Many of the resulting fine points of dialectical criticism are well taken, but the approach does lead the authors into a good amount of arid historical formalism, and the reader into a feeling that much of what he reads is an oft-told tale.

The book may be approached in another way, more suggestive to one interested in religion as a *modus vivendi*, rather than a theological system.

Disregarding the historical aspect of the distinction between men who write and men who are written about, we may consider these essays as representing two opponent views as to the nature of man. Malebranche, "obsessed by the consequences of original sin," appraised the natural man even lower than did Hobbes. The natural man cannot know, love, or act. However laudable Malebranche's motive, his "holy dread that men would attach themselves to creatures rather than to the Creator," may have been for this act of dispraise, it is difficult to see how such a pessimistic view of human nature can form the basis for an effective religious life. Shun this world, it seems to imply, and fix your vision upon God alone. Such an attitude is all too likely to lead to the figure of Simeon Stylites as the model of human excellence.

Opposed to this view is the intellectually paradoxical, but practically and emotionally efficacious view of Aristotelianism as re-orientated by Aquinas. Offering to the natural man definite possibilities for knowledge, love and action, yet carefully retaining the pessimism implied by the doctrine of original sin; ascribing to the material world reality, yet putting that reality in its proper secondary place by a doctrine of creation, Thomistic humanism presents us with the effective paradox of a sacramental religion. It is a paradox because the human mind insists upon, for instance, "either God or man," while sacramentalism insists upon "both God and man." It is effective because men are not minds, and what in sacramentalism presents itself to the intellect as an annoying paradox presents itself to man as an assurance that he can achieve some measure of good by working with the materials at hand, and as a warning that it is a difficult task in which he is going to need outside help.

Malebranche would have done well, certainly, to listen more carefully to his opponents; but they also, at least as represented by the authors of these essays, would have done well to realize that the value of dialectical criticism, carried on within the bounds of a historical system of philosophy, is decidedly limited.

MARCUS B. MALLETT

Environmental Factors in Christian History. Edited by JOHN T. McNEILL, MATTHEW SPINKA AND HAROLD WILLOUGHBY. University of Chicago Press, 1939. x + 417 pp. $4.00.

Of all the unecessary books published in these days in which printing and thinking have long foregone their proper relationship, I suppose *Festschriften* hold the foremost rank. They comprise essays whose chief merit lies in the fact that they are confined to less than twenty pages, and whose chief defect is that the really significant papers are buried amid a morass of writing that contributes neither to learning nor to literature. The present volume is no exception to this general rule. It contains essays dedicated to Dr. Shirely Jackson Case, whose "constructive" and "significant" contribution to theological learning and American education are dealt with in

an opening note. We then wend our way through twenty-one papers that traverse the range of Church History from the general point of view of the cultural influences that have played upon it. Fully half of the essays add nothing to our knowledge or understanding, and are too technically written to be valuable as popular surveys.

There are, however, some papers of outstanding merit, as, for instance, McNeill's keen and judicious treatment of "The Feudalization of the Church" (pp. 187 ff.), where he deals with the problems of the *ecclesia privata*, the *mensa episcopalis*, and the monastic *advocatus*. Spinka contributes a learned paper on "The Effect of the Crusades upon Eastern Christianity" (pp. 252 ff.). Though somewhat overburdened with detail, it is well worthy of attention. Pauck has made a brave defense of Luther in his "Nationalism and European Christianity." Other essays, such as Lyttle's, on "The Religion of Early Freemasonry," Haydon's, on "The Influence of Medieval Judaism on Christianity," and McKeon's, on "Aristotelianism in Western Christianity," are fresh and readable. The sections on the early Church, however, are less significant—an unhappy feature of the book, seeing that Dr. Case wrote so extensively in that field.

C. C. R.

The Art of Conducting Public Worship. By ALBERT W. PALMER. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939. 211 pp. $2.50.

The Reformation was necessary. But it brought one dire evil in its train: so bitter was the controversy that both Catholics and Protestants exaggerated to the utmost every point of difference, rejecting with horror the suggestion that wide reaches of possible agreement still remained. Today, however, both Churches are seeking to restore precious values needlessly discarded; above all in the sphere of worship. On the Roman Catholic side the Liturgical Movement is attacking petty and tawdry accretions; on the Protestant side the sermon is no longer regarded as the whole purpose of a Sunday service. Visually this partial reconciliation is manifest in the changes taking place in church architecture and arrangement. The Roman Catholic periodical, *Liturgical Arts*, has been publishing a series of "before" and "after" pictures of liturgical remodelling, and in the present volume President Palmer publishes similar pictures of Protestant churches; while in the "before" stage the Catholic and Protestant interiors had almost nothing in common, in the "after" stage they are almost indistinguishable.

President Palmer makes a particular contribution to this quest for lost values in his wise and understanding book. No pell-mell Catholicizing is advocated, for Protestantism has values of priceless worth. So his advocacy of liturgical forms does not involve a plea for a fixed liturgy; free worship demands flexibility according to the occasion and wide variety over any space of time. None the less there is no reason why a free liturgy should not be framed to have the unity of an art-form, taking the theme of the sermon and repeating it in the readings, hymns and prayers. To create such

liturgies will, no doubt, mean labor for the clergy—but labor that will be infinitely repaid.

BURTON SCOTT EASTON

The Sum of Things. By SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1939. 150 pp. $1.90.

Happiness is the theme of this mellow little book—"not Power, nor even Wisdom, but just Happiness, the last end as well as the original begetter of Love." But it is not a superficial, Pollyanna type of happiness of which Sir Francis speaks, but rather, the final peace and contentment which come to a man toward the end of his life when he looks back on a fight well fought, and a work well done; and even more,—a lifelong search well ended. For, it is the story of a lifelong search after spiritual truth which is told here. The two chief forces which molded his spiritual development were science and the Oriental religions, with which he came in contact in his long years of travel in the service of the British Government. The former served to stretch his conception of the universe far beyond the confines of Christian orthodoxy; the latter gave him a religious philosophy adequate to deal with cosmic immensities. But it was, of course, his own natural bent for mysticism which produced that synthesis which he sets forth here with such simplicity and warmth. M. B.

What Use Is Religion? By ELMORE MCKEE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939. viii + 260 pp. $2.00.

There can be no doubt of the usefulness of this book; but that it will be convincing to thoroughgoing skeptics, for whom it is written, is unlikely. It is a modern and liberal apologetic treatise which will prove helpful to those doubters within Christianity who are confused by the tensions between inherited beliefs and intelligent modernism.

These brief chapters are in sermonic style, and have at the same time the quality of essays. They deal with the major aspects of theology: religion, God, morality, the soul, sin, Jesus, the cross, prayer, the Bible, the church, and immortality. They are suggestive and richly rewarding, but obviously are not detailed. Frequently, they are not entirely convincing.

The answers often seem too easy. The record of the church in social affairs is covered in a single page (p. 44). The chapter on the Bible is based on Henry K. Booth's *The Background of the Bible.* "Paul," he says, "wrote his swan-song to his successor, Timothy, and was finally martyred in Rome" (p. 210). But Paul did not write Timothy.

There is a helpful bibliography, which is inclusive enough to guide readers beyond the limits of this volume. Unfortunately, while modern *English* translations of the Bible are recommended, the *American* translations of Goodspeed-Smith and Ballantine are not mentioned. There is no index.

RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER

One Generation and Another. By ROBERT RUSSELL WICKS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939. 191 pp. $1.50.

The Dean of the University Chapel at Princeton has given us a companion volume to *The Reason for Living*, and one equally useful for its positive philosophy of life. This present volume presents in a most attractive way, the Dean's philosophy of Christian marriage and the family. Fortunate is the young couple who take it as a chart for their voyage across the unknown seas of matrimony, for it is full of humane and mature wisdom.

M. B.

The Evolution of Man's Mind. By ARTHUR A. BEALE. Philadelphia: David McKay Company, 1939. 96 pp. $1.25.

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